Richard Stewart Long v. State
This text of Richard Stewart Long v. State (Richard Stewart Long v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-16-00373-CR
RICHARD STEWART LONG, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 443rd District Court Ellis County, Texas Trial Court No. 39461CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In one issue, appellant, Richard Stewart Long, contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by revoking his community supervision. Specifically, he complains that the
record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the grounds used to revoke his
community supervision. Because we conclude otherwise, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2014, Long was charged by indictment with one count of assault
family violence with a previous felony conviction for assault family violence. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2016). As part of the plea bargain with
the State, Long pleaded guilty to the charged offense. On March 16, 2015, the trial court
accepted Long’s plea of guilty, found him guilty, sentenced him to ten years’
incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
suspended the sentence, and placed him on community supervision for five years.
Approximately four months after Long’s placement on community supervision, the State
filed a motion to revoke, alleging that Long had violated four provisions of his
community supervision. Specifically, the State alleged that Long failed to: (1) report to
his supervision officer from March 2015 to July 2015; (2) pay monthly supervision fees,
as well as numerous other fees; and (3) enroll in and successfully complete a Battering
Intervention and Prevention Program.
On November 17, 2015, the trial court amended the conditions of Long’s
community supervision by requiring Long to pay $590 in court-appointed attorney’s fees,
extending the term of the supervision to seven years, ordering Long to serve forty-seven
days in the Ellis County Detention Center, and extending by ninety days the deadline to
successfully complete the Battering Intervention and Prevention Program. On July 26,
2016, the State filed its second motion to revoke Long’s community supervision. In this
Long v. State Page 2 filing, the State asserted that Long failed to: (1) report to his supervision officer from
March 2016 to July 2016; (2) pay monthly supervision fees, as well as numerous other
fees; and (3) enroll in and successfully complete a Battering Intervention and Prevention
Program.
Long pleaded “not true” to the allegations made in the State’s second motion to
revoke. However, after a hearing, the trial court concluded that the allegations made in
the State’s second motion to revoke were indeed true. Accordingly, the trial court
revoked Long’s community supervision and sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court
also certified Long’s right of appeal, and this appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
To justify revocation, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. See Hacker v.
State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “In the probation-revocation
context, ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ means ‘that the greater weight of the credible
evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a
condition of his probation.’” Id. at 865 (quoting Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764). The trial court
is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
Long v. State Page 3 testimony; thus, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. See id. Proof by a preponderance of any one alleged violation is sufficient to affirm
an order revoking community supervision and adjudicating guilt. See Smith v. State, 286
S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“We have long held that ‘one sufficient ground
for revocation would support the trial court’s order revoking’ community supervision”
(quoting Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978))); Clay
v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.); see also Nathan v. State,
No. 10-12-00432-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7511, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 20, 2013,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
III. ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, Long contends that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence demonstrating that he violated the terms and conditions of his
community supervision by failing to pay supervision and other fees, failing to report to
his supervision officer, and failing to complete the Battering Intervention and Prevention
At the hearing on the motion to revoke, the State called Jobeth Vines, a probation
officer with the Ellis County Adult Probation, as a witness. Vines testified that Long was
assigned to be supervised on March 16, 2015. According to Vines, Long never reported
for the initial orientation, and he failed to report to his supervision officer from March
through July 2016. Additionally, Vines recounted that her records do not show that Long
Long v. State Page 4 has ever completed the Battering Intervention and Prevention Program. Later, Vines
noted that Long was required to pay $60 a month in supervision fees; however, Long did
not pay any of those fees, despite receiving a $360 credit when he was released from jail.
Vines also testified that the records reflected that Long did not pay any other fees
associated with his community supervision.
Long testified on his own behalf at the hearing. He explained that he could not
report to his supervision officer from March through April 2016 because he was living in
Clifton, Texas, and did not have transportation. He further explained that he could not
report to his supervision officer from May through July 2016 because he was in jail. Later,
Long testified that he could not enroll in the Battering Intervention and Prevention
program because he lacked identification and transportation. He later admitted that he
obtained a Texas identification card and a Social Security card on January 26, 2016;
however, he still did not enroll or complete the required program even after obtaining
identification. With regard to the community-supervision fees, Long stated that he has
had trouble finding a job, though he acknowledged that he would “stand at what we call
the money tree out there in Midlothian and I would get a job for day labor.” As a result
of the day labor, Long received “80 bucks a day and that would go towards food on the
table and take care of expenses at the house” where he was living with another woman.
Long admitted that “20 bucks here, I could have paid that . . . .”
Long v. State Page 5 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State proved by a preponderance of
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