IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION RHONDA SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 1:26-cv-175-KD-N SODEXO, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER This civil action is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 2), or in forma pauperis (“IFP”), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This IFP motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See docket sheet reference notation 5/12/2026; S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b). Per 28 U.S.C. § 1914, “[t]he clerk of each district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee” and “such additional fee . . . as are prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)-(b). However, a district court may grant a plaintiff permission to proceed without prepayment of such fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows: [Generally], any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).1 “The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, ensures that indigent persons will have equal access to the judicial system.” Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612-13 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962)). However, “[t]here is no question that proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right,” Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986),2 and “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “while a trial court has broad discretion in denying an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915, it must not act arbitrarily and it may not deny the application on erroneous grounds.” Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing Flowers v. Turbine
Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[A] trial court has wide discretion in denying an application to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
2 Accord Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722, 724 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Leave to proceed IFP is, and always has been, the exception rather than the rule. To commence a civil lawsuit in federal district court, the general rule is that initiating parties must prepay a filing fee . . . .To be sure, proceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right— fundamental or otherwise.”), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). . . . . However, in denying such applications a court must not act arbitrarily. Nor may it deny the application on erroneous grounds.” (citation omitted)). When considering a motion filed pursuant to § 1915(a), “[t]he only determination to be made by the court ... is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 ([5]th Cir. 1976). An affidavit addressing the statutory language should be accepted by the court, absent a serious misrepresentation, and need not show that the litigant is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent status under § 1915. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338– 40, 69 S. Ct. 85, 88–89, 93 L. Ed. 43 (1948). Such an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents. Id. at 339, 69 S. Ct. at 89. In other words, the statute is not to be construed such that potential litigants are forced to become public charges or abandon their claims because of the filing fee requirements. Id. at 339–40, 69 S. Ct. at 89. . . . The district court must provide a sufficient explanation for its determination on IFP status to allow for meaningful appellate review. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131, 138 (5th Cir. 1969); Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988); Besecker v. State of Ill., 14 F.3d 309, 310 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (footnotes omitted). “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished)3 (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307-08). Upon consideration of the representations made by Plaintiff Rhonda Smith in the sworn IFP motion (Doc. 2), the undersigned is not persuaded that requiring Plaintiff to prepay the $405.00 filing fee for this action will impose an undue hardship
3 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. 3 on Plaintiff.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION RHONDA SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 1:26-cv-175-KD-N SODEXO, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER This civil action is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 2), or in forma pauperis (“IFP”), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This IFP motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See docket sheet reference notation 5/12/2026; S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b). Per 28 U.S.C. § 1914, “[t]he clerk of each district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee” and “such additional fee . . . as are prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)-(b). However, a district court may grant a plaintiff permission to proceed without prepayment of such fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows: [Generally], any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).1 “The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, ensures that indigent persons will have equal access to the judicial system.” Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612-13 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962)). However, “[t]here is no question that proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right,” Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986),2 and “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “while a trial court has broad discretion in denying an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915, it must not act arbitrarily and it may not deny the application on erroneous grounds.” Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing Flowers v. Turbine
Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[A] trial court has wide discretion in denying an application to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
2 Accord Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722, 724 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Leave to proceed IFP is, and always has been, the exception rather than the rule. To commence a civil lawsuit in federal district court, the general rule is that initiating parties must prepay a filing fee . . . .To be sure, proceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right— fundamental or otherwise.”), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). . . . . However, in denying such applications a court must not act arbitrarily. Nor may it deny the application on erroneous grounds.” (citation omitted)). When considering a motion filed pursuant to § 1915(a), “[t]he only determination to be made by the court ... is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 ([5]th Cir. 1976). An affidavit addressing the statutory language should be accepted by the court, absent a serious misrepresentation, and need not show that the litigant is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent status under § 1915. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338– 40, 69 S. Ct. 85, 88–89, 93 L. Ed. 43 (1948). Such an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents. Id. at 339, 69 S. Ct. at 89. In other words, the statute is not to be construed such that potential litigants are forced to become public charges or abandon their claims because of the filing fee requirements. Id. at 339–40, 69 S. Ct. at 89. . . . The district court must provide a sufficient explanation for its determination on IFP status to allow for meaningful appellate review. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131, 138 (5th Cir. 1969); Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988); Besecker v. State of Ill., 14 F.3d 309, 310 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (footnotes omitted). “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished)3 (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307-08). Upon consideration of the representations made by Plaintiff Rhonda Smith in the sworn IFP motion (Doc. 2), the undersigned is not persuaded that requiring Plaintiff to prepay the $405.00 filing fee for this action will impose an undue hardship
3 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. 3 on Plaintiff. The motion reflects that Plaintiff • is single • has no dependents • has been gainfully employed for eight months and is paid $718.24 per week • owns outright a Ford Taurus vehicle with a present value of $25,000 • pays $475 each month as rent on a house or apartment • is not receiving welfare benefits
Assuming, without deciding, that these factual representations are true, the IFP motion reflects that Plaintiff possesses sufficient assets that can be used, sold, and/or borrowed against to pay the fees for bringing this civil action. The only itemized expense, debt, or obligation identified by Plaintiff in the IFP motion is the $475 per month rent payment. On a monthly basis, Plaintiff’s wage income is more than six times the rent payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to, no later than JULY 2, 2026, either (1) pay to the Clerk of Court the $405.00 filing fee or (2) file a supplemental affidavit or sworn declaration providing additional relevant information which supports a claim of entitlement to IFP status in this action. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Order may result in the entry of a recommendation to the Court that the Plaintiff be denied leave to proceed IFP in this action, and that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and obey the Court’s orders unless the Plaintiff pays the filing fee within the time period for objections to the such a recommendation. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute and obey a court order under both Federal 4 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and the court’s inherent power to manage its docket); Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187, 187 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (denial of IFP motion is “the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal”); Escobedo v.
Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Obviously, if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial.”). DONE and ORDERED this the 8th day of June 2026. /s/ Katherine P. Nelson KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE