McDade v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

• Court: District Court, W.D. Arkansas
• Decided: November 9, 2017
• Docket: 6:16-cv-06097
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HOT SPRINGS DIVISION ROYCE GLEN MCDADE PLAINTIFF vs. Civil No. 6:16-cv-06097 NANCY BERRYHILL DEFENDANT Commissioner, Social Security Administration MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce Glen McDade (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 9.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background: Plaintiff’s applications for DIB and SSI were filed on August 1, 2013. (Tr. 68, 256-265). Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to his neck, back, a brain injury and heart problems. (Tr. 290). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of September 29, 2007 which was later amended to October 3, 2009.

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF. No.___” The transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” 1 (Tr. 68). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 194-209). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his applications and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 213). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on November 6, 2014. (Tr. 90-118). Plaintiff was present and was represented by attorney, Hans Pullen, at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Stefanie Ford testified at this hearing. Id. At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was

forty-four (44) years old and had a high school education. (Tr. 95-96). On June 26, 2015, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for DIB and SSI. (Tr. 68-85). In this decision, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2010. (Tr. 71, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since September 29, 2007, his alleged onset date. (Tr. 71, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of history of coronary artery disease with intermittent angina pectoris, left ventricular systolic dysfunction, aortic stenosis, dyslipidemia, diabetes mellitus, obesity, hypertension, degenerative joint disease, and disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. (Tr. 71, Finding 3). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 71, Finding 4). In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 72-83). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC for sedentary work with restrictions including being able to stand and walk for no more than two hours out of an 8-hour workday; could never crouch, stoop, or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; 2 could occasionally balance, kneel, or crawl; could not be exposed to temperature extremes of heat or cold, unprotected heights, or fumes, odors, or gases; limited to work where the complexity of one to two step tasks was learned and performed by rote with few variables requiring little judgment; and supervision required would be simple, direct, and concrete, with the work comprised of Specific Vocational Preparation (SPV)-1 or SVP-2 jobs that could be learned in 30 days. Id. The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 83, Finding 6). The ALJ

found Plaintiff was unable to perform his PRW. Id. The ALJ, however, also determined there was other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 367-369). The ALJ based this determination upon the testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically, the VE testified that given all Plaintiff's vocational factors, a hypothetical individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as table worker with 33,100 such jobs in the nation and sticker/labeler with 7,000 such jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act from September 29, 2007, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 85, Finding 11). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 64). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable decision. (Tr. 1-5).

On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 1, 2016. ECF No. 9. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 12, 13. This case is now ready for decision. 2. Applicable Law: In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than 3 a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that

his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment 4 listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this

analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003). 3. Discussion: Plaintiff brings the present appeal claiming the ALJ erred: (A) by failing to find Plaintiff met a Listing, (B) in failing assess his need for heart surgery in combination with other impairments, and (C) in the RFC determination. ECF No. 12, Pgs. 10-19. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 13. A. Listings The ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff has a severe impairment that significantly limits the physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. A medically determinable impairment

or combination of impairments is severe if it significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 and 416.921. The ALJ found Plaintiff did suffer from impairments considered to be severe within the meaning of the Social Security regulations. These impairments included history of coronary artery disease with intermittent angina pectoris, left ventricular systolic dysfunction, aortic stenosis, dyslipidemia, diabetes mellitus, obesity, hypertension, degenerative joint disease, and disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. (Tr. 71, Finding 3). However, there was no substantial evidence

5 in the record showing Plaintiff’s condition was severe enough to meet or equal that of a listed impairment as set forth in the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that his impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment set out in the Listing of Impairments. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990). Plaintiff has not met this burden.

Plaintiff argues he meets a Listing under Section 1.02 for major dysfunction of a joint and 11.14 for peripheral neuropathy. ECF No. 12, Pg. 10. Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to establish he meets theses Listings. ECF No. 13. Impairments found under Listing 1.02 for major joint dysfunction requires evidence of: major dysfunction of a joint characterized by gross anatomical deformity (e.g., subluxation, contracture, bony, or fibrous ankylosis, instability) and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of the affected joint, and findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint, with involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e. hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in an inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b or involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity (i.e., shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively, as defined in 1.00B2c. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.02. An “inability to ambulate effectively” is an extreme limitation of the ability to walk, i.e., an impairment that interferes very seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is having insufficient lower extremity functioning to permit independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits the functioning of both upper extremities. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2b(1). To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daily living, and they must be able 6 to travel without companion assistance to and from a place of employment or school. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2b(2). Examples of ineffective ambulation include, but are not limited to, the inability to walk without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, the inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking,

and the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single hand rail. Id. In this matter, Plaintiff has failed to establish he is unable to ambulate effectively. Plaintiff has no medical record evidence he has to use a walker, two crutches, or two canes to walk, or that a physician prescribed these items. Further, Plaintiff presented no diagnostic medical evidence showing he has a major dysfunction of a joint characterized by gross anatomical deformity, and findings on medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joints. An “inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively” means an extreme loss of

function of both upper extremities; i.e., an impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the individual's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. To use their upper extremities effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining such functions as reaching, pushing, pulling, grasping, and fingering to be able to carry out activities of daily living. Examples of inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively include, but are not limited to, the inability to prepare a simple meal and feed oneself, the inability to take care of personal hygiene, the inability to sort and handle papers or files, and the inability to place files in a file cabinet at or above

waist level. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2c. There is no credible evidence showing Plaintiff is prohibited from ambulating effectively with a major peripheral joint in each upper extremity resulting in inability to perform fine and gross 7 movements effectively. Plaintiff also argues he meets Listing 11.14 for peripheral neuropathy. However, Plaintiff did not show he met Listing 11.14. The records relied on by Plaintiff fail to provide any evidence showing Plaintiff meets the criteria of a Listing under Section 11.14. In order to meet Listing 11.14, Plaintiff must have peripheral neuropathies “with

disorganization of motor function as described in 11.04B, in spite of prescribed treatment.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 11.14. Listing 11.04B requires “significant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station” Id. §11.04B. “Persistent disorganization of motor function in the form of paresis or paralysis, tremor or other involuntary movements, ataxia and sensory disturbances (any or all of which may be due to cerebral, cerebellar, brain stem, spinal cord, or peripheral nerve dysfunction) which occur singly or in various combinations, frequently provides the sole or partial basis for decision in cases of neurological impairment. The assessment of

impairment depends on the degree of interference with locomotion and/or interference with the use of fingers, hands, and arms.” Id. § 11.00C. Whether Plaintiff meets a listed impairment is a medical determination and must be established by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c), 404.1526(b), 416.925(c), 416.926(b). Plaintiff has not met this burden. I find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1.

B. Combination of Impairments Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to consider his need for heart surgery in combination with his other impairments. However, under the facts in the present case and after a thorough review 8 of the ALJ’s opinion and the record in this case, this Court finds the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. The Social Security Act requires the ALJ to consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2006). In the present action, in reviewing

these claimed impairments, the ALJ stated Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Tr. 71, Finding 4) (emphasis added). The ALJ also found, “after consideration of the entire record,” the Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with some limitations. (Tr. 72, Finding 5). The ALJ went on to state Plaintiff’s RFC would not preclude him from performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 84, Finding 10). These statements are sufficient under Eighth Circuit precedent to establish that the ALJ

properly considered the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments. See Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that statements such as “the evidence as a whole does not show that the claimant’s symptoms . . . preclude his past work as a janitor” and “[t]he claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from performing janitorial work . . .” sufficiently establish that the ALJ properly considered the combined effects of the plaintiff’s impairments). Thus, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Hajek, this Court finds the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. Plaintiff has alleged he suffers from a number

of impairments. However, this Court is not required to find a claimant is disabled simply because he or she has alleged a long list of medical problems. The ALJ’s opinion sufficiently indicates the ALJ properly considered the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments, and the ALJ properly 9 considered the severity of the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments. See Hajek, 30 F.3d at 92. C. RFC Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC determination must be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See

Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should consider “‘all the evidence in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). The Plaintiff has the burden of producing documents and evidence to support his or her claimed RFC. See Cox, 160 F.3d at1206; 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The ALJ, however, bears the primary responsibility for making the RFC determination and for ensuring there is “some medical evidence” regarding the claimant’s “ability to function in the

workplace” that supports the RFC determination. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination if that determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000). In this matter, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC for sedentary work with restrictions including being able to stand and walk for no more than two hours out of an 8-hour workday; could never crouch, stoop, or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; could occasionally balance,

kneel, or crawl; could not be exposed to temperature extremes of heat or cold, unprotected heights, or fumes, odors, or gases; limited to work where the complexity of one to two step tasks was learned and performed by rote with few variables requiring little judgment; and supervision required would 10 or SVP-2 jobs that could be learned in 30 days. (Tr. 72, Finding 5). Substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s RFC determination. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in this RFC determination because the ALJ failed to consider a sit/stand option. ECF No. 12, Pgs. 17-18. However, Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. To begin with, Plaintiff fails to refer to any evidence to establish a sit/stand option is needed. Although, Plaintiff testified he occasionally used assistive devices for walking; these were not prescribed by an acceptable medical source and the records do not establish a medical necessity. Plaintiff also argues the ALJ’s hypothetical questions did not adequately depict Plaintiff’s

condition. At Step Five of a disability determination, the SSA has the burden of establishing that a claimant retains the ability to perform other work in the economy. See Snead v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 838, 836 (8th Cir. 2004). The SSA may meet this burden by either applying the Grids or by relying upon the testimony of a VE. See Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 621 (8th Cir. 2004). In this matter, the ALJ had responses from a VE regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform work in the national economy. It is generally accepted that VE testimony, in response to a hypothetical question, is substantial evidence if the hypothetical sets forth the credible impairments with reasonable precision. See Starr v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992). It has further been

established the ALJ must only include in the hypothetical those impairments which the ALJ actually finds credible, and not those which he rejects, assuming his findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1993). The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with limitations. (Tr. 72, Finding 5). In response to a hypothetical question containing these limitations, the VE provided answers that work existed in the national economy consistent with the limitations found by the ALJ. 11 (Tr. 367-369). The ALJ found a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 84, Finding 10). Relying on the VE testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Act. (Tr. 85). The ALJ's hypothetical question properly set forth those limitations the ALJ found credible and which are supported by the evidence of record. The VE stated jobs existed in both the national and regional economy for the vocational profile of the Plaintiff. Such testimony, based on a hypothetical question consistent with the record, provided substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing his claimed RFC. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff has not met his burden in this case and because the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by sufficient medical evidence, this Court finds the ALJ’s RFC determination should be affirmed. 4. Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58. ENTERED this 9th day of November 2017. /s/__ Barry A. Bryant HON. BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE