Reynolds v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 12, 2019
• Docket: 3:17-cv-04202
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICHARD LANCE REYNOLDS, Case No. 17-cv-04202-SI

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 J. MERENDA, Re: Dkt. No. 27 11 Defendant.

12 13 In this pro se prisoner’s civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Richard Lance Reynolds 14 claims that correctional officer Merenda violated Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment rights. Merenda 15 now moves for partial summary judgment on the merits of Reynolds’ claim and on the defense of 16 qualified immunity. Reynolds does not oppose the motion. For the reasons discussed below, 17 Merenda’s motion for partial summary judgment will be granted. The case will be referred to the 18 Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. 19 20 BACKGROUND 21 Reynolds alleges that Merenda used excessive force on two occasions: (1) during efforts to 22 handcuff Reynolds in the medical area and (2) in Merenda’s office, moments after the handcuffing. 23 Only Merenda’s actions surrounding Reynolds’ handcuffing are at issue in the pending motion. 24 Therefore, only facts related to that incident are described below. Viewed in the light most favorable 25 to Reynolds,1 the evidence shows the following events occurred while Reynolds was at the 26 1 Merenda states that he intends to dispute many of Reynolds’ factual assertions at trial but 27 assumes those assertions to be true for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Docket No. 1 Correctional Training Facility in Soledad: 2 On April 5, 2016, an alarm sounded while Reynolds was exiting the bathroom at the Facility 3 “D” Yard Clinic. Docket No. 1 at 3. After exiting the bathroom, Reynolds was instructed to sit 4 down on the clinic bench. Id. As Reynolds was attempting to comply with these instructions, 5 Merenda yelled at Reynolds: “‘Hey[,] don’t you know you are suppose [sic] to sit down when the 6 alarm is sounding, you stupid Mother Fucker?’” Id.2 At this point, Reynolds apparently was seated, 7 but after hearing Merenda’s comment, Reynolds “jumped up on [his] feet” again and said to 8 Merenda: “Hey, you know what, fuck you, you fucking cock sucker.” Docket No. 27-2 at 15. 9 Reynolds continued to yell at Merenda: “I was in the fucking bathroom, fucking pissing when that 10 fucking alarm went off.” Id. Reynolds stated at his deposition that he “didn’t hold [his] lip” and 11 “let [Merenda] have it” for cursing at him. Id. at 16. 12 In response to Reynolds’ comments and actions, Merenda told Reynolds to put his arms 13 against the wall. Docket No. 1 at 3. Reynolds extended his left arm straight up on the wall. 14 However, Reynolds could only extend his right arm about 90 degrees away from his body and told 15 Merenda that “‘this arm doesn’t go up any more. It’s fucking titanium.’” Docket No. 27-2 at 18; 16 see also Docket No. 1 at 3. (Although Reynolds states in his complaint his left arm had limited 17 mobility, he testified at his deposition that the problem arm was actually his right arm.) Merenda 18 did not accept Reynolds’ claim and attempted to pull Reynolds’ right arm up the wall to match the 19 left arm’s position. Docket No. 27-2 at 18–19. As Merenda began to move Reynolds’ right arm 20 “maybe three [or] four inches” up the wall, Reynolds yelled “it won’t go up, [my arm]’s fucking 21 titanium.” Id. at 20–21. Merenda stopped moving Reynolds right arm immediately after Reynolds 22 yelled out. Id. at 22. However, the movement of Reynolds’ arm was enough to cause him “severe 23 and extreme pain.” Docket No. 1 at 3; see also Docket No. 27-2 at 24. The pain lasted three to five 24 seconds. Docket No. 27-2 at 26. Merenda then moved both of Reynolds’ arms behind Reynolds’ 25 back and pushed him through a door. Id. at 22. This action also caused Reynolds discomfort, but 26 2 The parties’ language is quoted not for its eloquence but to give context to their actions. 27 Reynolds urges that Merenda’s disrespectful language triggered Reynolds’ responsive comments 1 Reynolds did not mention it to Merenda. Id. at 24. Reynolds was not physically injured as a result 2 of these actions. 3 Once outside, Reynolds was handcuffed. Reynolds believes he was handcuffed by 4 correctional officer Gomez, apparently at Merenda’s request. Id. at 23 (“I’m pretty sure Gomez gets 5 involved and he’s the one that handcuffed me . . . .”; id. at 25 (“Q. Do you remember who it was 6 who put the handcuffs on? A. I’m almost sure it was Gomez because he is the C.O. that went . . . 7 with [Merenda].”). After being handcuffed, Reynolds was led to Merenda’s office. (As noted 8 earlier, Reynolds contends excessive force was used on him in the office also, but Merenda has not 9 moved for summary judgment on that claim.) 10 At the relevant time, Reynolds had a titanium shoulder replacement and a titanium rod in his 11 upper arm. Docket No. 27-2 at 11. There is no evidence that having a titanium shoulder replacement 12 or titanium rod necessarily limits a person’s range of motion. There also is no evidence that 13 Reynolds had anything visible (such as a brace) that would have suggested to Merenda that 14 Reynolds’ range of motion was limited. 15 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that there 18 is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as 19 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party who 20 fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 21 case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of 22 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 23 facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A fact is material if it 24 might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is 25 genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 26 party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 27 Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the 1 the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by [his or her] own affidavits, or by the 2 ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing 3 that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). 4 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 5 based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. 6 McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10–11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint as 7 opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff 8 stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were not based 9 purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Here, Reynolds’ complaint and amendment 10 thereto (Docket Nos. 1 and 13) were signed under penalty of perjury and the facts in them are 11 considered as evidence for purposes of deciding the motion. 12 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 13 determinations nor to weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 14 Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence 15 must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the inferences to be drawn 16 from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 631. 17 18 DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiff Reynolds claims defendant Merenda violated Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment rights 20 when Merenda forcefully restrained Reynolds following Reynolds’ confrontation of Merenda. 21 Merenda contends that no Eighth Amendment violation occurred and to the extent one did, Merenda 22 is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that 23 Merenda’s conduct was unlawful at the time. 24 25 A. Qualified Immunity Defense 26 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil 27 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 1 The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to balance two important and sometimes competing 2 interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and 3 the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 4 reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). To determine whether an official is 5 entitled to qualified immunity, the court must decide whether the facts show the official’s conduct 6 violated a constitutional right; and, if so, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 7 conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 8 (2001); see also generally Pearson, 555 U.S. 223 (overruling Saucier’s requirement that qualified 9 immunity analysis proceeds in a particular sequence). 10 11 1. Eighth Amendment Violation 12 The treatment an inmate receives in custody and the conditions under which he is confined 13 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 14 When a prison official stands accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth 15 Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain 16 or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 17 1, 6–7 (1992); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying “malicious and 18 sadistic” standard to claim that prison guards used excessive force when attempting to quell a prison 19 riot). In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 20 discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need 21 for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent 22 of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts 23 made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; LeMaire v. Maass, 12 24 F.3d 1444, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) 25 (guards may use force only in proportion to need in each situation). 26 Here, there was a need for some force against Reynolds in response to Reynolds’ verbal 27 outburst and physically provocative actions. After Merenda yelled at Reynolds, Reynolds admitted 1 confront Merenda and hurling Merenda’s initial insult back at him, along with other expletives. See 2 Docket No. 27-2 at 15–16. Reynolds’ outburst threatened order within the prison and could have 3 reasonably been perceived by Merenda to require force to reestablish it. These facts support the 4 conclusion that Merenda’s conduct was aimed at maintaining or restoring discipline, not for the 5 malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm. 6 In addition, the amount of force used by Merenda was appropriate for the need. Although 7 Reynolds’ actions were not overly aggressive, neither was Merenda’s response. By restraining 8 Reynolds, Merenda restored order to the situation using minimal force. Reynolds did not suffer 9 physical injuries from the initial handcuffing—just three to five seconds of pain. (There is no 10 evidence that the bruises mentioned in the complaint were due to the movement of the arm; rather, 11 the bruises alleged in the complaint apparently resulted from the object that hit Reynolds in the face 12 while in Merenda’s office.) The lack of injuries is not dispositive. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 13 However, it is another factor that indicates Merenda did not use force maliciously and sadistically 14 to cause harm. See id. at 9-10 (not every “malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 15 cause of action. . . . The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments 16 necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force.”) 17 Reynolds’ position apparently is that Merenda had to accept Reynolds’ assertion at face 18 value that his right shoulder was made of titanium and had limited mobility. This is not the case. 19 In scenarios where a suspect tells an officer about a pre-existing injury, the “officer need not 20 endanger himself by unduly crediting [the] suspect’s mere claim of injury.” Winterrowd v. Nelson, 21 480 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).3 There is no evidence that existence of a titanium shoulder 22 necessarily means the arm’s motion is limited; rather, it was Reynolds’ individual situation that his 23

24 3 In Winterrowd, police officers pulled over plaintiff Winterrowd because they believed his car’s license plates were invalid. Id. at 1182. Winterrowd was asked to put his arms behind his 25 back for a pat down. Id. Winterrowd told the police officers that because his right shoulder was injured, his right arm could not reach behind his back. Id. at 1182. Ignoring this information, a 26 police officer forced Winterrowd on to the hood of Winterrowd’s car, grabbed his right arm, and pushed it behind his back. Id. at 1183. Winterrowd screamed in pain, but the officer did not let go. 27 Instead, the officer “applied greater pressure, pumping [Winterrowd’s] arm up and down.” Id. The 1 arm’s range of motion was limited due to his particular shoulder replacement. Therefore, Merenda 2 did not have to immediately cease all efforts to restrain Reynolds in light of his claim of pre-existing 3 injury. By ceasing to apply pressure to Reynolds’ right arm after moving the arm just a few inches 4 and confirming Reynolds’ claim that the right arm’s motion was limited, Merenda tempered his use 5 of force appropriately for the situation.4 6 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find an 7 Eighth Amendment violation occurred when Merenda moved Reynolds’ arm a few inches in 8 preparation for handcuffing. 9 With respect to the actual handcuffing, the record shows a different correctional officer, not 10 Merenda, handcuffed Reynolds at Merenda’s direction. Reynolds explained this in his deposition, 11 and it is not disputed in his verified complaint. In addition, regardless of who actually handcuffed 12 Reynolds, this force was a good-faith effort to restore discipline after Reynolds’ outburst for the 13 same reasons outlined above. Whoever handcuffed Reynolds was reasonably responding to the 14 same threat Merenda was attempting to address when he initially patted down and restrained 15 Reynolds. As a result, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find an Eighth Amendment 16 violation occurred during the actual handcuffing of Reynolds, let alone a violation by Merenda. 17 18 2. A Reasonable Official Could Have Thought the Acts Lawful 19 In this case, Merenda prevails on the first prong of the Saucier test because there was not a 20 violation of Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See 21 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (threshold question in qualified immunity analysis is: “Taken in the light 22 most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct 23 violated a constitutional right?”). Even assuming, arguendo, that there was an Eighth Amendment 24 violation in Merenda’s actions, Merenda would prevail on the second prong of the qualified 25 4 This fact helps distinguish Reynolds’ case from Winterrowd. The police officer in 26 Winterrowd continued to hurt Winterrowd after realizing his pre-existing injury was real by applying greater force and “pumping [Winterrowd’s] arm up and down.” Winterrowd, 480 F.3d at 1183. 27 Conversely here, Merenda immediately stopped moving Reynolds’ arm and let it down when 1 immunity test because there was no clearly established law controlling the specific facts of this case. 2 “An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s 3 contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood 4 that he was violating it,’ meaning that ‘existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional 5 question beyond debate.’” City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 6 (2015) (alteration and omission in original; citation omitted). This is an “exacting standard” which 7 “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by 8 protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (alteration 9 in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–18 10 (2014) (law not clearly established whether officer may conduct a “knock and talk” at any entrance 11 to a home that is open to visitors, rather than only at the front door); Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 12 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2019) (defendants entitled to qualified immunity where “the specific right that 13 the inmates claim in these cases—the right to be free from heightened exposure to Valley Fever 14 spores—was not clearly established at the time”); Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 15 601–02 (9th Cir. 2019) (officer entitled to qualified immunity on failure-to-protect claim from 16 pretrial detainee who attempted to hang himself because there was conflicting information as to 17 whether he was suicidal and the case law “was simply too sparse, and involved circumstances too 18 distinct from those in this case, to establish that a reasonable officer would perceive a substantial 19 risk that [detainee] would imminently attempt suicide”). 20 The Supreme Court “has repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to 21 define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 22 (2018) (per curiam) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a woman who was armed 23 with a large knife, was ignoring officers’ orders to drop the weapon, and was within striking distance of her housemate; prior cases on excessive force did not clearly establish that it was unlawful to use 24 force under these circumstances, where officer may not have been in apparent danger but believed 25 woman was a threat to her housemate). 