Reyes v. County of Alameda

Opinion

VANESSA REYES, et al., Case No. 20-cv-03971-DMR

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION v. TO DISMISS

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 10 Defendants.

On June 15, 2020, Plaintiffs Vanessa Reyes, Raymond Christopher Reyes, Sr., Yasmin Reyes, and minor R.R. filed this action against Defendants County of Alameda (“County”) and Wellpath, Inc. (“Wellpath”), bringing civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state laws. [Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”).] Defendants move to dismiss some of the claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). [Docket Nos. 10 (“Mot.”), 14 (“Reply”).] Plaintiffs oppose. [Docket No. 12 (“Opp.”).] This motion is appropriate for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. This action arises from the death of Raymond Christopher Reyes (“Decedent”) while he was incarcerated in Santa Rita Jail. Minor R.R. is the biological child of Decedent and Decedent’s wife, Vanessa Reyes. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Raymond Christoper Reyes, Sr. and Yasmin Reyes are the biological parents of Decedent. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The factual allegations in the complaint are sparse. On July 24, 2019, Decedent committed suicide while incarcerated in Santa Rita Jail. Compl. ¶ 16. He allegedly expressed suicidal ideations while being booked, but the jail staff did not place him on suicide watch. Id. ¶ 17. Jail deputies Decedent allegedly ingested methamphetamine while under supervision.1 Id. Deputies attempted to revive Decedent with naloxone; however, that drug is used to treat heroin (not methamphetamine) overdoses. Id. Plaintiffs bring claims for (1) violation of Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) wrongful death (section 1983); (3) a survival action for violation of Decedent’s civil rights (section 1983); (4) violation of Plaintiffs’ right to a familial relationship (section 1983); (5) a claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (6) negligence; (7) a claim for failure to summon medical care in violation of California Government Code § 845.6; (8) wrongful death; (9) intentional inflection of emotional distress; and (10) medical negligence. All Plaintiffs assert all claims against all Defendants, except that the fifth claim is brought solely against the County and Doe Defendants. II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR 12(B)(6) MOTIONS A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v.

