Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 358 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-22-700
Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023
RICHARD BLOCK APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 22CR-21-155]
HONORABLE CREWS PURYEAR, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Richard Wayne Block appeals after he was convicted by a Drew County
Circuit Court jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender to serve 180 months’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency
of his conviction. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
Appellant was charged by criminal information with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, a Class D felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103(a)(1)
(Supp. 2021). The State further stated that appellant’s sentence should be increased as a
habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(b) (Supp. 2021) for
having been previously convicted of four or more felonies. A jury trial was held on April 12,
2022. Appellant stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction, and the jury was instructed
regarding the stipulation at trial. The State introduced the testimony of Officer Shawn
Curtis, employed by the Monticello Police Department. Officer Curtis testified that while
he was on patrol on June 3, 2021, at 1:15 a.m., a silver SUV pulled out in front of him and
accelerated. He checked the license plate and learned that the vehicle owner’s driver’s license
had been suspended, so he made a traffic stop of the vehicle. It is undisputed that appellant
was driving the vehicle and was the sole occupant of the vehicle; however, he did not own
the vehicle. Officer Curtis testified that as a result of the stop, appellant was taken into
custody, and an inventory search was conducted.1 The search yielded a box of .38 Special
ammunition found “kind of stuffed up underneath the [driver’s] seat on the floorboard” and
a loaded .38 Special revolver found in the glove box. Officer Curtis testified that the box of
ammunition was “not completely” in plain view but that he could see the “edge” of the box.
Officer Curtis admitted that the items were not tested for DNA or fingerprints. A
photograph from Officer Curtis’s body-cam video showed that the revolver was loaded.
Amanda Rowland testified that she was in a relationship with appellant at the time
of the traffic stop and that she owned the vehicle. She testified that appellant had a key to
the vehicle and had her permission to use it. Rowland admitted that she had previously said
1 Appellant did not challenge the traffic stop or his arrest. In a pretrial conference, appellant admitted that he was driving on a suspended license and that he was lawfully taken into custody because he had an active warrant for his arrest. Therefore, the parties stipulated that the details regarding why appellant was taken into custody did not need to be given to the jury, and Officer Curtis was instructed not to mention the active warrant during his testimony.
2 that the firearm was hers because she was scared and was trying to cover for appellant, who
was not supposed to have a firearm. However, at trial, she testified that she retracted that
prior statement, and she testified that the ammunition and firearm were not hers, she did
not put the firearm in the truck that morning, and she had not seen the firearm before.
After the State rested, appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the “State
has failed to prove beyond speculation and conjecture that my client possessed the firearm
– either actual, per the definition – they’ve failed to prove actual sovereignty, control or
management.” The circuit court denied the motion, and appellant then rested without
introducing any further evidence. Appellant renewed his motion for directed verdict, which
the circuit court also denied. The jury found appellant guilty, and he was sentenced as a
habitual offender to serve 180 months’ incarceration. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency
challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only
the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if
substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of
sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one
way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence
may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s
guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35,
3 617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to
decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the
trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions
of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.
This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom
apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose,
being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be
shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because
intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common
knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty
in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
No person who has been convicted of a felony shall possess or own any firearm. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-73-103(a)(1). On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support the verdict on the element of possession. He specifically argues that the State
failed to prove that he “owned” the firearm, and there was no proof that he “possessed the
firearm absent conjecture or speculation.” He explains that he did not own the vehicle and
that there were no linking factors that tied him to the firearm, such as his exhibiting
suspicious behavior, the firearm being in plain view or on his side of the vehicle, the firearm
being found among his belongings, or DNA or fingerprint analysis. Instead, appellant points
4 to Rowland’s prior statement that the firearm was hers and explains that “her prior statement
adds to the questionable nature of the evidence as to the owner and possessor of the firearm.”
The supreme court has stated that it is not necessary for the State to prove that an
accused physically held the contraband because possession of contraband can be proved by
constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband. Pokatilov v.
State, 2017 Ark. 264, 526 S.W.3d 849. Constructive possession can be inferred where the
contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and
subject to his control. Polk v.
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Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 358 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-22-700
Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023
RICHARD BLOCK APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 22CR-21-155]
HONORABLE CREWS PURYEAR, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Richard Wayne Block appeals after he was convicted by a Drew County
Circuit Court jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender to serve 180 months’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency
of his conviction. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
Appellant was charged by criminal information with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, a Class D felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103(a)(1)
(Supp. 2021). The State further stated that appellant’s sentence should be increased as a
habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(b) (Supp. 2021) for
having been previously convicted of four or more felonies. A jury trial was held on April 12,
2022. Appellant stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction, and the jury was instructed
regarding the stipulation at trial. The State introduced the testimony of Officer Shawn
Curtis, employed by the Monticello Police Department. Officer Curtis testified that while
he was on patrol on June 3, 2021, at 1:15 a.m., a silver SUV pulled out in front of him and
accelerated. He checked the license plate and learned that the vehicle owner’s driver’s license
had been suspended, so he made a traffic stop of the vehicle. It is undisputed that appellant
was driving the vehicle and was the sole occupant of the vehicle; however, he did not own
the vehicle. Officer Curtis testified that as a result of the stop, appellant was taken into
custody, and an inventory search was conducted.1 The search yielded a box of .38 Special
ammunition found “kind of stuffed up underneath the [driver’s] seat on the floorboard” and
a loaded .38 Special revolver found in the glove box. Officer Curtis testified that the box of
ammunition was “not completely” in plain view but that he could see the “edge” of the box.
