Reynolds v. Mika Properties LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 15, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-12047
StatusUnknown

This text of Reynolds v. Mika Properties LLC (Reynolds v. Mika Properties LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. Mika Properties LLC, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN E. REYNOLDS

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-12047 MIKA PROPERTIES LLC, Honorable Linda V. Parker KATYA VENEDIKTOVA, MICHAEL BARENBOYM, AARON D. FOX, ANDREW HEROLD, and DAVID ROSENBERG,

Defendants. _____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND REQUIRING HIM TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed this pro se lawsuit against Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) He also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 5.) The Court is granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, because no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction is apparent from the face of the Complaint, the Court is ordering Plaintiff to file an amendment complaint setting forth facts, if he is able, establishing federal-court jurisdiction. COMPLAINT The lawsuit relates to property in Detroit, Michigan, which Plaintiff acquired

through a land contract with Defendant Mika Properties LLC (“Mika”). (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2 ¶ 11.) Defendants Katya Venediktova and Michael Barenboym own Mika. (Id. ¶ 6.) After the property was damaged in a fire, Plaintiff attempted to

repair it using insurance proceeds issued in his name. (Id. ¶ 11.) He claims Defendants interfered with the repair and then obtained a default judgment for forfeiture in state court. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claims Defendants used improper service and made false allegations

to obtain the forfeiture judgment. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants also sought the insurance proceeds ($205,000), which he claims are at risk of being released to them “under a flawed and fraudulent judgment.” (Id. at PageID. 3

¶ 15.) Defendant Aaron Cox is Mika’s attorney. (Id. at PageID.2 ¶ 8.) Defendants Andrew Herold and David Rosenberg represented Plaintiff in the state court proceedings, although Plaintiff claims they failed to file proper motions or appear in court. (Id. at PageID. 2-3 ¶¶ 9, 16.)

Plaintiff alleges “a disturbing pattern of procedural manipulation, possible collusion, and abuse of process.” (Id. at PageID.3 ¶ 17.) He asserts the following claims against all Defendants, except where noted: (I) a violation of due process

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (II) fraud upon the court; (III) abuse of process; (IV); tortious interference with contractual expectancy; (V) ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorneys Herold and Rosenberg; and (VI) unjust enrichment.

(Id. at PageID.3-4.) Plaintiff also seeks a temporary restraining order to stay the state court judgment. (Id. at PageID.4; see also ECF Nos. 4, 5.) APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint set forth a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. A

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, that when accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570 (2007)). A

claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Even when read liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), Plaintiff’s allegations fail to plead a sufficient factual

basis for federal court jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and only have “the authority to decide cases that the Constitution and Congress have empowered them

to resolve.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). The basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction must appear “on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342

F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Generally, federal court jurisdiction is premised on “federal question” or “diversity” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, respectively.

Federal Question Jurisdiction Under § 1331, district courts have jurisdiction over “actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The complaint must establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that

the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1,

27-28 (1983)). While Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his allegations do not support a claim under the statute. To state a viable claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or

laws of the United States; and (2) this deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Littler v. Ohio Assoc. of Pub. Sch. Emps., 88 F.4th 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Tahfs v.

Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish federal question jurisdiction because there is no basis to conclude that any Defendant was acting under color of state law. Defendants are private entities or

individuals. “A plaintiff may not proceed under § 1983 against a private party ‘no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’ the party’s conduct.” See Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). To establish that a private defendant was acting under color of state law, the plaintiff must allege facts establishing that the defendant’s conduct causing the deprivation of federal law was “fairly attributable to the State.” Littler, 88 F.4th at

1180-81 (quoting Lugar v.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.
457 U.S. 922 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Elease Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital
895 F.2d 1131 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)
Floyd Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transport, Inc.
462 F.3d 536 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
Ohio Ex Rel. Skaggs v. Brunner
549 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Sister Michael Marie v. American Red Cross
771 F.3d 344 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Christina Littler v. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Emps.
88 F.4th 1176 (Sixth Circuit, 2023)

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