Reza Tehrani v. John Mattos

Opinion

3 REZA TEHRANI, Case No.: 2:25-cv-02389-APG-EJY 4 Petitioner, Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, Reopening Case, 5 vs. and Setting Briefing Schedule

6 JOHN MATTOS, [ECF No. 21]

7 Respondent

8 9 On January 5, 2026, Reza Tehrani filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 10 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 4. Tehrani sought to be released from the custody of the U.S. 11 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and “to receive a bond hearing.” Id. at 8. On 12 January 26, 2026, an immigration judge (IJ) conducted a bond hearing and ordered Tehrani be 13 released on a $3,500 bond and “ATD [alternatives to detention] at the direction and discretion of 14 DHS/ERO.” ECF No. 16-1 at 2. Because Tehrani received a bond hearing, I denied his habeas 15 petition as moot. ECF No. 19. 16 Tehrani moves for reconsideration, arguing that his petition is not moot because he 17 learned that after the government secured a dismissal of his petition in this case, it appealed the 18 IJ’s decision granting him release on bond.1 According to Tehrani, the government argued in the 19 appeal that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to order the bond and that Tehrani should challenge his 20 detention through habeas proceedings. Tehrani thus contends the government should be 21

1 It is not clear if the government appealed the order or what the status of any appeal is. The 22 government does not dispute that it filed an appeal, but a search of the government’s Automated Case Information System does not reflect that an appeal was filed. See EOIR Automated Case 23 Info, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMGR. REV., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited June 17, 2026) (showing “[n]o appeal was received for [Tehrani’s] case”). 1 judicially estopped from asking this court to dismiss his habeas petition as moot due to the IJ’s 2 bond order while also arguing to the Board of Immigration Appeals that the IJ had no jurisdiction 3 to enter that bond order and that Tehrani’s only remedy is through a habeas petition. Tehrani 4 also argues that his petition is not moot in any event because he asked for release from custody,

5 not just a bond hearing. Tehrani argues that I should vacate my prior ruling and grant him 6 release independent of the bond proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that I order the 7 government to show cause for (1) his prior detention, (2) the new conditions of release imposed 8 by the bond, which he asserts includes ankle monitoring, and (3) its attempts to take him back 9 into custody through an appeal of the bond decision despite telling this court that his habeas 10 petition was moot. 11 The government responds that Tehrani must first exhaust his administrative remedies by 12 appealing the IJ’s bond decision if he is dissatisfied with that order. The government also argues 13 that my order dismissing the case as moot was not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust because 14 there is no dispute that Tehrani was released on bond as he requested in his petition. The

15 government contends that even if the government’s appeal of the IJ’s decision is newly 16 discovered evidence, that does not support reconsideration because the government is entitled to 17 appeal the IJ’s decision and Tehrani can oppose the government’s appeal in those proceedings. 18 Tehrani replies that he need not exhaust administrative remedies because the IJ’s bond 19 order did not require ankle monitoring; rather, that was ICE’s decision. Although the bond order 20 permits ATD at ICE’s discretion, he asserts that ATD does not necessarily mean ankle 21 monitoring and the decision whether to use ankle monitoring was ICE’s, not the IJ’s. He 22 therefore argues that appealing the bond order’s “broad and indeterminate delegation of authority 23 would not have provided a genuine opportunity for adequate relief and indeed would have been 1 futile.” ECF No. 27 at 2 (quotation omitted). He also argues that because ICE imposed ankle 2 monitoring with no justification, and because the government appealed the bond order, his 3 petition is not moot because the IJ’s bond order and ICE’s ankle monitoring condition impose 4 restrictions on his liberty.

5 A district court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or 6 modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient,” so long as it has jurisdiction. 7 City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) 8 (simplified); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 & 9 n.14 (1983) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court 10 (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision 11 was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 12 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A district court 13 also may reconsider its decision if “other, highly unusual, circumstances” warrant it. Id. “A 14 motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments upon

15 which the court already has ruled.” In re AgriBioTech, Inc., 319 B.R. 207, 209 (D. Nev. 2004). 16 Additionally, a motion for reconsideration may not be based on arguments or evidence that could 17 have been raised previously. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 18 Cir. 2000). 19 I grant Tehrani’s motion for reconsideration in that I will reopen the case and direct 20 Tehrani to file an amended petition by July 6, 2026. The amended petition must raise all 21 grounds Tehrani seeks to raise relating to his initial detention, as well as any new claims related 22 to events that occurred after he filed his original petition. If Tehrani is going to ask me to review 23 the IJ’s decision to grant discretionary authority to DHS to impose ADT conditions, then he must address the government’s argument that he must first exhaust his administrative remedies, as well as the legal authority that would permit me to review that decision. If he is going to ask me to review ICE’s decision to impose ankle monitoring and the other conditions ICE imposed, then he must outline the statutory, regulatory, or other legal authority that would permit me to review 5} that decision, as well as whether administrative exhaustion is required related to that review. 6 The government must file its response to the amended petition by July 20, 2026. If the government moves to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds, such as a failure to exhaust 8|| administrative remedies, it must also address any substantive grounds Tehrani raises, or I will 9) deem its response to those arguments waived. And if the government is going to argue Tehrani 10|| must exhaust administrative remedies to challenge either the IJ’s decision or ICE’s decision, then must outline the statutory, regulatory, or other legal authority by which Tehrani could exhaust 12]|in each circumstance. 13 Additionally, both parties should address the status and impact of the government’s appeal in the immigration proceedings (if one was filed). 15 I THEREFORE ORDER that petitioner Reza Tehrani’s motion for reconsideration (ECF 16|| No. 21) is GRANTED. The clerk of court is instructed to reopen this case. 17 I FURTHER ORDER that petitioner Reza Tehrani’s amended petition for writ of habeas 18]| corpus is due July 6, 2026. 19 I FURTHER ORDER that the respondents’ response is due July 20, 2026. 20 I FURTHER ORDER that the petitioner’s reply is due July 27, 2026. 21 DATED this 18th day of June, 2026. 22 G- ANDREWP.GORDON. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE