Richard Dykstra Julia Dykstra v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Ninth Circuit

Richard Dykstra Julia Dykstra v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

260 F.3d 1181, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16643, 2001 WL 881115

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 25, 2001

Docket00-70011

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 260 F.3d 1181 (Richard Dykstra Julia Dykstra v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Richard Dykstra Julia Dykstra v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 260 F.3d 1181, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16643, 2001 WL 881115 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Richard and Julia Dykstra appeal pro se a decision of the Tax Court denying their petition challenging a deficiency of $224 for the 1996 tax year. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. We review de novo the Tax Court’s interpretation of Treasury Regulations, see Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 997 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). We affirm.

The Dykstras challenge Treasury Regulation 1.79-3. We have reviewed the enabling statute, 26 U.S.C. § 79(c), the statute’s legislative history, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 88-1149 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1940, 1958-60, and the comments concerning the drafting of the regulation, T.D. 7924, 1984-1 C.B. 23-24. We agree with the Tax Court’s determination that the regulation was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the intention of its enabling statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Redlark v. Comm’r, 141 F.3d 936, 939-40 (9th Cir.1998).

With respect to the Dykstras’ argument that the Tax Court violated their procedural rights in its handling of their case, there is nothing in the record to substantiate their contentions. See Sacks v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1996); Sherman v. United States, 801 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1986).

AFFIRMED.

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OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Richard and Julia Dykstra appeal pro se a decision of the Tax Court denying their petition challenging a deficiency of $224 for the 1996 tax year. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. We review de novo the Tax Court’s interpretation of Treasury Regulations, see Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 997 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). We affirm.

The Dykstras challenge Treasury Regulation 1.79-3. We have reviewed the enabling statute, 26 U.S.C. § 79(c), the statute’s legislative history, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 88-1149 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1940, 1958-60, and the comments concerning the drafting of the regulation, T.D. 7924, 1984-1 C.B. 23-24. We agree with the Tax Court’s determination that the regulation was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the intention of its enabling statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Redlark v. Comm’r, 141 F.3d 936, 939-40 (9th Cir.1998).

With respect to the Dykstras’ argument that the Tax Court violated their procedural rights in its handling of their case, there is nothing in the record to substantiate their contentions. See Sacks v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1996); Sherman v. United States, 801 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1986).

AFFIRMED.

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260 F.3d 1181, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16643, 2001 WL 881115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-dykstra-julia-dykstra-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca9-2001.

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