1 The complaint seems to suggest that Decedent died of a methamphetamine overdose but that Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). As a general rule, a court may not consider “any material beyond the pleadings” when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” id. at 689 (citing Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading,” without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1125-26. The court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). In their opposition, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their second, third, ninth, and tenth claims, and the eighth claim as to Decedent’s parents. They also agreed to dismiss their request for injunctive relief and punitive damages. Defendants’ remaining arguments are that (1) the County is immune from Plaintiffs’ state law claims; (2) Decedent’s mother and father do not have standing to assert the first, fifth, sixth, or seventh claim; (3) Decedent’s wife and son have not perfected their first, fifth, sixth, or seventh claim; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Monell claim should be dismissed. A. County Immunity Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the County (the sixth claim for negligence and the eighth claim for wrongful death) must be dismissed because the County is immune from those claims. Generally, “a public entity is not liable for . . . [a]n injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Govt. Code § 844.6. The immunity provision extends to survival actions. See Lowman v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 127 Cal. App. 3d 613, 616 (1982) (finding that section 844.6 barred a survival action for wrongful death). However, there are limited exceptions. At issue here is whether the exception in Government Code section 845.6 applies. That provision states: caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6. Plaintiffs assert that Decedent “made statements of clear suicidal intent at booking, but nothing was done to address his suicidality.” Id. at 4. They argue that county employees therefore knew of Decedent’s need for immediate medical care and failed to provide it. Id. at 4-5. This obligation could have been fulfilled, for example, by placing Decedent under observation. See id. at 5. Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs plead the elements for the section 845.6 exception in their seventh claim. The factual allegations underlying all three claims is the same: namely, that county employees knew of Decedent’s need for medical care and failed to provide it, thereby causing fatal injury to Decedent. Plaintiffs do not offer any justification or exception for independently maintaining the sixth and eighth claims against the County. Therefore, those claims are essentially duplicative of the seventh claim and are dismissed as to the County. See Hernandez v. Cty. of Santa Clara, Case No. 19-cv-07888-EJD, 2020 WL 3101041, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2020) (dismissing claims against a county for negligence and wrongful death where the plaintiffs also pleaded a claim under section 845.6). B. Survivorship Claims As a general rule, “only the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated can sue to vindicate those rights.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended (Nov. 24, 1998) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). However, survival actions are permitted under section 1983 if state law authorizes a survival action. Id. The plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that “a particular state’s law authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s requirements for bringing a survival action.” Id. Defendants do not dispute that California authorizes survival actions, and such actions “may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.”). However, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not fulfilled the requirements to bring a survival claim under California law. Specifically, California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 requires a plaintiff to execute and file an affidavit or declaration stating, among other things, that the declarant is the decedent’s successor in interest or authorized to act on behalf of the decedent’s successor in interest. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.32(a)(5). The statute also requires the plaintiffs to attach a certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate to the affidavit or declaration. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.32(a)(5). At the time Defendants filed their motion, Plaintiffs had not filed any affidavit or declaration under section 377.32. Attached to their opposition, they submitted a declaration from Vanessa Reyes averring that she meets the requirements of the survival statute; a petition to appoint Vanessa Reyes as guardian ad litem for R.R.; and a second declaration from Vanessa Reyes, as guardian ad litem for R.R., that R.R. also meets the requirements to bring a survival claim. There are numerous issues with Plaintiffs’ submissions. First, they filed the petition to appoint Vanessa Reyes as guardian ad litem as an attachment to their opposition rather than as a separate motion. Second, they did not file any declaration by Raymond Christoper Reyes, Sr. or Yasmin Reyes. Finally, although the declarations state that “[a] copy of the decedent’s death certificate is attached to this declaration,” there is no such attachment. Defendants pointed out all of these errors in their reply, which they filed on August 3, 2020. On August 20, 2020, seventeen days later, Plaintiffs submitted another filing, styled as a motion to appoint Vanessa Reyes as guardian ad litem. See Docket No. 18. Attached to that filing are declarations pursuant to section 377.32 for all four plaintiffs. These declarations also suffer from some errors, including that the declarations were attached to the guardian ad litem motion and not filed separately and that the declarations still do not attach a certified copy of Decedent’s death certificate. While Plaintiffs’ attempts to comply with the survivorship statute have been sloppy and late, it seems likely that they will be able to cure these defects. The court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to appoint Vanessa Reyes as guardian ad litem for R.R. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall file declarations complete and compliant declarations may result in dismissal of Plaintiffs’ survivor claims. C. Monell Claim A municipality may face section 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). However, the municipality may be held liable “only for ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). It cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions. Id. (citations omitted). To establish municipal liability, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official policy’ requirement ‘was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,’ and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original). Official municipal policy includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (citations omitted). Such policy or practice must be a “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the County should be dismissed because Monell does not authorize an independent claim; it merely provides a basis for holding a municipality liable for other section 1983 claims. The argument seems to be that Plaintiffs bring multiple 1983 claims against the County, they do not explain how the County is liable for those claims except under Monell, and therefore the fifth claim is at most duplicative of the other section 1983 claims. The court agrees that the other section 1983 claims against the County are duplicative of the Monell claim. The County is liable for section 1983 claims only if Plaintiffs’ injury was caused by an “action pursuant to official municipal policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Plaintiffs’ fifth claim already pleads municipal liability under Monell and so the other section 1983 claims against the County merely repeat that theory. 1 but the other section 1983 claims against the County are dismissed as duplicative. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ first, fourth, sixth, and eighth claims are dismissed 4 as to the County. As Plaintiffs have failed to explain how those claims are not duplicative of other 5 claims, the court finds that amendment would be futile; therefore, the dismissal of these claims is 6 with prejudice. Accounting for the claims that Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew, the remaining claims 7 for all Plaintiffs are the first and fourth section 1983 claims against Wellpath; the fifth claim for 8 municipal liability under Monell against the County; the sixth claim for negligence against Wellpath; 9 and the seventh claim for failure to summon medical care in violation of California Government 10 Code § 845.6 against both Defendants. Vanessa Reyes and minor R.R. maintain the eighth claim 11 against Wellpath. a 12 However, to preserve their first, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims asserting survival rights,

13 Plaintiffs must file declarations that conform to California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32

v 14 || by no later than September 8, 2020. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of those survival claims. O 15 16 KES DISTRIGS KD QD 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. iS) oO IK, oO Z 18 || Dated: August 31, 2020 z2 < 19 Ly YL = (easy 20 ieeseres Magistrate Ketee vy 21 Le KE VORTICES 22 23 24 25 26 27 28