Richard and Deloris Bowles v. Blue Lake Development Corporation, Blue Lake Mobile Home Ranch, Inc., and Rapee Realty Company, Inc.
This text of 504 F.2d 1094 (Richard and Deloris Bowles v. Blue Lake Development Corporation, Blue Lake Mobile Home Ranch, Inc., and Rapee Realty Company, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This appeal was taken from a final judgment and permanent injunction issued by the district court, enjoining appellants from bringing state court actions for eviction against the plaintiffs-appellees, seventeen tenants of appellants’ trailer park. The complaint alleged that all of the plaintiffs had received Notices to Quit 1 their rented lots sent out by appellants’s agents. The complaint alleged further that appellants operated their mobile home park in violation of various county and state zoning, health and safety codes, and that appellees had complained of conditions and violations in the trailer park to various governmental agencies, and additionally that many or all the appellees had picketed the mobile home park, exhibiting signs setting forth their grievances.
Temporary and permanent injunctions were granted because of a showing satisfactory to the trial judge that the threatened evictions were undertaken in retaliation for the conduct of the plaintiffs-appellees in exercising their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This appeal, taken April 19, 1971, followed entry of the Final Judgment and denial of motions for new trial and for amendment of the Final Judgment.
The principal and related issues on the appeal were whether proof of retaliation is a valid defense to eviction proceedings in Florida courts, and whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin prospective state court eviction proceedings under the teachings of the Younger v. Harris sextet of decisions 2 of the Supreme Court.
Some time after oral argument of the appeal before another panel of this court in March 1972, the Supreme Court granted its writ of certiorari to review this court’s decision in Becker v. Thompson, 3 459 F.2d 919, wherein we undertook to interpret and apply the Younger v. Harris decision. The grant of the writ prompted the original panel to notify counsel that decision of this appeal would be withheld pending the Supreme Court’s action in Steffel v. Thompson. That decision, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, reversed and remanded our decision in Becker v. Thompson.
Thereafter this appeal was recalen-dared for oral argument and argued upon supplemental briefs before this panel. We learn from the supplemental briefs of the parties that while these proceedings were thus held in abeyance, the Florida Legislature passed legislation which had the effect, in our judgment, of mooting the issues on this appeal.
*1096 In 1973, the Florida Legislature enacted Secs. 83.69 4 and 83.60 5 of the Florida Statutes.
Sec. 83.69 severely limits the grounds upon which the owner of a mobile home park may evict tenants. Had this section been in effect when the injunction was issued by the trial court in 1971, the injunction would have been unnecessary. The appellant landlords could not have proceeded to evict the tenant appel-lees in the absence of a violation of an ordinance or rule of the park or for non-payment of rent. Retaliatory eviction because of the tenants informing governmental agencies as to deficiencies *1097 in the trailer park could not have taken place.
F.S. 83.60 clarifies the Florida law by providing that in an action for possession of premises, the tenant “may raise any other defense, whether legal or equitable, that he may have.” This determines the issue raised in the original briefs as to whether or not a defense of retaliatory eviction may be raised in a Florida summary possession suit. Clearly, it may.
Additionally, during its 1974 session, the Florida Legislature also adopted F.S. 83.695, 6 which provides that no tenancy may be enforceable or terminated by a landlord of a mobile home park unless prior to the occupancy the tenant has been offered a bona fide lease. Absent such a written lease, tenancy may be terminated only in accordance with F.S. 83.69 [Note 4; supra] for non-payment of rent or violation of ordinances or park regulations.
F.S. 83.695(3) limits enforceable regulations to those reasonable under the circumstances, giving additional protection to the tenant by making reasonableness of regulations a fact issue triable before the court or jury trying the pos-sessory action.
Finally the parties agree that retaliatory eviction is now a criminal offense under Florida law. It is declared to be an unfair or deceptive practice under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, effective October 1, 1973, F.S. Sec. 501.201 et seq. Sec. 501.204 makes unfair trade practices unlawful. Rule 2-11.07, Rules of the Florida Department of Legal Affairs [authorized under Sec. 501.205(1)] declares retaliatory eviction to be an unfair trade practice. The threat of criminal sanction is an added and effective deterrent to these appellants or any other landlords’ engaging in such practices in the future.
*1098 We do not reach the merits of this appeal. The district court’s injunctive decree, regardless of the grounds existing for its issuance in 1971, is no longer warranted. The three original plaintiffs-appellees the parties advise remain as tenants (of an original number of seventeen tenants) of the mobile home park operated by appellants do not need the protection of the decree. Appellants should no longer be stigmatized by the existence of the injunction.
Accordingly this appeal is dismissed as moot, with directions to the district court to vacate its Permanent Injunction and Final Decree, and dismiss the complaint. The costs of this appeal shall be taxed to the appellants.
Dismissed as moot and remanded with directions.
. The prerequisite, under Florida law F.S. § 83.03, to actions for eviction of month to month tenants. F.S. § 83.241 provides mobile home tenants an additional 30 days after filing of suit before they may be removed.
, Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; Samuels v. Mackell and Fernandez v. Mackell, 1971, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688; Boyle v. Landry, 1971, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696; Dyson v. Stein, 1971, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct; 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781; Byrne v. Karalexis, 1971, 401 U.S. 216
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
504 F.2d 1094, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5932, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-and-deloris-bowles-v-blue-lake-development-corporation-blue-lake-ca5-1974.