REVISED AUGUST 5, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-11118
CARLOS H. REYES-MATA,
Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,
VERSUS
IBP, INC.,
Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas July 22, 2002
Before DAVIS, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Reyes-Mata was injured when a beef carcass and shackle
fell from a gravity rail conveyor system and struck him in the
head. The injury occurred while Reyes-Mata was working at a beef
processing facility in Amarillo, Texas. He sued his employer IBP,
Inc. in federal district court for common-law negligence and
statutory negligence. A jury awarded Reyes-Mata a total of $110,912 in damages and the district court entered judgment for
Reyes-Mata and awarded pre-judgment interest on the entire verdict
in the amount of $24,707.07. IBP now appeals claiming that the
jury charge was erroneous and that the district court erred by
allowing prejudgment interest.
The jury charge submitted states, in relevant part:
“Negligence” means failure to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace and to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by the condition or use of a workplace equipment or procedures, that is, by failing to do that which an employer of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances. “Ordinary care” means that degree of care that would be used by an employer of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
The mere occurrence of an event causing injury is not evidence of negligence. An occurrence may be an “unavoidable accident,” that is, an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.
While an employer is not the insurer of its employees’ safety at work, an employer does have a continuing and nondelegable duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace for its employees. Under this duty, each employer shall:
1) provide and maintain employment and a place of employment that is reasonably safe and healthful for employees;
2) install, maintain, and use methods, processes, devices, and safeguards, including methods of sanitation and hygiene, that are reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of the employer’s employees; and
3) take all other actions that are reasonably necessary to make the employment and place of employment safe.
You are instructed that while an employer has a duty to warn employees of known dangers and to make reasonable
2 inspections to see that workplace equipment does not become defective, an employer cannot be held liable for latent defects in the workplace, that is, defects that are not known by an employer and could not be revealed by the exercise of ordinary care.
You are instructed that the Plaintiff must show more than that the Defendant merely furnished a condition in the workplace that made the injury possible. That is, Plaintiff must show that the Defendant in furnishing the condition failed to do that which an employer of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or did that which an employer of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
IBP proffered to the district court what it believed to be a
correct instruction for premises liability only. The district
court overruled IBP’s objection and submitted its jury charge. The
jury returned a verdict for Reyes-Mata for $5,000 for physical pain
and mental anguish, $912 for loss of earning capacity, $5,000 for
physical and mental impairment and $100,000 for future medical
expenses. The district court entered judgment against IBP for
$110,912 and also awarded $24,707.07 in prejudgment interest.
This Court recognizes that the district court has broad
discretion in formulating the jury charge, and, therefore, reviews
those instructions with great deference. Deines v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
A challenge to a jury instruction “must demonstrate that the charge
as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the
jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.” Mooney v.
Aramco Servs., Inc., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1995). “However,
3 even erroneous jury instructions will not require reversal if based
upon the entire record the challenged instruction could not have
affected the outcome of the case.” Deines, 164 F.3d at 279.
IBP claims that the jury instruction is erroneous because it
is not limited to a premises liability claim. The Texas Supreme
Court has stated that to recover on a negligent activity theory,
the injured party must have been injured by or as a contemporaneous
result of the activity itself rather than by a condition created by
the activity. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.
1992). That court refused, however, to eliminate all distinctions
between premises conditions and negligent activities. Id. Indeed,
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bazan, 966 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.App.–San
Antonio 1998, no pet.), the court stated that liability for an
injury on business premises can be found under either a premises
condition theory or a negligent activity theory. Id. at 746.
Also, in Texas, trial courts are given deference in their decisions
as to what charge the jury receives. Wyler Indus. Works, Inc. v.
Garcia, 999 S.W.2d 494, 510-11 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1999, no. pet.).
After reviewing the record, we find that the district court in the
present case did not err in formulating the jury instructions and
we therefore give deference to its decision.
This Court reviews a district court’s award of prejudgment
interest for an abuse of discretion. Harken Exploration Co. v.
Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 478 (5th Cir. 2001). Under
4 § 304.102 of the Texas Finance Code, “A judgment in a wrongful
death, personal injury, or property damage case earns prejudgment
interest.” The Texas Supreme Court has held that this provision
entitles a plaintiff to prejudgment interest on its entire judgment
including future damages because the statute makes no distinction
between damages awarded in judgment for past damages and damages
awarded for future damages. C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson,
903 S.W.2d 315, 324 (Tex. 1994) (referring to § 304.102's precursor
statute Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-1.05, § 6). In the
past, this Court has upheld an award for prejudgment interest on
future medical damages when it found that the Alaska Supreme Court
(the state whose law controlled in that matter) endorsed such
awards. Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 575-76 (5th Cir.
1981).
IBP argues first that, though, the Texas Legislature may have
passed a statute that endorses prejudgment interest awards on all
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REVISED AUGUST 5, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-11118
CARLOS H. REYES-MATA,
Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,
VERSUS
IBP, INC.,
Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas July 22, 2002
Before DAVIS, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Reyes-Mata was injured when a beef carcass and shackle
fell from a gravity rail conveyor system and struck him in the
head. The injury occurred while Reyes-Mata was working at a beef
processing facility in Amarillo, Texas. He sued his employer IBP,
Inc. in federal district court for common-law negligence and
statutory negligence. A jury awarded Reyes-Mata a total of $110,912 in damages and the district court entered judgment for
Reyes-Mata and awarded pre-judgment interest on the entire verdict
in the amount of $24,707.07. IBP now appeals claiming that the
jury charge was erroneous and that the district court erred by
allowing prejudgment interest.
The jury charge submitted states, in relevant part:
“Negligence” means failure to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace and to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by the condition or use of a workplace equipment or procedures, that is, by failing to do that which an employer of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances. “Ordinary care” means that degree of care that would be used by an employer of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
The mere occurrence of an event causing injury is not evidence of negligence. An occurrence may be an “unavoidable accident,” that is, an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.
While an employer is not the insurer of its employees’ safety at work, an employer does have a continuing and nondelegable duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace for its employees. Under this duty, each employer shall:
1) provide and maintain employment and a place of employment that is reasonably safe and healthful for employees;
2) install, maintain, and use methods, processes, devices, and safeguards, including methods of sanitation and hygiene, that are reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of the employer’s employees; and
3) take all other actions that are reasonably necessary to make the employment and place of employment safe.
You are instructed that while an employer has a duty to warn employees of known dangers and to make reasonable
2 inspections to see that workplace equipment does not become defective, an employer cannot be held liable for latent defects in the workplace, that is, defects that are not known by an employer and could not be revealed by the exercise of ordinary care.
You are instructed that the Plaintiff must show more than that the Defendant merely furnished a condition in the workplace that made the injury possible. That is, Plaintiff must show that the Defendant in furnishing the condition failed to do that which an employer of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or did that which an employer of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
IBP proffered to the district court what it believed to be a
correct instruction for premises liability only. The district
court overruled IBP’s objection and submitted its jury charge. The
jury returned a verdict for Reyes-Mata for $5,000 for physical pain
and mental anguish, $912 for loss of earning capacity, $5,000 for
physical and mental impairment and $100,000 for future medical
expenses. The district court entered judgment against IBP for
$110,912 and also awarded $24,707.07 in prejudgment interest.
This Court recognizes that the district court has broad
discretion in formulating the jury charge, and, therefore, reviews
those instructions with great deference. Deines v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
A challenge to a jury instruction “must demonstrate that the charge
as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the
jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.” Mooney v.
Aramco Servs., Inc., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1995). “However,
3 even erroneous jury instructions will not require reversal if based
upon the entire record the challenged instruction could not have
affected the outcome of the case.” Deines, 164 F.3d at 279.
IBP claims that the jury instruction is erroneous because it
is not limited to a premises liability claim. The Texas Supreme
Court has stated that to recover on a negligent activity theory,
the injured party must have been injured by or as a contemporaneous
result of the activity itself rather than by a condition created by
the activity. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.
1992). That court refused, however, to eliminate all distinctions
between premises conditions and negligent activities. Id. Indeed,
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bazan, 966 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.App.–San
Antonio 1998, no pet.), the court stated that liability for an
injury on business premises can be found under either a premises
condition theory or a negligent activity theory. Id. at 746.
Also, in Texas, trial courts are given deference in their decisions
as to what charge the jury receives. Wyler Indus. Works, Inc. v.
Garcia, 999 S.W.2d 494, 510-11 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1999, no. pet.).
After reviewing the record, we find that the district court in the
present case did not err in formulating the jury instructions and
we therefore give deference to its decision.
This Court reviews a district court’s award of prejudgment
interest for an abuse of discretion. Harken Exploration Co. v.
Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 478 (5th Cir. 2001). Under
4 § 304.102 of the Texas Finance Code, “A judgment in a wrongful
death, personal injury, or property damage case earns prejudgment
interest.” The Texas Supreme Court has held that this provision
entitles a plaintiff to prejudgment interest on its entire judgment
including future damages because the statute makes no distinction
between damages awarded in judgment for past damages and damages
awarded for future damages. C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson,
903 S.W.2d 315, 324 (Tex. 1994) (referring to § 304.102's precursor
statute Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-1.05, § 6). In the
past, this Court has upheld an award for prejudgment interest on
future medical damages when it found that the Alaska Supreme Court
(the state whose law controlled in that matter) endorsed such
awards. Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 575-76 (5th Cir.
1981).
IBP argues first that, though, the Texas Legislature may have
passed a statute that endorses prejudgment interest awards on all
damages including future damages, this Court should recognize that
future medicals are an economic rather than physical damage. As
such, IBP avers that Casteel v. Crown Life Ins., 3 S.W.3d 582
(Tex.App.–Austin 1997), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, vacated in
part & remanded on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 1998), should
apply. This conclusion is not supported by the decision in C & H
Nationwide, however, and that case made no such distinction. In
fact, Casteel relies in part on Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking,
5 Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, (Tex. 1985), but that case was recognized as
having been modified by statute in C & H Nationwide. C & H
Nationwide, 903 S.W.2d at 324. Though IBP argues that, as a matter
of policy, plaintiffs should not be entitled to damages that they
have not yet incurred, “[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest
recognizes that the injured party was injured at the moment the
cause of action accrued, and that the injured party is entitled to
be made whole as of that moment. Thus the purpose of prejudgment
interest is to put a plaintiff in the position he would have been
in had he had his trial and recovered his judgment immediately
after his injury.” Carlton, 640 F.2d at 576. Therefore, under a
plain reading of the statute, plaintiffs are allowed to collect
prejudgment interest on all damages when the case is a personal
injury case. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco
Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998).
IBP also raise claims that the prejudgment interest statute is
unconstitutional because it violates their substantive due process
rights, because it violates their right to a jury trial and because
it violates their right to be free from excessive fines. Many of
these arguments, however, rely on this Court believing IBP’s
argument that the prejudgment interest awarded on future medical
expenses is really a fine. As already explained above, prejudgment
interest is not a fine but a recognition that, had the plaintiff
recovered immediately, they would have had the entire amount of
6 money to use as they pleased. Additionally, IBP’s substantive due
process arguments were already dealt with by the Texas Supreme
Court in C & H Nationwide. There, the court noted that the statute
need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
C & H Nationwide, 903 S.W.2d at 326 (citing Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 & n.6 (1977)). The court concluded
that this test was met because the statute related to fully
compensating the plaintiff as well as expediting settlements and
trials. Id. IBP’s other two arguments both rely on IBP’s
assumption that prejudgment interest is a fine. IBP seems to think
that it has somehow been denied a trial by jury because a court
imposed prejudgment interest, but a trial was already held for
liability and damages. The interest accrued is based on damages
already found by a jury, so IBP can not now claim that it was
denied a trial by jury. IBP’s final argument that the prejudgment
interest imposes an excessive fine is also without merit. IBP has
failed to demonstrate that it has been fined or that the interest
imposed was oppressive in light of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the
parties’ respective briefing and for the reasons set forth above,
7 we conclude that the district court did not err in submitting its
jury instructions or in awarding prejudgment interest. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.