2025 IL App (1st) 241203-U
FOURTH DIVISION Order filed: January 30, 2025
No. 1-24-1203
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
KASHIF RIAZ, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, ) NORTHWESTERN FACULTY FOUNDATION, d/b/a ) NORTHWESTERN MEDICAL GROUP, and GEORGE ) CYBULSKI, M.D., ) ) Defendants ) No. 2018 L 013053 ) (THE LAW OFFICE OF STEPHANIE K. ) NATHANSON, ) Honorable ) Kathy M. Flanagan, Petitioner-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s order granting as modified the petitioner’s attorney fee petition based on quantum meruit is affirmed. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion 1) in declining to award a full contingency fee without an evidentiary hearing; 2) No. 1-24-1203
by determining a fee award without an evidentiary hearing; and 3) in awarding a fee based on the hours the petitioner spent working on the case as modified.
¶2 The petitioner, the Law Office of Stephanie K. Nathanson, appeals from an order of the
Circuit Court of Cook County granting as modified its petition for attorney fees based on quantum
meruit for work it performed prior to discharge in the underlying medical malpractice action filed
on behalf of the respondent, Kashif Riaz. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the circuit
court’s order.
¶3 On September 6, 2018, the respondent retained the petitioner to represent him in a medical
malpractice action. The attorney-client contract entered into between the petitioner and the
respondent provided for a contingency fee of one-third of all sums recovered through settlement,
judgment, or otherwise. The petitioner filed suit on behalf of the respondent on December 14,
2018, against the defendants, Northwestern Memorial Hospital and Northwestern Faculty
Foundation, d/b/a Northwestern Medical Group (collectively, “Northwestern”), George Cybulski,
M.D., John Bailitz, M.D., and Robert Turelli, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as the underlying
action). The complaint alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose and
properly treat the respondent’s spinal condition. The matter proceeded to discovery, which was
overseen by the Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan through the duration of the case.
¶4 On April 16, 2023, the respondent discharged the petitioner as his counsel, and on April
18, 2023, the law firm of Deratany and Kosner filed an appearance on behalf of the respondent.
On May 17, 2023, the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the respondent and for
a reimbursement of costs. The motion also reserved the right to pursue a quantum meruit claim for
attorney fees once the case concluded. On May 22, 2023, the circuit court granted the motion to
withdraw and ordered that the petitioner’s claimed costs of $66,621.88 remained as a lien against
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any recovery in the case. The circuit court retained jurisdiction over the case to hear the petitioner’s
attorneys fee claim.
¶5 The underlying case continued on with Deratany and Kosner serving as counsel for the
respondent. On May 9, 2023, the respondent moved to voluntarily dismiss Drs. Bailitz and Turelli
as defendants.
¶6 On November 14, 2023, the underlying case was assigned for trial before Judge Jean M.
Golden. On November 15, 2023, the respondent and the remaining defendants presented their
respective motions in limine. The respondent moved, inter alia, to bar certain testimony by defense
experts, Drs. Herman and Sze. After arguments from the parties, Judge Golden ruled that Dr.
Herman, a defense expert, could testify to a multi-factorial cause of any injury to the respondent
but could not state that the respondent’s diabetes was the sole cause of any injury. Judge Golden
also barred Dr. Sze, from testifying that the posterior decompression of the respondent’s spine as
seen in an x-ray film was “common”.
¶7 In the afternoon of November 15, 2023, after the motions in limine were resolved, the
respondent and the defendants reached an agreement settling the action for $3.85 million. Judge
Golden entered an agreed order dismissing the action against Dr. Cybulski, but the order did not
provide for the dismissal of Northwestern. However, on November 17, 2023, Judge Golden
entered an order dismissing the underlying action with prejudice pursuant to the settlement
agreement entered into between the respondent and the Northwestern defendants. The order also
provides that the court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate any liens or to enforce the settlement.
¶8 On November 29, 2023, the matter was returned to Judge Flanagan for resolution of the
petitioner’s claim for an award of attorney fees and costs. Judge Flanagan entered an order
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directing respondent’s attorney to have the settlement order amended to reflect the settlement was
also with Northwestern. The order also directed the petitioner to file its fee petition by December
27, 2023, and the respondent to file his response to the petition by January 31, 2024. No provision
was made in the order for the filing of a reply by the petitioner. The order indicates that it was
drafted by someone from the petitioner’s law firm, and we find nothing in the record suggesting
that the petitioner requested an opportunity to file a reply. Judge Flanagan told the parties that the
court would inform them as to whether, based on their filings, an evidentiary hearing was needed.
¶9 The petitioner filed its fee petition on January 3, 2024, requesting that the circuit court
award it a full contingency fee of one-third of the settlement between the respondent and
Northwestern plus $66,621.88 for costs. Attached as an exhibit to the petition was an exhibit
containing an itemized statement of the hours expended by the petitioner in the representation of
the respondent in the underlying case which totaled 726.35 hours and setting forth each activity
performed, the time spent, and the individuals in the petitioner’s law firm performing each activity.
The petition asserted that the hourly billing rates for the individuals in the petitioner’s law firm
rendering the services listed are as follows: Nathanson $450, Michael Peterson $375, Rebecca
Borowicz $300, and Jannel Sandoval $200. The petition was also supported by Stephanie K
Nathanson’s (Nathanson) affidavit. The petition did not request an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 10 On January 30, 2024, Deratany and Kosner filed a response to the fee petition. The
response acknowledged that the underlying case was settled for $3.85 million. It alleged that 102.2
of the hours that the petitioner claimed to have rendered services in its representation of the
respondent were performed after the petitioner was discharged as the respondent’s attorney and
also questioned the reasonableness of other entries in the statement attached to the petition. The
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response argued that the petitioner’s claimed hours of service should be reduced to 573.04 to be
paid at the hourly rates set forth in the petition. The response also alleged that the costs claimed
by the petitioner should be reduced by $8,275, representing bills that were paid by Deratany and
Kosner after the petitioner’s discharge. In conclusion, the response argued that the reasonable
value of the petitioner’s services is $231,978.78 for 573.04 hours worked on behalf of the
respondent plus $58,571.88 for costs incurred. The response was supported by the affidavits of
Kosner, the respondent, and Daniel Mills, an attorney for the defendants in the underlying action.
Mills’ affidavit was later withdrawn. The response asserted that an evidentiary hearing on the
petition was necessary due to disputed factual issues.
¶ 11 On February 13, 2024, a day before a hearing was set on the fee petition, Nathanson sent
an email to the circuit court with two affidavits. The first affidavit was executed by Rebecca
Borowicz, a junior associate of the petitioner, correcting minor errors in the itemized list of hours
attached to the original petition. The second affidavit was from Nathanson, which disputed
assertions made in the response to the petition, specifically contesting the idea that Kosner changed
the theory of the case, disputing an assertion by Kosner that the parties argued the motions in
limine for two days based on the transcript indicating that it only took approximately two hours,
and providing additional information surrounding the petitioner’s discharge. Nathanson’s second
affidavit also contested the settlement posture of the parties prior to the petitioner’s discharge. The
respondent objected to the additional submissions, noting that the court’s briefing schedule did not
provide for any reply in support of the fee petition. Judge Flanagan responded by email to the
parties stating that the ruling on the petition was set for the next day and that no additional materials
were needed.
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¶ 12 On February 14, 2024, the circuit court issued a written order granting the petition as
modified without an evidentiary hearing. The written order recounted the procedural history of the
case through settlement, finding that there was a difference in settlement offers and a change in
the theory of the respondent’s case after Deratany and Kosner began representing the respondent.
The court found that the petitioner was not entitled to the full amount of one-third of the settlement,
as the case was not “on the cusp” of settlement prior to the petitioner’s discharge and also finding
that it was Kosner’s work on the motions in limine and preparation for trial that was the “driving
force” in procuring the settlement of the case.
¶ 13 In determining a reasonable fee award for the petitioner, the circuit court used the hours
provided by the petitioner in the fee petition and made modifications to arrive at the final fee
award. The modifications made by the circuit court included: (1) excluding work done by the
petitioner on a motion to vacate a dismissal for want of prosecution filed on April 8, 2022,
attributing the dismissal to attorney error; (2) excluding services rendered post-discharge; (3)
excluding certain duplicative entries; (4) reducing time for entries that were unreasonable, such as
billing a half of an hour for “review of a certificate of service”; (5) excluding hours claimed for
expert and legal research or “investigation” time; and (6) reducing time for reviewing an opposing
motion. The court attached to its order a copy of the itemized billing statement which was attached
to the fee petition and indicated on that statement which entries were deleted or reduced from the
hours originally claimed. The court applied Nathanson’s uncontested hourly rate of $450 to all
remaining hours, finding that the petitioner’s other attorneys and a legal assistant who billed time
did not perform the bulk of services. In total, the circuit court awarded the petitioner $253,485.00
in attorney fees for 563.30 hours of work. The court also deducted the unpaid invoices of $8,275
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which were forwarded to Deratany and Kosner from the costs claimed by the petitioner and
awarded the petitioner a total of $58,346.88 for costs incurred.
¶ 14 On March 15, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court’s February
14, 2024, order awarding attorney fees and costs. The motion argued that the circuit court erred by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to allow for a reply, and by failing to consider
Nathanson’s affidavit submitted on February 13, 2024. According to the motion, the response to
the fee petition raised factual assertions that the circuit court took as fact without holding an
evidentiary hearing. The motion also asserted that there had been no change in the theory of the
case as the court had found in its February 14, 2024, order and argued that it would be unjust for
Deratany and Kosner to receive 80% of the attorneys fee for taking three depositions and preparing
an expert disclosure before settling the case when the petitioner spent over four years representing
the respondent. On May 6, 2024, the circuit court issued a five-page written order, denying the
motion to reconsider and detailing the reasons for its ruling. This appeal followed.
¶ 15 In its brief the petitioner argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by: 1) failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on its fee petition, 2) failing to allow it to file a reply to the response
filed in opposition to its petition, 3) failing to allow oral argument on the petition, and 4) failing
to award it a fee equal to one-third fee of the amount for which the underlying action was settled.
¶ 16 We will address together the questions of whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
denying the petitioner’s claim for a fee equal to one-third of the settlement amount and whether
the circuit court abused its discretion by deciding the issue without an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 17 In its brief, the petitioner contends that there were material factual issues that required an
evidentiary hearing to resolve, listing 10 such facts: 1) “Whether a mediation occurred [in the
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underlying case] and, if so whether it was done in good faith (prior to the *** [respondent’s] new
liability expert being disclosed);” 2) “What factors impacted any offer that was given at that
mediation;” 3) “Whether the mediation holds any weight in evaluating ***[the petitioner’s]
quantum meruit claim;” 4) “Whether the ‘theory of the case’ changed and, if so, whether that
change impacted the settlement or potential verdict value on the case;” 5) “The reason(s) prior
experts withdrew from the case;” 6) “The amount offered (and the reasons for that amount being
offered) prior to the close of expert discovery;” 7) “The amount offered (and the reasons for that
amount being offered) immediately before trial;” 8) “Whether any (and which) motions in limine
were argued and ruled upon;” 9) “The amount offered (and the reasons for that amount being
offered) after the supposed rulings on motions in limine;” and 10) “The amount of time actually
spent by Kosner (i.e., one morning vs. 2-3 days of arguing motions in limine).” According to the
petitioner, Nathanson’s and Kosner’s affidavits contradict one another as to these questions. The
respondent argues that there were no material fact questions that needed to be resolved in order for
the circuit court to rule on the fee petition. He takes the position that the issues identified by the
petitioner as needing to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing were not outcome determinative and
irrelevant to a resolution of the petition. For the reasons which follow, we agree with the
respondent.
¶ 18 When, as in this case, an attorney retained pursuant to a contingency agreement is
discharged, the attorney is entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered on the basis
of quantum meruit. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O’Brien, 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 53; In
re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 40 (1991); Rhoads v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d
217, 230 (1979). The circuit court has broad discretionary powers in awarding attorney fees and
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its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. In re Estate of Callahan,
144 Ill. 2d at 43-44.
¶ 19 Whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is also a matter within the discretion of the
circuit court A.L. Dougherty Real Estate Management Co. v. Su Chin Tsai, 2017 IL App (1st)
161949, ¶ 46. An evidentiary hearing on a fee petition is required only when the party opposing
the petition creates an issue of fact “that cannot be resolved without further evidence.” Young v.
Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL (1st) 131887, ¶ 113. In determining whether the circuit
court abused its discretion, we do not decide whether we merely disagree. We will reverse the
circuit court only if we find that it “‘acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious
judgement or, in view of all circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized
principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.’” May v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical
Laboratories, 304 Ill. App. 3d 242, 246 (1999) (quoting Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark
Industries, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594-95 (1991)).
¶ 20 As a preliminary matter, we note that in its brief the petitioner asserts that it and the
respondent both requested an evidentiary hearing on the fee petition. To be precise, the petitioner
did not request an evidentiary hearing in its petition or at the time that the petition was filed. The
petitioner first requested an evidentiary hearing in its motion to reconsider. It is true that the
respondent requested an evidentiary hearing in his response to the petition. However, the
petitioner cannot rely on the respondent’s request to support a claim of error based on the circuit
court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Powell v. Dean Foods Co. 2012 IL 111714,
¶ 36 (“A party must assert its own legal rights and interests, rather than assert a claim for relief
based on the rights of third parties.”). By failing to request an evidentiary hearing on its fee
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petition, the petitioner essentially conceded that the matter could be decided without an evidentiary
hearing. Demitro v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation., 388 Ill. App. 3d 15, 22 (2009).
¶ 21 An award of a full contingency fee to a discharged attorney is proper when a case settles
immediately after the attorney’s discharge. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd., 2024 IL
129599, ¶ 60. The petitioner does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that the defendants
in the underlying case made any offer of settlement during the period that it represented the
respondent. Further, it cannot be seriously argued that the underlying case settled immediately
after the petitioner was discharged. These two facts distinguish this case from the cases of Andrew
W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd, 2024 IL 129599, Will v. Northwestern University, 378 Ill. App.
3d 280 (2007), and Wegner v. Arnold, 305 Ill. App. 3d 689 (1999), upon which the petitioner relies.
¶ 22 In Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd., the defendants retained the plaintiff law firms
on October 29, 2015, pursuant a written contract which provided, inter alia, that the defendants
agreed to pay the plaintiffs 15% of the first $10,000,000 of assets recovered from the O’Brien
estates and related entities (collectively referred to as O’Brien Estate) and 10% of any additional
values of assets recovered. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd., 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 7. During
the course of their representation of the defendants in various actions in the circuit court of Cook
County, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the Illinois Appellate
Court, and the circuit court of Barrien County, Michigan, the plaintiff law firms spent
approximately 3000 hours of attorney and paralegal time over a period of 19 months. Id. ¶¶ 32,
42. From September 2016 through May 1, 2017, the defendants and the O’Brien Estate engaged
in settlement negotiations consisting of offers, demands and counter offers. On May 1, 2017, the
O’Brien Estate made a $16.25 million settlement offer to the defendants. On May 8, 2017, the
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plaintiffs provided the defendants with a recommended demand totaling $16.75 million, but the
defendants did not authorize the plaintiffs to convey the demand to the O’Brien Estate. On May
10, 2017, the O’Brien Estate withdrew its May 1, 2017, $16.25 million settlement offer. On May
25, 2017, the defendants discharge the plaintiffs as their attorneys. Fifty-seven days later, on July
21, 2017, the defendants accepted a $16.85 million settlement offer from the O’Brien Estate. Id.
¶¶ 34-35. The circuit court found that the settlement was reached shortly after the plaintiffs were
discharged and could be substantially attributed to the plaintiffs’ efforts. The circuit court used the
contingency fee structure contained in the October 29, 2015, written retainer agreement to
calculate the amount of fees it awarded to the plaintiffs. That method of calculation was affirmed
by the supreme court. Id. ¶¶ 45-46, 77.
¶ 23 In Will, the plaintiffs, as coadministrators of the estate of their deceased son, filed a
wrongful death and survival action against the defendants. Will, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 282. Following
years of litigation, the attorney representing the estate negotiated a $16 million settlement. One of
the coadministrators rejected the settlement. Id. at 285. Three months later the attorney was
discharged. Id. at 306. Two months after the attorney was discharged and before the estate was
represented by new counsel, the circuit court ordered the estate to accept the $16 million settlement
offer. Id. at 306. The circuit court held that the discharged attorney was entitled to the full one-
third of the recovery pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Id. at 287. On appeal, this court
found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the discharged attorney the full
one third of the recovery pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Id. at 305.
¶ 24 In Wegner, the attorney agreed to represent the plaintiff estate in a wrongful death action
pursuant to a contingency fee agreement dated September 13, 1996. The agreement provided that
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the attorney would be entitled to one-third of the gross amount recovered through settlement, suit,
or trial. Wegner, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 691. On August 28, 1997, the attorney was discharged and
was notified that substitute counsel would be representing the plaintiff estate in the pending action.
Id. Two days prior to the attorney’s discharge, the defendant’s attorney recommended to the
defendant’s insurer that it offer the $100,000 policy limit in settlement of the case. Id. at 692. On
November 17, 1997, the defendant made a formal settlement offer of $100,000 to the estates new
counsel. Id. The discharged attorney filed a petition seeking an award of fees and costs, and the
circuit court awarded him $7000. Id. at 693. The discharged attorney appealed, contending that
he was entitled to a full one-third of the $100,000 settlement for his quantum meruit. Id. at 690-
91. This court vacated the circuit court’s fee award and remanded the matter with directions to
award the discharged attorney his one-third contract fee less the amount that is to be awarded to
the successor attorney in quantum meruit. Id. at 697.
¶ 25 Unlike the circumstances present in Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd., Will, and
Wegner, this case was not settled for an amount negotiated or offered prior to the petitioner’s
discharge. It is uncontroverted that the defendants in the underlying action made no offer of
settlement while the petitioner was representing the respondent, a fact that is undisputed. We are
at a loss to understand what could have been brought forth by the petitioner at an evidentiary
hearing, a reply in support of its fee petition, or in an oral argument to the circuit court in support
of the petition that would have established the petitioner’s entitlement to a full one-third
contingency fee. Clearly, Deratany and Kosner represented the respondent following the
petitioner’s discharge and it was Kosner that negotiated the $3.85 million settlement with
Northwestern. These facts were all well known to the circuit court when it ruled on the fee petition.
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As we noted earlier, a discharged attorney may be entitled to a fee award equal to the full
contingency fee set forth in a retainer agreement when a case settles immediately after the
attorney’s discharge. This is not such a case. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to award the petitioner a full one-third contingency fee without an evidentiary
hearing.
¶ 26 Although we have found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioner a full one-third fee without an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner was still entitled to a
reasonable fee for the work it performed on the underlying case. Andrew W. Levenfeld &
Associates, Ltd., 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 53; DeLaPaz v. SelectBuild Const., Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 969,
976 (2009). Our task at this juncture is to determine both whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing in determining a reasonable fee to be awarded
to the petitioner and, in the absence of an abuse of that discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing, whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding the petitioner $253,458.00 for
its fees in representing the respondent and $58,346.88 for costs incurred.
¶ 27 Because the termination of an attorney creates liability in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of the services rendered, the elements of quantum meruit are established as a
matter of law. Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd., 2024 IL 129599, ¶ 55; Rhoads, 78 Ill. 2d
at 227-28. In determining the reasonable value of an attorney’s services to be awarded in quantum
meruit, the factors for the circuit court’s consideration are (1) the attorney's skill and standing, (2)
the time and labor required, (3) the nature of the cause and the difficulty of the issues involved,
including the amount of money at issue, (4) the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter, (5) the
attorney's degree of responsibility in managing the case, (6) the usual and customary charge for
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that type of work in the community, and (7) the benefits resulting to the client. In re Estate of
Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 44 (1991). The petitioner argues that the circuit court failed to address
those factors. Specifically, it contends that the circuit court made no reference or finding relating
to Nathanson’s skill or standing, the nature of the action, the novelty and difficulty of the subject
matter, Nathanson’s degree of responsibility in managing the case, or the usual and customary
charge in the community for the type of work performed.
¶ 28 In her February 14, 2024, order awarding fees to the petitioner, Judge Flanagan specifically
found that the respondent received a benefit from the services performed by the petitioner. As to
the time required in the petitioner’s representation of the respondent, the circuit court noted that it
had reviewed the itemized fee petition submitted by the petitioner. As recited earlier, attached to
the petition for fees filed by the petitioner was an exhibit containing an itemized statement of the
hours expended by the petitioner in its representation of the respondent which totaled 726.35 hours.
The exhibit itemized each activity performed, the time spent, and the attorney or legal assistant in
the petitioner’s law firm that performed the activity. With the exception of the time disallowed,
the circuit court awarded the petitioner fees for the amount of time claimed at the rate of $450 per
hour. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the circuit court’s use of $450 per hour in calculating
the fees awarded was not arbitrary. In its fee petition, the petitioner asserted that Nathanson’s
hourly billing rate is $450, and her hourly billing rate was the highest of all individuals listed as
having rendered services to the respondent in the underlying case. In its response to the fee
petition, the respondent did not challenge the hourly billing rates. Because the circuit court
specifically found that the services rendered by the petitioner benefited the respondent and used
Nathanson’s uncontested $450 hourly billing rate, the petitioner cannot claim prejudice in the
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circuit court’s resolution of either issue without conducting an evidentiary hearing, affording it an
opportunity to file a reply in support of its petition or failing to allow for argument on the petition.
Having awarded fees at Nathanson’s hourly rate of $450 as claimed by the petitioner itself, there
was no further need for the circuit court to address Nathanson’s skill and standing as an attorney,
her degree of responsibility in managing the case, or the usual and customary charge for the
services rendered. We are left then with the remaining factors for consideration; namely, the time
required to perform the services rendered by the petitioner, the amount of money at issue and the
novelty and difficulty of the subject matter.
¶ 29 In resolving a fee petitions, the judge may and should rely on her own knowledge and
experience. McHenry Savings Bank v. Autoworks of Wauconda, Inc., 399 Ill. App. 3d 104, 113
(2010); see also Will, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 304. When, as in this case, the judge presiding over a fee
petition proceeding also presided over the case for most of its duration, the judge can draw on that
knowledge to determine whether the fees sought are reasonable without hearing testimony. Young,
2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶ 114.
¶ 30 Judge Flanagan not only ruled on the fee petition in this case, she also presided over the
underlying case both during the time that the respondent was represented by the petitioner and
during the time that the respondent was represented by Deratany and Kosner up to the date the
case was assigned to Judge Golden for trial. The record reflects that from January 14, 2019, less
than six weeks after the underling case was filed, until the petitioner was discharged as
respondent’s attorney on April 16, 2023, the case came before Judge Flanagan for case
management purposes in excess of 22 times. Judge Flanagan entered orders relating to pleadings
and discovery, including expert discovery. After the petitioner was discharged and while the
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respondent was represented by Deratany and Kosner, the underlying case came before Judge
Flanagan for case management approximately 9 times, following which she entered orders
regulating discovery. Judge Flanagan’s extensive involvement in the underlying case is apparent
from the orders which she entered which are contained in the common law record and without
reference to any affidavit submitted in support of or in opposition to the fee petition. Further, the
February 14, 2024, fee order specifically states that the court (Judge Flanagan) observed the
performance of the petitioner from the date of the filing of the underlying case up to the date of
the petitioner’s discharge. Clearly, the court, based on its extensive supervision of the underlying
case both during the period that the respondent was represented by the petitioner and after, was
aware of the amount of money at issue and the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter, without
the need for an evidentiary hearing, a reply in support of the petition, or argument before ruling.
¶ 31 Determining the amount of time spent in performing legitimate services for the client and
then multiplying that time by a reasonable hourly rate, as the circuit court did in this case, is the
best way to determine the reasonable value of a discharged attorney’s services. Johns v. Klecan,
198 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1021 (1990). The circuit court in this case took the itemized statement of
the number of hours of services performed by the petitioner during its representation of the
respondent which totaled 726.35 hours, subtracted from the total claimed hours of activity those
hours it found inappropriate, and then multiplied the remaining 563.30 hours by Nathanson’s
hourly billing rate of $450 to arrive at the $253,485.00 that it awarded to the petitioner.
¶ 32 The petitioner made no argument in its brief addressed to the propriety of the mathematical
calculation made by the circuit court or to the circuit court’s disallowance of fees for 163.05 hours
of time that the petitioner claimed was expended in representing the respondent. As a
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consequence, any claim of error based on either argument has been forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R 341(h)(7)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 33 Forfeiture aside, we find no error in the manner in which the circuit court calculated the
fee award or in its disallowance of certain claimed hours of service in arriving at the fees awarded.
“The trial court's determination as to an appropriate award of attorney fees must be considered in
light of the principle that the trial judge is permitted to use his own knowledge and experience to
assess the time required to complete particular activities, and a court of review may not reverse an
award of attorney fees merely because it may have reached a different conclusion.” Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1074 (1993). When a trial court
reduces the amount requested in a fee petition, the court's ruling should include the reasons
justifying a particular reduction. Shortino v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 279 Ill. App. 3d 769, 773
(1996).
¶ 34 In its February 14, 2014, order, the circuit court specifically set forth its reasons for
disallowing portions of the time claimed by the petitioner in its representation of the respondent
as set forth in the exhibit attached to its fee petition. The court found that the 102.2 hours claimed
for work done post-discharge were not compensable. It disallowed time claimed for vacating a
dismissal for want of prosecution that the court found was entered “due to the attorney’s failure to
submit the required case management email report.” The court also disallowed hours that it found
to be duplicative, excessive, or part of normal overhead expenses. We find that the circuit court’s
disallowance of portions of time claimed by the petitioner to have been expended in its
representation was made based on its assessment of the hours claimed and its knowledge and
experience with this case. The circuit court was in a superior position to determine whether the
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dismissal for want of prosecution was due to attorney error, and whether the work done by the
petitioner after discharge conferred no benefit to the respondent; both categories of hours were
properly excluded without an evidentiary hearing. The other modifications were reductions for
duplicate activities, time spent preparing or reviewing simple documents or motions, and vague
entries for “research”. We find that all these reductions and exclusions were within the knowledge
and experience of the circuit court regarding the benefit claimed activity to the respondent and the
time needed to complete certain tasks. It was well within the circuit court’s discretion to resolve
these matters without an evidentiary hearing. See A.L. Dougherty Real Estate Management Co,
2017 IL App (1st) 161949, ¶¶ 49-50 (finding that circuit court did not abuse discretion by denying
request for an evidentiary hearing when circuit court evaluated petition and “disallowed or reduced
numerous entries for fees that were excessive, not recoverable, or insufficiently supported”).
Further, find no basis to conclude that the circuit court’s disallowance of any of the hours claimed
was arbitrary, made without the employment of conscientious judgement, exceeded the bounds of
reason or ignored recognized principles of law.
¶ 35 In its briefs, the petitioner argues that there are factual controversies raised by the affidavits
submitted in support of and in opposition to its fee petition which required an evidentiary hearing
to resolve. However, the disputed facts relate in the main to services performed by Deratany and
Kosner and specifically Kosner as substitute counsel and the reasons for the petitioner’s discharge.
Those factual disputes relating to specific services performed by Kosner or the time that it took to
perform those services are neither outcome determinative or relevant to a determination of the
reasonable fees to which the petitioner is entitled, nor are the reasons for the petitioner’s discharge.
The circuit court was called upon to determine a reasonable fee to be awarded to the petitioner
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based on quantum meruit, for the services it performed in representing the respondent. It was not
called upon to determine a reasonable fee for Deratany and Kosner. Nor was the circuit court
tasked to determine the reasons for the petitioner’s discharge. The facts necessary to the
determination of a reasonable fee for the petitioner’s services in this case were matters within the
knowledge and experience of the judge who presided over both the fee petition proceeding and the
underlying case in addition to facts taken from the petitioner’s own petition and exhibit. We find
no abuse of discretion in the circuit court having resolved the fee petition without an evidentiary
hearing. Further, to the extent that the petitioner also argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion by not affording it the right to file a reply to the response filed in opposition to its fee
petition or by failing to consider the affidavits sent via email on the eve of the scheduled ruling on
the petition, we also find no abuse of the discretion. TIG Ins. Co. v. Canel, 389 Ill. App. 3d 366,
375 (2009) (circuit court has discretion to grant or withhold permission regarding a briefing
schedule). Nathanson was present when the circuit court set the briefing schedule on the fee
petition and did not request the opportunity to file a reply, nor did the petitioner ever make a formal
request by motion for leave to file a reply.
¶ 36 The petitioner also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding it less
than 20% of the total attorney fee to be paid from the proceeds of respondent’s settlement of the
underlying case. The argument appears to be based on a comparison/apportionment approach to
the award of attorney fees, which entails comparing the services provided by a discharged attorney
with the services provided by the successor attorney and then awarding the portion of the recovery
allocable to attorney fees to the attorneys based on the ratio of work performed by each. DeLaPaz,
Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 976. However, the comparison/apportionment approach has been rejected
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by this court. Id. at 975-76; Susan E. Loggans & Associates v. Estate of Magid, 226 Ill.App.3d
147, 168 (1992). Rather, a discharged attorney is only entitled to the reasonable value of the
services rendered during the period of employment. In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 41-
42. That determination was correctly made by the circuit court in this case by multiplying the
amount of time that the petitioner spent performing legitimate services for the respondent and then
multiplying that time by Nathanson’s hourly rate.
¶ 37 The petitioner’s brief also asserts, in the first paragraph of the argument section, that the
circuit court abused its discretion in denying its motion to reconsider. In the concluding paragraph
of its brief the petitioner requests that this court reverse the circuit court’s May 6, 2024, order
denying its motion to reconsider. However, the petitioner has cited no authority addressed to the
propriety of the circuit court’s denial of its motion to reconsider. As a reviewing court, we are
entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined and arguments supported by pertinent
authority. In re Marriage of Solano, 2019 IL App (2d) 180011, ¶ 70; Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011
IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides, in
relevant part, that arguments “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons
therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Arguments not
supported by citation to relevant authority are forfeited. Vernon Hills Illinois Limited Partnership
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 303, 310-11 (1997). Having failed to
cite any authority in support of its argument that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying
its motion to reconsider its February 14, 2024, order awarding attorney fees and costs, the
petitioner has forfeited the argument.
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¶ 38 Having found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when, without an evidentiary
hearing, it awarded the petitioner $253,485.00 in attorney fees for its representation of the
respondent prior to discharge plus $58,346.88 for costs incurred, we affirm the circuit court’s order
of February 14, 2024, and also affirm its order of May 6, 2024, denying the petitioner’s motion to
reconsider.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
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