Richard H. STARR, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee

981 F.2d 1006, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33970, 1992 WL 385896
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedDecember 31, 1992
Docket92-1697
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 981 F.2d 1006 (Richard H. STARR, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard H. STARR, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee, 981 F.2d 1006, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33970, 1992 WL 385896 (8th Cir. 1992).

Opinion

*1007 LAY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Richard Starr appeals the judgment of the district court 1 affirming the Secretary’s denial of social security disability benefits. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Richard Starr is a 57-year-old resident of Rapid City, South Dakota. He has an eighth grade education and has spent most of his life as a manual laborer. Starr worked many years as an equipment operator for the City of Rapid City and later operated his own septic truck. In the early 1980’s, Starr developed breathing problems. Starr also complained of back problems, arthritis and gout.

Starr claims permanent disability due to shortness of breath, arthritis and gout since July 2, 1986. Starr was examined by Dr. Alvin Wessel on March 17, 1988. The results of the pulmonary function studies indicated that Starr had progressive chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD). The Secretary of Health and Human Services denied Starr’s application for benefits. An administrative hearing was held on January 31, 1990. The AU determined that Starr had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since July 2, 1986. He found, however, that although Starr could not return to his prior work as a truck driver, he could have engaged in a significant number of “light occupations” in the national economy prior to March 17, 1988. Starr was awarded benefits based upon his onset of disability on March 17, 1988. The district court found substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the Secretary’s decision. Starr now appeals claiming that his benefits should have commenced as of July 2, 1986.

II. DISCUSSION

The question before this Court is whether the claimant was disabled within the meaning of the Act, prior to March 17, 1988.

Starr argues that the AU erred in determining that he retained residual capacity to engage in light work prior to March 17, 1988. He claims that there was not substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support this finding. The Secretary has defined light work as follows:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.

20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) (1991). Starr argues that there was no affirmative evidence in the record, either testimonial or documentary, that he was capable of performing any of these activities. Indeed, he argues that the only evidence submitted on these issues was his direct testimony and that of his wife, which demonstrated that he could not engage in light work. The claimant asserts that this testimony established that his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, his degenerative arthritis and gout, severe back injury and resultant pain, and alcoholism all combined to severely limit his ability to perform work-related functions prior to March 1988. 2

We agree with the district court that substantial evidence exists to support the AU’s finding that the claimant could perform some type of light work in the national economy prior to March 17, 1988. With regard to the claimant’s breathing problems, a 1986 pulmonary test taken at Ft. Mead Hospital indicated that Starr had only mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, as compared to his March 1988 *1008 test, which indicated the pulmonary problems were much worse. The claimant’s own testimony indicated that he had responded positively to a bronchodilator in 1986, but did not find relief from the same treatment in 1988. Starr in fact had not sought any additional treatment for his alleged disabling lung condition in the two years between his examination in July 1986 and the examination in March 17, 1988 when the condition was diagnosed as progressive.

Substantial evidence in the record also supports the AU’s finding that the claimant’s pain associated with back and gout problems were not debilitating. The record contains no medical evidence of treatment for either of these problems prior to 1988. At the time of Dr. Wessel’s examination in March 1988, Starr had good muscle tone, was able to walk unaided, had good range of motion, and showed no signs of suffering from rheumatoid arthritis.

Starr argues that the district court erred by improperly discounting his subjective complaints of pain in violation of the principles set forth in Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1984). However, subjective complaints may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. Id.; Conley v. Bowen, 781 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir.1986). We conclude that the AU properly considered Starr’s subjective complaints of pain under Polaski, finding that his testimony and that of his wife was “not fully credible to the extent [plaintiff] allege[d] disability prior to March 17, 1988.” The AU did not rely solely on the lack of medical evidence. He noted, for example, that Starr was only using aspirin at that time for pain relief which is not indicative of someone who is in severe disabling pain. The AU also noted that Starr worked in 1987. 3

We conclude that the AU was also correct in finding the record “devoid of any reference to the disabling effects of Plaintiff’s alcoholism.” The mere presence of alcoholism is not necessarily disabling. See Metcalf v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 793 (8th Cir.1986). In Adams v. Weinberger, 548 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.1977), we noted that in order to establish a disability predicated on alcoholism, the claimant must show: 1) that he has lost self control to the point of being “impotent to seek and use means of rehabilitation,” and 2) that his disability is encompassed by the Act. Id. at 245. Although Starr may have had a drinking problem in the past, there was no medical or psychological evidence of alcoholism so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity. See, e.g., Lubrinski v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir.1991).

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981 F.2d 1006, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33970, 1992 WL 385896, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-h-starr-appellant-v-louis-w-sullivan-secretary-of-health-and-ca8-1992.