Ricardo Marviance Thornton v. LVMPD

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Ricardo Marviance Thornton, Case No. 2:25-cv-01999-GMN-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 LVMPD, 9 Defendant. 10 11 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 incarcerated Plaintiff Ricardo Marviance Thornton is proceeding 12 in this action pro se and has requested authority to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1). 13 Plaintiff also submitted a complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and has moved for a status check (ECF No. 4) 14 and for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s application 15 is complete, it grants the application to proceed in forma pauperis. However, because the Court 16 finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not properly assert sufficient facts to support his federal 17 claims and does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction over his state claim, it dismisses the 18 complaint with leave to amend. Because the Court addresses Plaintiff’s application and screens 19 his complaint, the Court denies his motion for a status check regarding those items as moot. 20 Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, the Court denies his motion 21 for appointment of counsel without prejudice. 22 I. In forma pauperis application. 23 Plaintiff filed the affidavit required by § 1915(a). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has shown an 24 inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed 25 in forma pauperis will be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court will now review 26 Plaintiff’s complaint. 27 1 II. Legal standard for screening. 2 Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the 3 complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is 4 legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 5 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 6 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 7 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the 8 complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 9 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 11 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 13 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 14 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 15 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 16 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 18 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 19 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 20 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 21 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 22 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 23 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 24 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 25 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 26 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 27 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 1 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 2 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 3 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 4 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 5 “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a 6 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 7 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 8 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 9 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of 10 different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete 11 diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each 12 of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 13 III. Screening the complaint. 14 Plaintiff sues the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) for damages, 15 alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, civil rights, the United States Constitution, 16 and the Nevada Constitution. In his single cause of action, Plaintiff checks the box for “other” 17 and writes “false arrest/false imprisonment.” Plaintiff does not identify the provisions of the 18 United States or Nevada Constitutions under which he brings his claims or the civil rights he 19 asserts that the LVMPD violated. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as bringing 20 the following claims: (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) racial profiling in 21 violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) false 22 imprisonment under Nevada law. 23 Plaintiff alleges that on May 29, 2025, he was pulled over by an LVMPD officer who 24 asked for his license, registration, and insurance. As Plaintiff reached for those items, before he 25 could provide them, the officer told him to get out of the car. Plaintiff asked why he was pulled 26 over and the officer said it was because Plaintiff had run a stop sign. Plaintiff asserts that he 27 instantly knew he was being racially profiled. The officer walked Plaintiff to the police vehicle 1 the officer that the cards belonged to his wife and that she had given them to him so that he could 2 pick up groceries and dog food. Plaintiff then called his wife on the phone using Siri (a virtual 3 assistant on Apple iPhones that can be voice activated) and his wife answered, but the officer 4 hung up the call and would not let Plaintiff verify his story. Plaintiff asserts that the officer heard 5 his wife say hello, but would not speak to her. The officer then arrested Plaintiff by putting him 6 in handcuffs and also impounded Plaintiff’s car. The officer transported Plaintiff to the Clark 7 County Detention Center (“CCDC”). Plaintiff was charged with obtaining credit/debit cards 8 without owner consent and, as a result at the time of his complaint, claimed to still be in custody 9 on an illegal probation hold.1 Plaintiff asserts that the District Attorney denied the charge when 10 Plaintiff’s wife came to court to prove that the debit cards belonged to her and that she had given 11 Plaintiff permission to use them. Because of Plaintiff’s incarceration his pregnant wife was 12 evicted from their home and Plaintiff is unable to be with her. 13 A. False arrest. 14 A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of the 15 Fourth Amendment, provided that the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. 16 Dubner v. City of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause to arrest exists 17 when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person 18 of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person 19 being arrested.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 Plaintiff seeks to hold LVMPD liable for its officer’s actions under federal law. 21 Generally, however, municipalities are not liable under § 1983 unless the “municipality itself 22 causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 23 (1989) (emphasis in original). In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court 24 held that liability extends to a local government only when the constitutional violation was the 25 1 Public records reveal that Defendant is currently in custody of the Nevada Department of 26 Corrections (“NDOC”) serving a sentence for a different crime. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 27 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a court make take judicial notice of 1 result of its policy, practice, or custom, or a decision-making official directed or ratified the 2 complained-of conduct. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, to 3 succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show that the policy or lack thereof caused his injury. 4 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). 5 A plaintiff may bring a Monell claim under a theory of omission when a municipality’s 6 oversight amounts to deliberate indifference to a constitutional right. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra 7 Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los 8 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016). For an omission-based Monell claim like failure to 9 train or supervise, a plaintiff must show, among other things, “that the municipality had a policy” 10 that “ ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to [his] constitutional right.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 11 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S at 389–91). “Deliberate 12 indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a 13 known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 14 (2011) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating that 15 either “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” exists or “the 16 unconstitutional consequences of failing to train” are “so patently obvious that a city could be 17 liable ... without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id. at 62–64 (quotation omitted). 18 The latter showing, called “single-incident liability,” is “rare” and occurs only “in a narrow range 19 of circumstances.” Id. 20 Here, Plaintiff sues LVMPD for the actions of its officer but does not allege that LVMPD 21 itself caused the constitutional violation at issue. Plaintiff has not alleged that the constitutional 22 violation was the result of LVMPD’s policy, practice, or custom, or that a decision-making 23 official directed or ratified the complained-of conduct. The Court therefore dismisses this claim 24 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 25 B. Racial profiling. 26 “Racial profiling can constitute a deprivation of a citizen’s right to equal protection under 27 the law.” Thomas v. Melendez, No. 1:16-cv-01759-LJO-JLT, 2016 WL 7116720 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 1 Seattle, No. C10-1612-JLR, 2011 WL 6150567, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2011)). To state a 2 claim for racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, “a plaintiff must show that 3 the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based on 4 membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th 5 Cir. 2005). 6 Here, Plaintiff’s claim for racial profiling fails on two grounds. First, Plaintiff has not 7 alleged that the constitutional violation was the result of LVMPD’s policy, practice, or custom, or 8 that a decision-making official directed or ratified the complained-of conduct. Second, Plaintiff 9 has not alleged any facts to support his claim that the officer racially profiled him other than his 10 conclusory statement. So, the Court dismisses this claim without prejudice and with leave to 11 amend. 12 C. False imprisonment. 13 False imprisonment is a claim arising under Nevada law. See Toliver v. Soles, No. 2:17- 14 cv-02612-MMD-CWH, 2019 WL 3311745, at *3 (D. Nev. June 5, 2019). To assert a false 15 imprisonment claim in Nevada, the plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant acted intending to 16 confine plaintiff within boundaries fixed by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s act directly 17 resulted in such a confinement of the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff is conscious of the 18 confinement or was harmed by it. See Hernandez v. City of Reno, 634 P.2d 668, 671 (Nev. 1981). 19 An employer may be liable for the actions of its employee—called “respondeat superior” 20 liability”—only when the employee is under the control of the employer and when the act is 21 within the scope of employment. Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 925 P.2d 1175, 1223 22 (Nev. 1996). 23 Here, the Court has dismissed both of Plaintiff’s federal claims. So, it lacks federal 24 question jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also lacks diversity 25 jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiff has not presented facts to show that he is a citizen of a 26 different state than LVMPD. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. So, the Court lacks original jurisdiction over 27 Plaintiff’s state law claim. It therefore dismisses that claim without prejudice and with leave to 1 IV. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 2 A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 civil rights claims. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Under 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 5 counsel.” However, the court will appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional 6 circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 action). “When 7 determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the likelihood of 8 success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light 9 of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. “Neither of these considerations is 10 dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id. 11 Here, Plaintiff’s case has not yet passed screening, so it is unclear whether it will succeed 12 on its merits. Additionally, although the case has not yet passed screening, Plaintiff has otherwise 13 demonstrated an ability to articulate his claims and has been given an opportunity to amend his 14 complaint to address the issues for which the Court has dismissed it. The Court therefore denies 15 his motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice. 16 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 18 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is granted. Plaintiff will not be required to pay an initial installment fee. 19 Nevertheless, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the 20 Prison Litigation Reform Act. The movant herein is permitted to maintain this action to 21 conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of fees or costs or the giving of security therefor. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison 23 Litigation Reform Act, the Nevada Department of Corrections2 will forward payments from the 24 account of Ricardo Marviance Thornton #1122352 to the Clerk of the United States District 25 Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits (in months that the account 26

27 2 Because Plaintiff is now in NDOC custody, the Court will direct payments to come from his 1 exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of the Court 2 will send a copy of this order to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office. The Clerk will send a 3 copy of this order to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of 4 Corrections, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, even if this action is dismissed, or is otherwise 6 unsuccessful, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, as amended by the 7 Prison Litigation Reform Act. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file Plaintiff’s 9 complaint (ECF No. 1-1) on the docket but shall not issue summons. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed without 11 prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with leave to amend. 12 Plaintiff will have until May 29, 2026, to file an amended complaint if the noted deficiencies can 13 be corrected. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed that the Court 14 cannot refer to a prior pleading (i.e., the original complaint) to make the amended complaint 15 complete. This is because, generally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 16 Local Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete without reference to any 17 prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no longer 18 serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, 19 each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Failure to 20 comply with this order will result in the recommended dismissal of this case. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a status check (ECF No. 4) is 22 denied as moot. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF 24 No. 6) is denied without prejudice. 25 26 DATED: April 29, 2026, 27 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS