Rialto Terrance Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: E086082
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 12/10/25 Rialto Terrance Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RIALTO TERRACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., E086082 Petitioners, (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2309894) v. OPINION THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,

Respondent;

K.H., a Minor, etc.,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. David E. Driscoll,

Judge. Petition granted.

Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, Vanessa K. Herzog, Nicholas M. Gedo, and

Jamie Lee for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

1 Mendez & Sanchez, Giancarlo Mendes, Michael A. Sanchez, and Arya

Tahmassebi for Real Party in Interest.

A child suffered serious injuries from a dog attack while in the garage of an

apartment complex. Petitioners are the owner, manager, and homeowners’ association of

the complex. A tenant of the complex owned the dog. The child, acting through his

guardian ad litem, asserted causes of action for negligence and premises liability against

petitioners. The trial court denied petitioners’ summary judgment motion.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate requiring the trial court to grant them summary

judgment based on the lack of any evidence they knew the dog posed a danger. We grant

the petition.

FACTS

On December 9, 2022, real party in interest K.H., a 12-year-old boy, was bitten on

the legs and genitals by a pit bull while in the garage of an apartment complex, causing

severe injuries. Petitioners are Legend Apex Investments LLC (Legend), which owned

the apartment complex; DFT, Inc. dba Cannon Management (Cannon), which managed

it; and Rialto Terrace Homeowners Association (Rialto), a homeowners’ association

formed when the property was originally developed as condominiums to be sold, though

it ended up as a residential rental property. A tenant in the complex, Trisha Scott, owned

the dog.

2 Scott’s lease prohibited her from having a dog in the apartment without prior

written authorization, and disallowed pit bulls (and certain other “dangerous” breeds)

altogether, with an exception for service or companion animals.

K.H., acting through his guardian ad litem, sued petitioners and Scott. He asserted 1 claims for premises liability and negligence against petitioners.

Petitioners moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary

adjudication. The motion argued petitioners had no actual notice that the dog was

dangerous.

The trial court denied the motion. The court found a triable issue of material fact

based on a “false exculpatory statement.” Jose Lira, a Cannon employee who performed

maintenance work at the complex, testified in his deposition that he had “never seen a

dog in that unit.” There was ample evidence, however, that Lira had seen Scott’s dog in

her apartment on multiple occasions before the attack, including testimony from Scott

and an inspection report Lira had prepared that mentioned the dog. The court reasoned a

jury could infer “actual knowledge of the pit bull’s dangerous propensity to attack by way

of Lira’s false exculpatory statement.”

The court found this inference “bolstered” by evidence from other witnesses.

Specifically, K.H.’s mother had seen the dog pulling another child “in a dragging

motion,” had heard the dog “growling and barking on several occasions,” and reported

1 A third cause of action against petitioners, for breach of contract/third party beneficiary, did not survive demurrer. A fourth cause of action, for strict liability, was asserted only against Scott.

3 2 that two neighbors had told her the dog had attempted to attack their own dogs. Also,

K.H. had encountered the dog in Scott’s apartment “a handful of times,” and the dog

would bark and growl at him from the crate where it was confined. None of these

incidents were reported to petitioners before the dog attacked K.H.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners argue the trial court erred by denying their summary judgment motion.

In their view, they had no duty to protect K.H. from Scott’s dog unless they had actual

knowledge of the dog’s dangerousness, and there is no evidence that they had such

knowledge. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

A court must grant summary judgment if there is no triable issue of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party challenging denial of summary judgment may do so by

writ petition. (Id., subd. (m)(1).) “‘Where the trial court’s denial of a motion for

summary judgment will result in trial on nonactionable claims, a writ of mandate will

issue.’” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1259-1260.) We

review a trial court’s decision on summary judgment de novo, determining independently

whether the undisputed material facts support summary judgment. (Id. at p. 1260; Intel

Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)

2 Petitioners made no written objections to the admission of statements by neighbors relayed by K.H.’s mother.

4 B. Premises Liability and Negligence

To prevail on a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant “owed them a legal duty, that it breached the duty, and that the breach was a

proximate or legal cause of their injuries.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th

465, 477.) Thus, “[r]ecovery for negligence depends as a threshold matter on the

existence of a legal duty of care.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213

(Brown).) Premises liability is a negligence theory an injured plaintiff can use to reach

the property owner, or other person who controls the property, for failing to exercise due

care in managing activities on the premises or warning of hidden defects. (See, e.g.,

Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 672.) “[T]he duty arising from

possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies

in negligence cases.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

“Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court.” (Brown,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213.) “Duty, being a question of law, is particularly amenable to

resolution by summary judgment.” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th

456, 465.)

“‘California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or

her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)’”

(Kesner v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1142.) “[T]here is generally no duty to

protect others from the conduct of third parties. The ‘special relationship’ doctrine is an

exception to this general rule.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court

5 (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 627.) Even if there is “a special relationship between the parties or

some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect,” the court

may nevertheless determine that “relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that

duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209; see Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d

108, 112-113 [listing factors to consider in determining whether to limit a duty].)

Courts considering attacks by tenants’ dogs have imposed a limited duty of care

on landlords arising from the landlord-tenant relationship between the landlord and the 3 dog owner. The first California case to define this limited duty of care was Uccello v.

Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504 (Uccello). The Uccello court held the landlord

owed the victim a duty of care if (1) the landlord had the ability to control the premises

rented by the dog owner, and (2) the landlord had actual knowledge of both the dog’s

presence and its “dangerous propensities.” (Id. at pp. 507, 512, 514 [quote].)

The landlord’s actual knowledge may be proven by direct evidence of what the

landlord actually knew or may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that the landlord

must have known the dog was dangerous. (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 514, fn.

4.) Evidence the landlord should have known the dog was dangerous is insufficient.

(Ibid.)

3 The parties have not distinguished between Legend, Cannon, and Rialto for purposes of this appeal, making arguments that treat them all collectively as a landlord, even though each has a different role in relation to the apartment complex where K.H. was injured. We will do the same in our discussion, treating petitioners collectively as the complex’s landlord.

6 Since Uccello, California courts have continued to impose this limited duty of care

on landlords who have actual knowledge of a dog’s dangerous propensities, and refused

to impose any duty of care absent such knowledge. (See Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property

Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369 [“[I]t is well established that a landlord

does not owe a duty of care to protect a third party from his or her tenant’s dog unless the

landlord has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities and the ability to

control or prevent the harm”].) For example, in Lundy v. California Realty (1985) 170

Cal.App.3d 813 (Lundy), this court observed: “An owner of a dog may be held liable for

injuries inflicted by it on another person without any showing the dog had any especially

dangerous propensities or that the owner knew of any such dangerous propensities.

[Citations.] However to impose liability on someone other than the owner, even a

keeper, “‘previous knowledge of the dog’s vicious nature must appear.”’” (Id. at p. 821.)

There is no direct evidence petitioners had actual knowledge Scott’s dog was

dangerous. No incidents of purportedly aggressive behavior were reported to petitioners.

Also, a landlord’s awareness of a tenant’s dog’s breed, without more, does not support an 4 inference of actual knowledge that the dog has dangerous propensities. (Lundy, supra,

170 Cal.App.3d at p. 822.)

4 In that vein, even though Scott’s lease generally restricted ownership of certain breeds, including pit bulls, apparently because of their reputation for aggression, it implicitly recognizes that individual members of any particular breed do not necessarily pose a danger, but on the contrary may act as service or companion animals.

7 Instead, relying in large part on Donchin v. Guerrero (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1832

(Donchin), K.H. argues Lira’s false exculpatory statement during his deposition, together

with the evidence of incidents that were not reported to petitioners, amounts to

circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether petitioners had

actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerousness. We are not persuaded.

In Donchin, the Court ofAppeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment for the defendant landlord, finding a triable issue about whether he knew about

the “vicious propensities of his tenant’s two rottweilers.” (Donchin, supra, 34

Cal.App.4th at p. 1835.) Initially, the landlord denied knowing the dogs were staying on

his property and denied giving permission for them to be on the property. (Id. at pp.

1841-1842.) During the litigation, however, including in a declaration in support of his

motion for summary judgment, the landlord conceded he had always known about the

dogs; they were mentioned in the rental agreement, and he had even played with the dogs

during monthly visits to the property to collect rent. (Id. at p. 1835.) Nevertheless, he

denied ever knowing the dogs were dangerous. (Id. at pp. 1835, 1840.) The Court of

Appeal found “the fact finder can reasonably infer [the landlord] falsely denied he knew

the dogs were dangerous from his initial false denial of knowledge they even existed.”

(Id. at p. 1843.)

That inference from the landlord’s initial denial of knowledge was “bolstered” by

“affirmative evidence” the landlord had actual knowledge of the dogs’ dangerousness.

(Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.) A neighbor said he feared the dogs and

8 described behavior “justifying that fear”; the dogs were routinely kept in the front yard,

and “frequently” escaped to “[run] loose around the neighborhood, lunging towards both

people and other dogs.” (Id. at pp. 1836, 1843.) A delivery person declared he saw the

dogs once a week, and “every time he entered their area they would ‘growl and show

their teeth, ram the wood fence, attempt to jump the fence and appeared extremely

ferocious.’” (Id. at p. 1843.) Neither the neighbor nor the delivery person reported these

incidents to the landlord, though the neighbor did tell another neighbor and made a report

to animal control. (Ibid.) An animal behaviorist, however, opined that the landlord, as a

“‘relative stranger’” to the dogs, had “‘undoubtedly witnessed’” similar “‘displays of

territorial aggressive behavior’” on his regular visits to the property. (Id. at p. 1844.)

The Court of Appeal reasoned that if a jury had “chosen to disbelieve [the landlord’s]

denial of knowledge” of the dogs’ “vicious propensities” and returned a verdict in the

plaintiff’s favor, it “would have concluded substantial evidence supported the jury’s

credibility judgment,” so there was a triable issue as to the landlord’s knowledge. (Id. at

p. 1845.)

Like our colleagues in Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018) 27

Cal.App.5th 487 (Ayon), we are “uncomfortable” with Donchin’s reasoning to the extent

it suggests the landlord’s false exculpatory statement alone sufficed to show a triable

issue as to the landlord’s actual knowledge of the dogs’ dangerousness. (Ayon, at p. 497.)

“[W]e would not uphold a jury verdict if the only evidence tying the defendant to the

crime was a false claim about an alibi.” (Id. at p. 498.) “That evidence may be relevant,

9 and thus admissible, on the question of the defendant’s guilt, but it would certainly not be

substantial.” (Ibid.) In our view, there was a triable issue of the Donchin landlord’s

actual knowledge only because the inference from his false exculpatory statement was

bolstered by affirmative evidence showing he must have known about the dogs’

dangerous propensities.

Also, the facts of our case differ from Donchin’s. In Donchin, there was evidence

the dogs were consistently and obviously aggressive toward unfamiliar people. Both a

neighbor and a delivery person described that behavior, and expressly stated that they

feared the dogs. (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.) In contrast, K.H.’s mother

described seeing Scott’s dog pulling another child “in a dragging motion,” but did not say

either that the child had been afraid or that she had been afraid for the child. She had

heard Scott’s dog “growling and barking on several occasions,” but again, did not say she

was afraid as a result, and did not provide specifics showing how what she heard might

have differed from normal dog behavior. K.H. saw Scott’s dog in Scott’s apartment,

locked in a kennel and barking and growling, but again there are no specifics to support

the conclusion this was a sign of dangerous aggression rather than the normal behavior of

a dog who had not been trained to stay quiet when confined away from visitors. The

same is true of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the dog barked and growled at

Lira from his kennel. Two neighbors had told K.H.’s mother that Scott’s dog had shown

aggression toward their own dogs, but that is not the same thing as aggression towards

humans. In Donchin, an expert on animal behavior reviewed multiple reports of the

10 dogs’ behavior, and concluded the landlord “‘being a relative stranger, . . . undoubtedly

witnessed displays of territorial aggressive behavior’” towards him. (Donchin, at p.

1844.) There is no similar expert evidence here.

In our view, Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149 (Yuzon) is more

analogous to this case than Donchin. In Yuzon, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment, finding no evidence the landlord knew of the dog’s vicious

tendencies. (Yuzon, at pp. 168-169.) The landlord testified he was unaware the dog who

attacked the plaintiff was on the property, though he had authorized a different dog when

the lease was signed. (Id. at p. 153.) The dog-owning tenant produced evidence showing

the owner did in fact know about the new dog. (Ibid.) Despite this contradictory

evidence, arguably showing a false exculpatory statement, the court distinguished

Donchin because the dog had not displayed the same consistent signs of aggressiveness

as the dog in Donchin, and the landlord had not routinely visited the property as did the

Donchin landlord. As such, the plaintiff had failed to show a triable issue as to whether

the landlord knew about the dog’s “vicious propensities.” (Yuzon, at p. 168.)

Similarly, in this case, there is some evidence Lira knew Scott was keeping a dog

in her apartment. Perhaps, having seen the dog, Lira knew or should have known that the

dog was an adult male pit bull, which is one of the restricted breeds under Scott’s lease.

Those facts are insufficient, however, to establish that he must have known the dog was

dangerous. (See Yuzon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 168; Lundy, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d

at p. 822.) Here, as in Yuzon, the evidence the dog posed a danger was at best

11 ambiguous, sufficient only for speculation that petitioners perhaps should have been

concerned about the dog’s presence, not that they must have known the dog was

dangerous. There is no direct evidence showing petitioners had actual knowledge the dog

was dangerous, nor is there circumstantial evidence supporting a reasonable inference

that they must have known it was dangerous, so petitioners are entitled to summary

judgment in their favor.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue directing

the respondent superior court to (1) vacate its order denying petitioners’ motion for

summary judgment and (2) enter a new order granting the motion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON Acting P. J.

MENETREZ J.