Reyes v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Naomi Reyes, No. CV-20-02361-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 In July 2017, Claimant Naomi Reyes filed for Social Security Disability Insurance 17 Benefits (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of 18 the Social Security Act, alleging disability since December 1, 2015. AR 13, 233-39. The 19 agency denied Claimant’s applications initially and on reconsideration. AR 130-37, 140- 20 45. Claimant appeared with counsel and testified at an administrative hearing. AR 35-74. 21 In a decision dated June 11, 2020, an ALJ found Claimant not disabled. AR 10-29. The 22 Appeals Council denied review in October 2020, making the ALJ’s decision the final 23 decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-4. Claimant now seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 24 405(g). 25 I. Standard 26 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 27 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 28 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 1 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 2 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as 3 adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, 4 “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 5 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 6 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Whether the 7 Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence “is a highly deferential 8 standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 9 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only those 10 issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 11 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 13 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 14 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 15 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ 16 determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 17 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a 18 “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 19 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or 20 combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 21 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant 22 is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the analysis proceeds. At step four, the 23 ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether 24 the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R § 25 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she 26 determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy 27 based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 28 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Claimant’s symptom testimony 3 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 4 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 5 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 6 impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms 7 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell 8 v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 9 omitted)). If the claimant presents such evidence, then “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 10 testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 11 convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014-15. This is the most 12 demanding standard in Social Security cases. Id. at 1015. In determining credibility, an 13 ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering 14 claimant's reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony,” but 15 cannot reject a claimant’s testimony solely for “lack of medical evidence.” Burch v. 16 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). 17 The ALJ discounted Claimant’s testimony regarding her back pain, reciting the 18 many times that (1) Claimant’s medical examinations revealed a normal range of motion 19 in her lumbar spine, (2) she had not yet had to rely on surgical interventions, and (3) 20 scans showed only mild-to-moderate disc degeneration. AR at 26. Claimant contends that 21 the ALJ did not sufficiently “tie-in” Claimant’s symptom testimony with the reasons for 22 discounting it. (Doc. 20 at 19.) True, an ALJ must connect a claimant’s symptom 23 testimony with the basis for discounting it, but the ALJ need not perform an exegetical 24 tour de force to satisfy that requirement. The connection “must be sufficiently specific to 25 allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant's testimony on 26 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant's testimony regarding 27 pain” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bunnell v. 28 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991)). The ALJ made sufficiently specific “tie- 1 ins, and thus offered specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Claimant’s 2 symptom testimony. 3 B. Opinions of Dr. Briggs 4 Before awarding or denying SSDI or SSI benefits, the ALJ must “articulate in 5 [his] determination or decision how persuasive [he] finds all of the medical opinions and 6 all of the prior administrative medical findings in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 7 404.1520c(b)(1). Persuasiveness turns primarily on whether a medical opinion is 8 supported and consistent. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ need not consider other 9 factors, such as a medical source’s relationship with a claimant, unless the ALJ finds that 10 two or more medical opinions about the same issue are equally well-supported. 20 C.F.R. 11 § 404.1520c(b)(3). These considerations apply equally to findings by the state agency 12 medical and psychological consultants who review claims at the initial and 13 reconsideration levels of the administrative process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1); see 14 also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(5). 15 The ALJ explained her reasoning for finding the opinion of Dr. Briggs less 16 persuasive, noting that his physical examination of Claimant resulted in findings 17 inconsistent with other physical examinations in Claimant’s medical record, which were 18 largely normal. For instance, whereas Dr. Briggs opined that Claimant would be 19 restricted to less-than-sedentary work (e.g., lifting less than ten pounds, and sitting, 20 standing, and walking for two to three hours), other physical examinations in the medical 21 record showed normal lumbar range of motion, muscle strength, muscle tone, sensation, 22 coordination, motor function, reflexes, and gait. Id. What’s more, the ALJ noted that Dr. 23 Briggs’s opinion came from just one physical examination, which stood as an outlier to 24 the rest of the physical examinations contained in the record. Id. Thus, the ALJ properly 25 considered the supportability and consistence and consistence of Dr. Briggs’s opinion, 26 and substantial evidence supports finding his opinion less persuasive. 27 Claimant argues that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding that 28 the remaining medical opinions were persuasive. The Court disagrees. The ALJ || explained that the opinions of state agency physicians Drs. Quinones and Fountain— which concluded that Claimant could perform light exertional work—were supported by || largely normal physical examination findings. Jd. Consultative physician Dr. LaBarre 4|| likewise concluded that Claimant was not disabled, opining that she can lift/carry 30 5 || pounds occasionally and at least 25 pounds frequently and sit, stand and/or walk 6-8 6|| hours in an 8-hour day.” /d. The ALJ explained that this opinion was supported not only 7\| by Dr. LaBarre’s findings of normal mobility during a physical examination of Claimant, 8 || but also by the other physical examinations in the medical record which also noted 9|| normal lumbar spine range of motion. Jd. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding 10 || that the opinions of Drs. Quinones, Fountain, and LaBarre are persuasive. 11} If. Conclusion 12 The ALJ appropriately articulated reasons for discounting Claimant’s symptom 13} testimony, finding Dr. Briggs’s medical opinion less-than-persuasive, and finding the opinions of Drs. Quinones, Fountain, and LaBarre persuasive. 15 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 17 Dated this 27th day of March, 2023. 18 19 20 {Z, 21 {UO 22 Usted States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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