Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJuly 7, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-04012
StatusUnknown

This text of Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka (Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka, (D. Kan. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

LESLIE J. REYNARD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 19-4012-HLT-TJJ ) WASHBURN UNIVERSITY ) OF TOPEKA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER On July 1, 2020, the Court conducted a telephone hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and to Quash Document Request (ECF No 60). Plaintiff appeared through counsel, Heather J. Schlozman and Mark V. Dugan. Defendant appeared through counsel, Timothy A. Shultz. This order memorializes the Court’s oral rulings during the hearing. I. Relevant Background Plaintiff filed the present motion on June 23, 2020, seeking a protective order requiring Plaintiff’s deposition be taken remotely by video, and an order that Defendant’s request for documents in the deposition notice be quashed. The Court previously conducted a phone status conference regarding Plaintiff’s deposition on May 19, 2020.1 Plaintiff argued then, as she does now, that her age (73 years old),2 multiple underlying health conditions,3 and her husband’s age (71 years old) and stage 4 cancer4 make appearing in person for her deposition dangerous

1 See ECF No. 57. 2 ECF No. 60-1 at 2, ¶ 1. 3 Id. at ¶ 2 (Plaintiff’s conditions include chronic-acute Epstein Barr virus, fibromyalgia, probable myalgic encephalomyelitis, complex migraine/probable reversible cerebral vascular syndrome, erosive esophagitis, and deteriorating vision in left eye). 4 Id. at ¶ 3–4. because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant did not then, and does not now, dispute the health problems asserted by Plaintiff and her husband. However, Defendant opposed taking Plaintiff’s deposition via videoconference, stressing the importance of taking the deposition of a plaintiff who is asserting a significant damage claim, in person. Defendant argued it would have adequate safeguards in place to protect Plaintiff during her in person deposition.5 Defendant also

argued taking the deposition remotely would put Defendant at a disadvantage because of its inability to observe Plaintiff in-person, and because a video deposition in this situation would be impossible given the large number of deposition exhibits that will be utilized in Plaintiff’s deposition.6 Additionally, Defendant expressed concern that Plaintiff does not have sufficient internet capability to appear by video, noting that Plaintiff was unable to participate in a video meeting she previously had with Defendant due to her unstable internet connection.7 Plaintiff states now that she has resolved her internet difficulties and is “confident” she “could be available for a videoconference deposition.”8 During the May 19, 2020 hearing, the Court discussed with counsel various factors it

would weigh in determining whether, and if so under what conditions, Plaintiff’s remote deposition might be required. The Court extended the discovery deadline to allow Plaintiff’s deposition to be delayed and instructed the parties to continue to confer and attempt to resolve their dispute. The Court also instructed that if the parties were unable to resolve the dispute, Defendant should file a notice of deposition, and Plaintiff could file a motion for protective order.

5 See ECF No. 57 at 1–2. 6 Id. at 1. 7 Id. 8 ECF No. 60-1 at 3, ¶ 7. On June 15, 2020, Defendant noticed Plaintiff’s deposition for July 7 and 8, 2020 at defense counsel’s office in Topeka, Kansas.9 Plaintiff filed the present motion on June 23, 2020. The Court abbreviated the briefing schedule and set a phone hearing on July 1, 2020, in order to have a ruling in advance of Plaintiff’s deposition. Defendant filed its response on June 30, 2020, and Plaintiff filed her reply shortly before the hearing on July 1, 2020, pursuant to the Court’s

order setting the hearing.10 Based upon the briefing and arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion. The Court ordered that Plaintiff’s deposition shall proceed remotely and that Plaintiff shall produce all documents responsive to Defendant’s discovery requests to which she did not object prior to her deposition, for all of the reasons explained during the hearing and set out in detail below. II. Legal Standard Plaintiff brings this motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) and 30(b)(4). Rule 26(c)(1) states, in relevant part: “A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. … The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense …”

9 ECF No. 58. The parties previously agreed to certain aspects of the deposition, including that it will be limited to seven hours, and it will be split into two sessions. See ECF No. 57 at 2. There is a disagreement now as to whether the deposition is limited to seven hours or eight hours. See ECF No. 63 at 4–5 (“The deposition, by agreement of parties and pursuant to the Scheduling Order issued in this case … is scheduled for 8 hours.”) and ECF No. 64 at 2 n.2 (“The parties’ more recent discussions, however, have addressed a seven-hour deposition, and the Court’s May 26, 2020 Third Amended Scheduling Order notes that the deposition ‘will be limited to seven hours.’”). The original Scheduling Order in this case does reflect that Plaintiff’s deposition will be limited to eight hours (ECF No. 25 at 8). But, as Plaintiff indicates in her reply, and as counsel represented to the Court during the May 19, 2020 telephone status conference, the parties have since agreed to limit Plaintiff’s deposition to seven hours. Therefore, Plaintiff’s deposition shall be limited to seven hours split into two days. 10 See ECF No. 61. Rule 30(b)(4) states: “The parties may stipulate—or the court may on motion order— that a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means.”

The party seeking a protective order has the burden to show good cause for it.11 This Court has previously noted that “Rule 30(b)(4) is permissive, not mandatory, and the Court must exercise its discretion in determining whether the moving party has shown good cause for issuance of a protective order requiring that a deposition be taken remotely.”12 To establish good cause, a party must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”13 The Court “has broad discretion to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”14 The Supreme Court has recognized that trial courts are “in the best position to weigh the fairly competing needs and interests of the parties affected by discovery. The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.”15 III. Analysis A. Whether Plaintiff has shown good cause for her deposition to be taken remotely The Court considers first whether Plaintiff has shown good cause for a remote deposition. In support of her motion requesting a protective order requiring her deposition be taken

11 Univ. of Kan. Ctr. for Research, Inc. v. United States, No. CIVA 08-2565-JAR-DJW, 2010 WL 571824, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 2010) (citing Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 691 (D. Kan. 2000)). 12 Manley v. Bellendir, No. 18-CV-1220-EFM-TJJ, 2020 WL 2766508, at *2 (D. Kan. May 28, 2020). 13 Univ. of Kan. Ctr. for Research, Inc., 2010 WL 571824, at *3 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)). 14 Shockey v. Huhtamaki, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Kan. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). 15 Id.

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Related

Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
452 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Reed v. Bennett
193 F.R.D. 689 (D. Kansas, 2000)
Shockey v. Huhtamaki, Inc.
280 F.R.D. 598 (D. Kansas, 2012)

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Reynard v. Washburn University of Topeka, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynard-v-washburn-university-of-topeka-ksd-2020.