Peters, C. J.
The sole issue on this appeal is a determination of the scope of General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45, which regulate the business practices of pawnbrokers. In the face of possible criminal prosecution, the plaintiff Robert D. Rhodes, a licensed pawnbroker,1 sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45 apply to financing arrangements known as repurchase transactions. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that repurchase transactions do fall within the ambit of the two statutes. The plaintiff appeals from this judgment.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In conducting a repurchase transaction, the plaintiff purchases an item from a customer at 60 percent of its fair market value and gives the customer an option to repurchase the item at a stipulated price and within a [91]*91stipulated period of time, which is not less than fifteen days nor more than two months.2 He determines the repurchase price by adding 20 percent of the fair market value (which is 33V3 percent of the purchase price) each month to the purchase price. Upon delivering the item to the plaintiff, the customer signs and retains a copy of a document entitled “Repurchase Agreement,” which he must present to the plaintiff in order to repurchase the item. On those occasions on which the plaintiff lends money on a traditional pledge of pawned property, he lends the customer only half of the amount that would be available under a repurchase. Virtually all of the terms and conditions of these pawnbroking transactions are determined by the plaintiff.
General Statutes § 21-443 prescribes the maximum interest rates that pawnbrokers may charge on money they lend. General Statutes § 21-454 sets the minimum length of time that pawnbrokers must retain pledged personalty before it can be sold to the general public. [92]*92At trial, the plaintiff claimed that these provisions, which by their express language regulate loans, do not apply to his repurchase transactions because repurchase transactions are not loans. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs contention. Labeling the repurchase transaction a subterfuge for a loan, and positing that “[o]ne should not be able to avoid a tax on shoes by calling shoes slippers,” the trial court held that General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45 do apply to repurchase transactions. The plaintiff renews his claim on appeal. We find no error.
Before reaching the merits of this case, we must, as a preliminary matter, decide whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this action for declaratory relief even though the plaintiff is not presently engaging in repurchase transactions. A declaratory judgment action is a special proceeding under General Statutes § 52-29 that is implemented by §§ 389 and 390 of the Practice Book. Kiszkiel v. Gwiazda, 174 Conn. 176, 180, 383 A.2d 1348 (1978). Section 390 (b) of the Practice Book conditions declaratory relief upon the existence of “an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute ... which requires settlement between the parties.” The need for settlement of the dispute must be viewed in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Kiszkiel v. Gwiazda, supra, 181. In this case, the plaintiffs complaint alleged, and the state admits, that the state had manifested its intention to prosecute him for violation of §§ 21-44 and 21-45.5 Because the plaintiff has been restricted in pursuing his livelihood, his dispute with the state raises a substantial question suitable for [93]*93declaratory adjudication. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate this action.
Turning to the merits, we review the trial court’s construction of §§ 21-44 and 21-45 in light of well established principles that require us to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 370-71, 511 A.2d 336 (1986); State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984); State v. Delafose, 185 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1984) § 45.05. When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature. Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1986); Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). When we are confronted, however, with ambiguity in a statute, we seek to ascertain the actual intent by looking to the words of the statute itself; State v. Kozlowski, supra, 673; Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute; State v. Kozlowski, supra, 673; DeFonce Construction Corporation v. State, 198 Conn. 185, 187, 501 A.2d 745 (1985); State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 161, 496 A.2d 186 (1985); State v. Delafose, supra, 522; and the purpose the statute is to serve. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 221, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982); Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 8, 434 A.2d 293 (1980).
Examination of the language of §§ 21-44 and 21-45 reveals that neither statute plainly defines the pawnbroking activity to which it applies. Section 21-44 pro[94]*94vides, in relevant part, that “[n]o pawnbroker or loan broker or person who loans money on the pledge of personal property shall take or receive, directly or indirectly, for the use of money loaned on personal property, any more” than the interest rates prescribed therein. Section 21-45, apparently referring to the same class of pawnbroking transactions alluded to in § 21-44, provides that “[n]o such lender shall sell or dispose of any personal property left with him in pledge for money loaned in less than six months from the day when the same is left in pledge as aforesaid . . . . ” In determining the applicability of these two sections, the central issue before us is, therefore, whether a pawnbroker who engages in a repurchase transaction is, for purposes of § 21-44, a pawnbroker who takes or receives, directly or indirectly, interest in return for the use of money he loans on the pledge of personal property.
The plaintiff claims that, because §§ 21-44 and 21-45 are penal in nature, we should construe their provisions strictly and resolve any ambiguity in his favor. We disagree.
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Peters, C. J.
The sole issue on this appeal is a determination of the scope of General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45, which regulate the business practices of pawnbrokers. In the face of possible criminal prosecution, the plaintiff Robert D. Rhodes, a licensed pawnbroker,1 sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45 apply to financing arrangements known as repurchase transactions. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that repurchase transactions do fall within the ambit of the two statutes. The plaintiff appeals from this judgment.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In conducting a repurchase transaction, the plaintiff purchases an item from a customer at 60 percent of its fair market value and gives the customer an option to repurchase the item at a stipulated price and within a [91]*91stipulated period of time, which is not less than fifteen days nor more than two months.2 He determines the repurchase price by adding 20 percent of the fair market value (which is 33V3 percent of the purchase price) each month to the purchase price. Upon delivering the item to the plaintiff, the customer signs and retains a copy of a document entitled “Repurchase Agreement,” which he must present to the plaintiff in order to repurchase the item. On those occasions on which the plaintiff lends money on a traditional pledge of pawned property, he lends the customer only half of the amount that would be available under a repurchase. Virtually all of the terms and conditions of these pawnbroking transactions are determined by the plaintiff.
General Statutes § 21-443 prescribes the maximum interest rates that pawnbrokers may charge on money they lend. General Statutes § 21-454 sets the minimum length of time that pawnbrokers must retain pledged personalty before it can be sold to the general public. [92]*92At trial, the plaintiff claimed that these provisions, which by their express language regulate loans, do not apply to his repurchase transactions because repurchase transactions are not loans. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs contention. Labeling the repurchase transaction a subterfuge for a loan, and positing that “[o]ne should not be able to avoid a tax on shoes by calling shoes slippers,” the trial court held that General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45 do apply to repurchase transactions. The plaintiff renews his claim on appeal. We find no error.
Before reaching the merits of this case, we must, as a preliminary matter, decide whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this action for declaratory relief even though the plaintiff is not presently engaging in repurchase transactions. A declaratory judgment action is a special proceeding under General Statutes § 52-29 that is implemented by §§ 389 and 390 of the Practice Book. Kiszkiel v. Gwiazda, 174 Conn. 176, 180, 383 A.2d 1348 (1978). Section 390 (b) of the Practice Book conditions declaratory relief upon the existence of “an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute ... which requires settlement between the parties.” The need for settlement of the dispute must be viewed in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Kiszkiel v. Gwiazda, supra, 181. In this case, the plaintiffs complaint alleged, and the state admits, that the state had manifested its intention to prosecute him for violation of §§ 21-44 and 21-45.5 Because the plaintiff has been restricted in pursuing his livelihood, his dispute with the state raises a substantial question suitable for [93]*93declaratory adjudication. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate this action.
Turning to the merits, we review the trial court’s construction of §§ 21-44 and 21-45 in light of well established principles that require us to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 370-71, 511 A.2d 336 (1986); State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984); State v. Delafose, 185 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1984) § 45.05. When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature. Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1986); Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). When we are confronted, however, with ambiguity in a statute, we seek to ascertain the actual intent by looking to the words of the statute itself; State v. Kozlowski, supra, 673; Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute; State v. Kozlowski, supra, 673; DeFonce Construction Corporation v. State, 198 Conn. 185, 187, 501 A.2d 745 (1985); State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 161, 496 A.2d 186 (1985); State v. Delafose, supra, 522; and the purpose the statute is to serve. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 221, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982); Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 8, 434 A.2d 293 (1980).
Examination of the language of §§ 21-44 and 21-45 reveals that neither statute plainly defines the pawnbroking activity to which it applies. Section 21-44 pro[94]*94vides, in relevant part, that “[n]o pawnbroker or loan broker or person who loans money on the pledge of personal property shall take or receive, directly or indirectly, for the use of money loaned on personal property, any more” than the interest rates prescribed therein. Section 21-45, apparently referring to the same class of pawnbroking transactions alluded to in § 21-44, provides that “[n]o such lender shall sell or dispose of any personal property left with him in pledge for money loaned in less than six months from the day when the same is left in pledge as aforesaid . . . . ” In determining the applicability of these two sections, the central issue before us is, therefore, whether a pawnbroker who engages in a repurchase transaction is, for purposes of § 21-44, a pawnbroker who takes or receives, directly or indirectly, interest in return for the use of money he loans on the pledge of personal property.
The plaintiff claims that, because §§ 21-44 and 21-45 are penal in nature, we should construe their provisions strictly and resolve any ambiguity in his favor. We disagree. The plaintiff is correct in his assertion that the pawnbroking statutes have a penal component, as his own incipient prosecution for their violation demonstrates. See General Statutes § 21-47.6 We note, however, that although penal statutes are to be construed [95]*95strictly; Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 125, 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555, 271 A.2d 99 (1970); Hollenbeck v. Getz, 63 Conn. 385, 387, 28 A. 519 (1893); we need not adopt the narrowest technical meaning of a criminal statute so as to disregard the context in which it exists and to frustrate its obvious legislative intent. State v. Kozlowski, supra; State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151, 460 A.2d 26 (1983). Moreover, the facts of this case do not warrant special deference to the rule of strict construction. The plaintiff no longer faces criminal charges. He brought this declaratory judgment action to test the scope of criminal liability created by §§ 21-44 and 21-45 and to determine whether he may lawfully resume his customary business practices. Since the plaintiff runs no immediate risk of criminal exposure, his case does not present as compelling a case for a rule of strict construction as it would if it arose in the context of a prosecution of a criminal defendant. Finally, the rule of strict construction must be balanced against the competing interest of effectuating the public policy of the pawnbroking laws as remedial statutes. See Borzencki v. Estate of Stakum, 195 Conn. 368, 383, 489 A.2d 341 (1985); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 520, 461 A.2d 938 (1983); State v. Hurlburt, 82 Conn. 232, 236, 72 A. 1079 (1909).
The plaintiff urges us to hold that a pawnbroker’s involvement in a repurchase transaction does not constitute the taking or receiving, directly or indirectly, of interest in return for the use of money he loans on the pledge of personal property. In support of his argument, he claims that the language of § 21-44 limits its application to loans. Because a repurchase transaction takes the form of a sale with an option to repurchase rather than the form of a loan, he contends that repurchase transactions are beyond the scope of §§ 21-44 and 21-45. This reasoning, however, fails to take into [96]*96account the fact that the statute expressly governs loans given in return for indirect, as well as direct, interest payments. By extending the statutes’ coverage to transactions involving the indirect payment of interest, the legislature indicated that it intended the statutes to regulate not only those transactions that take the classic form of a conventional pawnbroking loan, but also financing arrangements that, in substance if not in form, amount to the economic equivalents of such a loan. Accordingly, the statutes apply to any transaction, regardless of its label or form, in which a pawnbroker gives a customer money and, in return, receives the right to hold the customer’s property and the right to demand payment from the customer for the use of the money before allowing the customer to reclaim his property.
A comparison of repurchase transactions with conventional pawnbroking loans illustrates that the two modes of finance are equivalents for purposes of General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45. In a typical pawnbroking loan, the pawnbroker lends money to his customer in return for a pledge of personal property. The customer can reclaim the pledged property by repaying the principal of the loan with interest. The pawnbroker may sell the property to the general public if the customer does not repay the loan within a predetermined period of time. In a repurchase transaction, the customer sells his property to the pawnbroker and retains an option to repurchase it within a specified period of time at a higher price. The difference between the repurchase price and the original sales price of the item amounts to a fee that the customer must pay for the use of the pawnbroker’s money. Whether or not the parties to the transaction label it as interest, this premium constitutes the type of indirect interest envisaged by the drafters of §§ 21-44 and 21-45. Because repurchase transactions satisfy the descrip[97]*97tion of regulated financing arrangements contained in § 21-44, we conclude that pawnbrokers who engage in repurchase transactions are subject to the restrictions imposed by §§ 21-44 and 21-45.
Our conclusion comports with the remedial purpose of pawnbroking statutes. We have long recognized that pawnbroking is a business “peculiarly demanding special regulation.” Sinclair, Scott Co. v. Miller, 80 Conn. 303, 307, 68 A. 257 (1907); accord State v. Griffith, 83 Conn. 1, 74 A. 1068 (1910), aff'd, 218 U.S. 563, 31 S. Ct. 132, 54 L. Ed. 1151 (1910). In enacting these statutes, the legislature sought to protect impecunious borrowers from extortionate interest rates and oppressive financing terms that some pawnbrokers might otherwise impose. See State v. Hurlburt, supra, 236. At the time of the passage of the predecessors to General Statutes §§ 21-44 and 21-45, repurchase transactions were recognized as vehicles used by unscrupulous pawnbrokers to extract usurious interest rates from their customers. One early twentieth century commentator, in his comprehensive treatise on the development of the law of pawnbroking, observed: “The greatest evil of the small money lending business is caused throughout the United States by those ubiquitous individuals who assist persons in need through bills of sale, with agreement which includes a right to repurchase. Instead of the regular pawnbroker’s ticket there passes between the borrower and the money lender agreements, by means of which the latter expects to gain quicker and higher returns than if he conducted his business as a pawnbroker .... The money lender is in many cases a duly licensed pawnbroker whose transactions must be shown by means of tickets. But he conducts the transaction under the guise of a purchase with the right of repurchase agreement. This system permits him to evade all pawnbroking laws, and make a greater profit than [98]*98if he charged the pawnbroker’s interest.” (Emphasis added.) S. Levine, A Treatise on the Law of Pawnbroking (1911) pp. 115-16. If we were to construe §§ 21-44 and 21-45 to exclude repurchase transactions from coverage as urged by the plaintiff, we would in effect leave such financing arrangements virtually unregulated.
When viewed alongside analogous statutes regulating consumer transactions7 and small loans,8 the restrictions governing the pawnbroking industry represent examples of a general policy designed to prevent over[99]*99bearing lenders and commercial entrepreneurs from exploiting impecunious borrowers and consumers who lack bargaining power. Cf. Fairfield Credit Corporation v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 551, 264 A.2d 547 (1969). In the absence of any clear manifestation of a legislative intent to define pawnbroking transactions narrowly, and thereby to contradict the strong public policy that favors protection of those who must have recourse to pawnbrokers, we will not impute such a purpose to the legislature.
The plaintiff challenges this conclusion by comparing the language of § 21-39,9 a licensing statute for [100]*100pawnbrokers that specifically states that repurchase transactions are subject to its provisions, with the language of §§ 21-44 and 21-45, which does not expressly mention repurchase transactions. He points out that in 1905, the legislature amended the predecessor to § 21-3910 to incorporate a reference to repurchase transactions, but made no similar alteration in the [101]*101predecessors to §§ 21-44 and 21-45.11 Arguing that the legislature would have also amended §§ 21-44 and 21-45 if it had intended these sections to apply to repurchase transactions, he cites the legislature’s failure to do so as compelling evidence that the statutes do not encompass repurchase agreements. We find the plaintiff’s contention unpersuasive.
There is no legislative history that explains why repurchase transactions are not expressly mentioned [102]*102in §§ 21-44 and 21-45 when they do appear in § 21-39. It is likely that the legislature omitted such specific references because it believed that §§ 21-44 and 21-45, in addressing themselves to financial arrangements that call for the payment of indirect, as well as direct, interest in return for the use of money, already adequately indicated that they apply to such transactions.
We further note that the legislature manifested its intent, in General Statutes § 21-39 et seq., to regulate conduct that impinges on all aspects of pawnbroking. These statutes do not merely establish licensing requirements, interest rate restrictions and retention periods. They also make pawnbrokers accountable to city officials on a regular basis requiring, for example, that they periodically furnish business records and [103]*103sworn statements which describe the transactions they have conducted. General Statutes §§ 21-41, 21-43. City officials thereby serve as industry watchdogs, responsible for scrutinizing the activities of pawnbrokers and guarding against any illegal practices. General Statutes § 21-42, furthermore, requires pawnbrokers to give each customer a receipt containing information about the customer and the item pawned or pledged. It would have been unreasonable for the legislature to have required pawnbrokers who conduct repurchase transactions to be licensed, without also requiring their compliance with these other pawnbroking statutes. We note that the plaintiff has failed to cite any prior instance in the last eighty years in which a repurchase transaction has been argued to fall outside of the regulatory scope of our pawnbroking statutes.
We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly held that repurchase transactions are subject to the restrictions contained in §§ 21-44 and 21-45.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.