Reynolds v. State

276 S.W.2d 279, 162 Tex. Crim. 143, 1955 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1576

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 5, 1955
• Docket: 27258
• Status: Published

Opinions

BELCHER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted under Art. 514, P.C., on nineteen separate counts in the information which charged that on nineteen separate days she “did unlawfully keep, and was then and there concerned in keeping and did then and there aid and assist and abet in keeping a bawdy house.” This statute provides that for each day any person violates its terms, he shall be fined $200 and confined in jail for twenty days. The judgment rendered herein against appellant was for 380 days’ confinement in jail and fines totaling $3,800.

It is not disputed that the appellant owned the motel here involved at all times alleged in the information.

The state’s evidence shows, that appellant, on each and all of the dates alleged in the nineteen counts upon which she was convicted, was operating said motel by and through her manager and porters who were conducting the business; that prostitutes were at said motel at said times for the purpose of prostitution and that they did commit illicit acts of intercourse with men, for which they received money, in the cabins and houses kept and provided for them or other persons at the motel with the consent and knowledge of appellant’s manager and porters; that appellant knew that said cabins and houses were being so kept, occupied and used for prostitution; and that she was paid by said manager and porters a percentage of the money which they received from the prostitutes for their acts of prostitution on the said nineteen days with knowledge that the money came in payment for acts of prostitution in her motel.

Appellant, while testifying in her own behalf, denied any knowledge of any acts or conduct on the part of anyone at said motel which would show the keeping or operating of a bawdy house.

The evidence supports the conviction under each of said nineteen counts of the information.

There is one formal bill of exception and no informal bills are indexed in the statement of facts filed on July 6, 1954.

Appellant delivered to the clerk of the county criminal court of Dallas County her “Index to Bills of Exception” to the statement of facts 155 or 156 days after she gave notice of appeal, and the same was received by the clerk of this court on September 30, 1954.

If appellant desired to preserve for review her exceptions to the admission of evidence as shown in the statement of facts, it was incumbent upon her to see that the statement of facts included as a part thereof an index to the exceptions relied upon before she filed it. Art. 759a, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., Sec. 3; Greenwood v. State, 157 Texas Cr. R. 58, 246 S.W. 2d 191; Tucker v. State, 157 Texas Cr. R. 259, 247 S.W. 2d 901; Simone v. State, 157 Texas Cr. R. 393, 248 S.W. 2d 938; Bristow v. State, 160 Texas Cr. R. 111, 267 S.W. 2d 415.

By formal bill of exception, appellant complains of the refusal of the trial court to hear testimony in support of her motion for a new trial which alleged that the three principal witnesses that gave testimony against appellant would then testify that appellant did not have any knowledge of the acts of prostitution at said motel and that they testified falsely concerning her knowledge of said acts.

Appellant’s motion for new trial is not verified or supported by affidavit and is therefore insufficient as a pleading and cannot be considered. Where matters extrinsic the record are sought to be presented as ground for new trial, the motion should be verified. The motion being insufficient, no error is shown in refusing to hear testimony in support thereof. Art. 756, C.C.P., Note 11; 31 Texas Jur. 298, Sec. 95; Crittenton v. State, 146 Texas Cr. R. 486, 176 S.W. 2d 757.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.