26 Here, it would not have been clear to a reasonable official in Merenda’s position that he must 27 1 the inmate in a manner consistent with such a claim. Nor is there clearly established law that a 2 correctional officer must accept at face value an inmate’s claimed physical inability to comply with 3 a request. Indeed, the one case found nearly on point, Winterrowd, explained that an officer does 4 not need to accept a suspect’s claim of pre-existing injury. Winterrowd, 480 F.3d at 1184.5 5 It also was not clearly established law that an inmate—who physically confronts a 6 correctional officer—has “the right to be free from forceful restraint against a wall.” Cabrera v. 7 Clark Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 2:12-cv-00918-RFB-CWH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49678, at *20 (D. Nev. 8 Apr. 12, 2016). In Cabrera, the plaintiff inmate Cabrera was slammed against a wall by defendant 9 correctional officer Neville after Cabrera disrupted a class Neville was leading and physically 10 confronted Neville. Id. at *5–*6. Neville held Cabrera against the wall for thirty seconds before 11 instructing Neville to return to his seat. Id. In granting the officer’s summary judgment motion, the 12 court determined that there was no Eighth Amendment excessive force violation. Id. at *19. 13 Furthermore, the court noted Neville was entitled qualified immunity “even if Cabrera had been 14 slammed more forcefully against the wall,” given the medical evidence indicating a lack of injuries. 15 Id. at *21–*22. 16 Here, the facts are nearly identical to Cabrera so it would not have been clear to Merenda 17 that his conduct was unlawful. In both cases, (1) an inmate stood up in a physically provocative 18 manner and mouthed off to the officer, (2) the officer responded by forcefully restraining the inmate 19 against the wall, and (3) there was a lack of medical evidence of any injury to the inmate. Although 20 the plaintiff in Cabrera did not have a physical impairment, because Merenda stopped moving 21 Reynolds’ arm as soon as he confirmed Reynolds’ assertions of its limited motion, any momentary 22 pain suffered from this movement does not differentiate the case from Cabrera. Therefore, even if 23 a constitutional violation did occur, Merenda is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not 24 have been clear to Merenda that his actions were unlawful. 25 5 Although Winterrowd involved a free citizen, the same rule can be applied to inmates. The 26 rule may even provide correctional officers greater latitude than police officers because prisoners “have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate 27 standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint,” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 1 C. Referral to Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program 2 With only one excessive force claim remaining, this case appears to be a good candidate for 3 the court’s mediation program. Good cause appearing therefor, this case is now referred to 4 Magistrate Judge Illman for mediation or settlement proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner 5 Mediation Program. The proceedings will take place within 120 days of the date this order is filed. 6 Magistrate Judge Illman will coordinate a time and date for mediation or settlement proceedings 7 with all interested parties and/or their representatives and, within five days after the conclusion of 8 the proceedings, file with the court a report for the prisoner mediation or settlement proceedings. 9 Plaintiff must attend and participate in the mediation or settlement conference proceedings. 10 The conference may be set up so that he will appear in person, by videoconference, or by telephone; 11 he must attend in whatever format Magistrate Judge Illman chooses. Plaintiff is cautioned that he 12 may be sanctioned for failure to comply with an order to participate in a mediation or settlement 13 conference, and such sanctions may include dismissal of part or all of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 16(a), (f), and 41(b). 15 16 D. Plaintiff’s Request For Copies 17 Reynolds sent a letter to the Court requesting a copy of pages 72-125 of his deposition. 18 Docket No. 28. The Court does not have those pages. Copies of depositions are not automatically 19 sent to the Court. Rather, the Court record will include parts or all of deposition transcripts only 20 when the parties file them in connection with a pending motion. Here, the excerpts of Reynolds’ 21 deposition that were filed by Merenda do not include the requested pages. If Reynolds wants to 22 obtain the other pages from his deposition, he should contact defense counsel or the court reporter 23 who transcribed the deposition. 24 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, Merenda’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED 27 with respect to the events surrounding Reynolds’ handcuffing. Docket No. 27. Merenda is entitled 1 based on events surrounding Reynolds’ handcuffing and on the defense of qualified immunity for 2 || that claim only. 3 This action is now referred to Magistrate Judge IlIman for mediation or settlement 4 || proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. The Clerk shall send a copy of 5 || this order to Magistrate Judge Illman. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: November 12, 2019 Site WU tee 9 □□ SUSAN ILLSTON 10 United States District Judge 11 a 12

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