Rich v. Lambert

53 U.S. 347, 13 L. Ed. 1017, 12 How. 347, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 662
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 18, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 53 U.S. 347 (Rich v. Lambert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rich v. Lambert, 53 U.S. 347, 13 L. Ed. 1017, 12 How. 347, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 662 (1852).

Opinions

Mr, Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, held in and for the District of South Carolina in admiralty.

The several libels were filed in the District Court, against the ship Martha, by the owners of cargo brought in the same from Liverpool to Charleston, for damage done to the goods in the course of the voyage.

Five of the separate owners of cargo joined in one of the libels, and each of the others filed separate lib'els; to each of which answers were put in by the respondents, and the parties proceeded in the usual way to take their proofs. Pending the proceedings, all the cases were consolidated by an order of the .court on the motion of the proctors for the libellants.

The District Court held the respondents liable, as carriers, for the damage done to the goods; and referred the cases to the clerk to take the necessary proofs, and ascertain the loss which each of the several parties had sustained, and report the amount, which was done accordingly. And, in the coming in of the report, a decree was entered adjudging to each of the fifteen several owners the amount of the loss, they had respectively sustained.

On an appeal by the respondents to the Circuit Court, this decree was affirmed. And the cases are now before us on an appeal to this court from that decree.

With the exception of two of the cases, the sum decreed against the respondents in favor of the several owners of the cargo is below the amount that authorizes an appeal to this court. ' And, it is insisted, on the part of the appellees, that the áppeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction as to all parts of the decree, except the' part relating to the two cases mentioned.

On the part of the appellants, it is contended, that the objection to the jurisdiction is not available to the five separate owners joining in the libel, as the aggregate amount decreed to them exceeds two thousand dollars; nor to any of the parties, on the ground that all the cases were consolidated by- the orders of the District -Court on the motion of the proctors for the libellants.

We are of opinion that neither of these grounds are sufficient to maintain the jurisdiction, and that the appeal must be- dis[353]*353missed as to all the cases except the two in each'of which the amount in the decree exceeds the two thousand dollars;

The joining of several owners of cargo conveyed in the same ship in ’a libel in rent for damages done to the goods in the course of shipment, and the consolidation of libels filed separately by the respective owners for like damage, is allowed by the practice of the court for its convenience, and the saving of time and expense to the parties. It is a practice deserving commendation and encouragement in all cases where it can be adopted without complicating too much the proceedings, and thereby prejudicing the rights of the parties.

In cases where the several claims against the ship are founded upon a common injury and loss, the questions involved depending upon the same general rules of law, and the same evidence, equally ápplicable to all of them, it is fit and proper that the proceedings should be joint, either by' allowing the parties to unite in the libel, or by an order for consolidation, if separate suits have been instituted.

The defence will usually be the same in all the cases; but, if otherwise, the parties will not be prejudiced, as they, may avail themselves in the answers of any defence existing against either of the several owners. For, although the proceeding assumes the form of a joint suit, it is in.reality a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by distinct parties, arising out of a common injury, and which are heard and determined, so far as the merits are concerned,' the same as in the case of separate’libels for each cause of action. The same decree, also, is entered as in the case of separate suits.

We do not perceive, therefore, any ground for a distinction as to the right of appeal from a decree as entered in these- cases from that which exists where the proceedings have been distinct and separate throughout. Clearly, a libellant could not have appeal, unless his claim exceed two thousand dollars. Nor can the respondent, upon the same principle, unless the amount decreed against him in the particular case, exceeds that sum. The principle, in effect, we think, has been already decided in this court.. 6 Pet. 143; 8 Id. 11; 11 How. 522.

There is another preliminary question which it is necessary to notice before proceeding to the merits.

Further evidence has been taken, on the part of the respondents, since the appeal, to this court was entered, which is objected to by the appellants.

The act of 3d March, 1803, (2 Stat. at Large, 244) allows additional evidence to be furnished by either party before this court in cases of appeals in admiralty and prize causes. And by the 27th rule of the court the evidence is to be taken under a [354]*354commission to be issued from this court, or from the Circuit Court, under the direction of any one of the -judges thereof.

The objection taken to the evidence is, that it does not appear from the record- that any order was obtained from either court for the issuing of the commission. We have, however, before us the commission itself, issued in the usual form by the clerk of the Circuit Court, and in the execution of which both parties have joined. An order, therefore, must have been entered, or, if not, it was waived by the act of the parties in suing out the commission, and joining in its execution. For these reasons we think the further evidence furnished to this court admissible.

This brings us to the merits of the case.

The different libels filed in the several cases are in form and substance the same. And so are the several answers of the respondents.

The libels charge that the ship Martha being at Liverpool on the 6th September, 1847, and bound on a voyage to Charleston, the libellants caused to be shipped on board the same, divers goods, wares, and merchandise, then in good order and condition, of gr> .at value, &c., to be taken care of and safely delivered in like good order, and condition, (the dangers and accidents of the seas and navigation excepted,) they'paying certain freight therefor as per bills of lading. That afterwards, on or about the twenty-first of the same month, the said ship, having on board the said goods, set sail from Liverpool, and on the ninth November following arrived at Charleston, and soon thereafter delivered the same to the said libellants.

That the said goods, wares, and merchandise were not taken care of and safely carried and delivered according to the tenor and effect of the bills of lading; but, on the contrary, although no damage accrued from any dangers or accidents of the seas, or navigation, the said goods were so badly taken care of by the said master, and the cargo of said ship, and particularly a quantity of salt on board thereof was stowed so improperly, that through the neglect, and mismanagement of the master, the said goods were greatly damaged, and great loss thereby sustained.

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Bluebook (online)
53 U.S. 347, 13 L. Ed. 1017, 12 How. 347, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rich-v-lambert-scotus-1852.