R.G. v. Marion County Office, Department of Family & Children

647 N.E.2d 326, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 160, 1995 WL 68876
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 22, 1995
Docket49A02-9405-JV-243
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 647 N.E.2d 326 (R.G. v. Marion County Office, Department of Family & Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R.G. v. Marion County Office, Department of Family & Children, 647 N.E.2d 326, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 160, 1995 WL 68876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinions

OPINION

STATON, Judge.

R.G. ("Mother") and T.G. ("Father") appeal from the trial court's judgment terminating their parental rights. They present three issues for our review which we consolidate into two and restate as follows:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment.
II. Whether the trial court improperly considered Mother and Father's mental disabilities as a determining factor in its decision to terminate their parental rights.

We affirm.

Mother and Father are the parents of B.J.G., who was born on March 28, 1989. Mother and Father have been diagnosed as mildly retarded with IL.Q.'s of 64 and 62, respectively. B.J.G. was born five weeks premature and was on a sleep apnea monitor and oxygen support from age six weeks through eighteen months.1 B.J.G. was placed in respite care with a foster family in April 1989.2 B.J.G. was declared a "Child in Need of Services" by the Marion County Office of Family and Children (CMCOFC") on May 17, 1989 and placed in foster care.3

On July 18, 1989, Mother and Father signed an Agreed Entry which was approved by the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, wherein they agreed that B.J.G. would remain in foster care so long as he needed the apnea monitor. Upon B.J.G.'s removal from the apnea monitor, Mother and Father agreed to: (1) gradually increased supervised visits with B.J.G.; (2) overnight visits with B.J.G. upon recommendation from his supervising nurse; (8) participate in counseling and parent training; (4) cooperate with the Semi-Independent Living Program of Noble Centers ("SLIPS") 4; and (5) attend B.J.G.'s medical appointments.

One hundred and fifty six supervised visits were scheduled from January 11, 1990 through November 18, 1991 of which Mother and Father attended 112. The supervised visits were then stopped based upon MCOFC's determination that Mother and Father were not sufficiently progressing from their counseling and training. MCOFC filed a petition for termination on November [328]*32818, 1992. After a hearing, the trial court granted MCOFC's petition.

L.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mother and Father contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment terminating their rights.

Where the trial court has heard evidence and has had the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, we will not set aside the judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. Eigly v. Blackford County DPW (1992), Ind., 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234-35. When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 1285.

To effect the involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship, the following elements must be supported by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;
(2) there is a reasonable probability that:
(A) the conditions that resulted in the child's removal will not be remedied; or
(B) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child;
(3) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(4) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

IND.CODE 81-6-5-4(c) (1998).

Mother and Father contend that the evidence does not suggest that there was a reasonable probability that they would never be able to independently parent B.J.G. Mother and Father also state that there was insufficient evidence to prove that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of B.J.G.

In evaluating the circumstances of terminating parental rights, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. In re Children: T.C. and Parents: P.C. (1994), Ind.App., 630 N.E.2d 1368, 1373, reh. denied. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. Matter of AM. (1993), 596 N.E.2d 236, 238, trans. denied.

The trial court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. J.L.L. v. Madison County DPW (1994), Ind.App., 628 N.E.2d 1228, 1227.

To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the condition which resulted in the removal of the child from the parent will not be remedied, the trial court must judge the parents' fitness for the care of their child as of the time of the termination hearing taking into account any evidence of changed conditions. Egly, supra, at 1234. The court must also evaluate the parents' pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id.

Mother and Father contend that their gradual progression in counseling and parental training is indicative of their potential to raise B.J.G. independently at some point in the future, and that because of this potential, their parental rights should not be terminated.

The record indicates that Mother and Father have shown isolated areas of improvement in attending to B.J.G. during their supervised visits. The registered nurse who supervised the visits between B.J.G. and Mother and Father testified that Mother had learned to change B.J.G.'s diapers without prompting, placed B.J.G. in his car seat without assistance, and encouraged B.J.G. to eat his meal independently with a spoon. The nurse also stated that Mother and Father were able to understand the importance of home safety and could identify several age [329]*329related developments such as crawling, walking, and talking.5

However, the nurse testified that she could not recommend unsupervised visits or overnight visits between them because such visits could potentially endanger the safety of B.J.G. She indicated that during such visits, Mother and Father would be unable to meet B.J.G.'s basic needs because they would be unable to determine when B.J.G. was in need of a medical emergency, whether B.J.G. was getting food properly, and whether B.J.G. needed a change in diapers. In her reports, she noted that during the supervised visitations, that B.J.G. often ate the lunch prepared by his foster mother because Mother and Father did not have enough money to feed the child and that Mother and Father mentioned they had financial problems.6

The record shows that Mother and Father are no longer involved in the SLIPS program. Father indicated that he did not require any help and Mother stated that she can do things on her own. However, a case worker assigned to Mother, testified that Mother would benefit from being in a SLIPS program because she needed assistance with managing her finances and her household duties.

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R.G. v. Marion County Office, Department of Family & Children
647 N.E.2d 326 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
647 N.E.2d 326, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 160, 1995 WL 68876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rg-v-marion-county-office-department-of-family-children-indctapp-1995.