Officer Curtis admitted that the items were not tested for DNA or fingerprints. A
photograph from Officer Curtis’s body-cam video showed that the revolver was loaded.
Amanda Rowland testified that she was in a relationship with appellant at the time
of the traffic stop and that she owned the vehicle. She testified that appellant had a key to
the vehicle and had her permission to use it. Rowland admitted that she had previously said
1 Appellant did not challenge the traffic stop or his arrest. In a pretrial conference, appellant admitted that he was driving on a suspended license and that he was lawfully taken into custody because he had an active warrant for his arrest. Therefore, the parties stipulated that the details regarding why appellant was taken into custody did not need to be given to the jury, and Officer Curtis was instructed not to mention the active warrant during his testimony.
2 that the firearm was hers because she was scared and was trying to cover for appellant, who
was not supposed to have a firearm. However, at trial, she testified that she retracted that
prior statement, and she testified that the ammunition and firearm were not hers, she did
not put the firearm in the truck that morning, and she had not seen the firearm before.
After the State rested, appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the “State
has failed to prove beyond speculation and conjecture that my client possessed the firearm
– either actual, per the definition – they’ve failed to prove actual sovereignty, control or
management.” The circuit court denied the motion, and appellant then rested without
introducing any further evidence. Appellant renewed his motion for directed verdict, which
the circuit court also denied. The jury found appellant guilty, and he was sentenced as a
habitual offender to serve 180 months’ incarceration. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency
challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only
the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if
substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of
sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one
way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence
may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s
guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35,
3 617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to
decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the
trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions
of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.
This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom
apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose,
being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be
shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because
intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common
knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty
in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
No person who has been convicted of a felony shall possess or own any firearm. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-73-103(a)(1). On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support the verdict on the element of possession. He specifically argues that the State
failed to prove that he “owned” the firearm, and there was no proof that he “possessed the
firearm absent conjecture or speculation.” He explains that he did not own the vehicle and
that there were no linking factors that tied him to the firearm, such as his exhibiting
suspicious behavior, the firearm being in plain view or on his side of the vehicle, the firearm
being found among his belongings, or DNA or fingerprint analysis. Instead, appellant points
4 to Rowland’s prior statement that the firearm was hers and explains that “her prior statement
adds to the questionable nature of the evidence as to the owner and possessor of the firearm.”
The supreme court has stated that it is not necessary for the State to prove that an
accused physically held the contraband because possession of contraband can be proved by
constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband. Pokatilov v.
State, 2017 Ark. 264, 526 S.W.3d 849. Constructive possession can be inferred where the
contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and
subject to his control. Polk v. State, 348 Ark. 446, 73 S.W.3d 609 (2002). In cases involving
joint occupancy of the premises where contraband is found, some additional factors must be
present linking the accused to the contraband. Pokatilov, supra; see also Lewis v. State, 2023
Ark. 12; Lambert v. State, 2017 Ark. 31, 509 S.W.3d 637. In such cases, the State must prove
two elements: (1) that the accused exercised care, control, or management over the
contraband; and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Carter v.
State, 2010 Ark. 293, 367 S.W.3d 544. This control and knowledge can be inferred from
the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to the accused, the fact that it is
in plain view, and the ownership of the property where the contraband is found. Id. In
addition, the supreme court has held that an accused’s suspicious behavior coupled with
proximity to the contraband is clearly indicative of possession. Id.
Although much of appellant’s argument centers on his contention that there was an
absence of additional linking factors, a single occupant in a borrowed car or a car owned by
another is only subject to the general inquiry for constructive possession; the State need only
5 prove constructive possession of the contraband without including any inquiry into the
elements for joint occupancy. Polk, 348 Ark. 446, 73 S.W.3d 609; Cain v. State, 2020 Ark.
App. 465, 609 S.W.3d 680; Bens v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 6, 593 S.W.3d 495; Jones v. State,
2010 Ark. App. 775. As such, constructive possession can be inferred here where the
contraband was found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and
subject to his control. Bens, supra.
Appellant was the driver and sole occupant of a vehicle that he borrowed from
Rowland. Officer Curtis testified that he found a box of .38 Special ammunition “kind of
stuffed up underneath the [driver’s] seat on the floorboard” and a loaded .38 Special revolver
in the glove box, which were immediately and exclusively accessible to appellant. Further,
Officer Curtis testified that he could see the “edge” of the box of ammunition in plain view,
and the ammunition in the box was the same type of ammunition used in the firearm.
Moreover, Rowland admitted at trial that she owned the vehicle; however, she testified that
neither the ammunition nor the firearm was hers, she did not put the firearm in the vehicle
that morning, and she had not seen the firearm before. Although appellant questions
Rowland’s credibility because she admittedly made a prior contradictory statement, witness
credibility is an issue for the jury, which is free to believe all or a portion of any witness’s
testimony and whose duty it is to resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent
evidence. Robinson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 689, 537 S.W.3d 765. Accordingly, we hold that
substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict and affirm appellant’s conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm.
6 Affirmed.
GLADWIN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Short Law Firm, by: Lee D. Short, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.