Rhodes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedNovember 24, 2025
Docket19-1619V
StatusUnpublished

This text of Rhodes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Rhodes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rhodes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2025).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-1619V Filed: October 28, 2025

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * KIM B. RHODES, * * Petitioner, * v. * * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Milton Clay Ragsdale, IV, Esq., Law Offices of M. Clay Ragsdale, Birmingham, AL, for petitioner. Lynn Christina Schlie, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION ON INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

Roth, Special Master:

On October 17, 2019, Kim B. Rhodes filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 2 alleging that she developed clinical rheumatoid arthritis as a result of the influenza (“flu”) vaccine she received on October 21, 2016. Petition, ECF No. 1.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on April 7, 2025. Motion for Interim Fees, ECF No. 83. Petitioner requests a total of $152,349.95, representing $135,319.00 in attorneys’ fees and $17,030.95 in costs. Id. at 5, 12. Respondent filed a response on April 10, 2025, deferring to the undersigned to determine whether the standard for an award of interim

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned finds that the identified material fits within this definition, such material will be redacted from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018). attorneys’ fees and costs was met and, if so, to determine a reasonable award. Response, ECF No. 84. Petitioner did not file a reply.

For the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s Motion for Interim Fees is GRANTED.

I. Legal Framework

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs. § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, petitioner’s counsel is automatically entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2013). However, a petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1).

The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs” under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee” is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.

Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

II. Discussion

A. Availability of Interim Fees

Special masters have discretion to award interim fees while the litigation is ongoing if “the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship” and the claim was “brought ‘in good faith’ and with ‘a reasonable basis.’” Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F. 3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1352. The court in Avera held that interim fees may be awarded “in appropriate circumstances.” 515 F. 3d at 1351. The court then listed some circumstances— cases involving “protracted” proceedings and “costly experts”—in which it would be “particularly appropriate” to award interim fees. Id. at 1352. But “the Federal Circuit in Avera . . . did not enunciate the universe of litigation circumstances which would warrant an award of interim attorney’s fees,” Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012), and “special masters [retain] broad discretion in determining whether to award” them, Al-Uffi ex rel. R.B. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015). In making this determination, “the special master may consider any of the unique facts of a case.” Rehn v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 126 Fed. Cl. 86, 94 (2016).

2 Under the circumstances of this case, interim fees are warranted. This case has been pending for over six years 3, which ordinarily “suffice[s] to constitute the type of ‘circumstances’ to warrant an interim fee award.” Woods, 105 Fed. Cl. at 154; see also, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-475V, 2018 WL 1559799, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 28, 2018) (“[I]nterim attorneys’ fees and costs are appropriate because waiting for the conclusion of the case would place an undue hardship in petitioner”); Kottenstette v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1016V, 2017 WL 5662780, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 30, 2017) (finding two- year proceeding constituted appropriate circumstances for interim fees). During the pendency of her claim, petitioner has filed extensive medical records, three expert reports, and a Motion for Ruling on the Record with a substantive brief and reply. As such, petitioner has expended significant time and costs in litigating this matter thus far, and it will be some time before a decision is complete. At this juncture, I find that petitioner has satisfied the good faith and reasonable basis requirements to allow for an award of attorneys’ fees. Further, the circumstances of this case warrant an award of interim fees and costs to not impose economic hardship on petitioner.

B. Reasonable Hourly Rates

A “reasonable hourly rate” is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir.

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