FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 30, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FERNANDO REYES-LUEVANOS,
Petitioner,
v. No. 19-9545 (Petition for Review) WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General,
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER _________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This matter comes before the panel on the petition for rehearing and rehearing
en banc filed by Fernando Reyes-Luevanos. Upon consideration of the petition, the
panel grants rehearing, withdraws the Order and Judgment filed on July 22, 2020, and
issues in its place the attached substitute Order and Judgment. The panel denies the
government’s request, included in its response to the petition, to hold the case in
abeyance pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Niz-Chavez v. Barr, No. 19-863. In light of the grant of the petition for panel rehearing, the request
for en banc rehearing is denied as unnecessary.
Entered for the Court
CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk
2 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 30, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FERNANDO REYES-LUEVANOS,
v. No. 19-9545 (Petition for Review) WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Fernando Reyes-Luevanos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from a
decision by an immigration judge (IJ) denying his application for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),
we grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings as requested by
Petitioner.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated
removal proceedings by serving Petitioner with a notice to appear (NTA), alleging he
was removable for having stayed beyond the one year allowed under the H-2B visa
issued to him in 2003. The NTA provided his initial appearance before an IJ would
be at a date and time “to be set.” Admin. R. at 912. Five days later, he was served
with a notice of hearing (NOH), which specified the date and time for his appearance.
At a hearing in June 2010, Petitioner conceded he was removable but requested
cancellation of removal. In September 2010, he filed an application for such relief,
alleging, among other things, that he had been continuously present in the United
States for the preceding ten years, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
At a hearing before an IJ in 2018, Petitioner testified that he originally entered
the United States illegally in 1998, that he travelled to Mexico in 2002 to visit family
for approximately thirty days, and that he returned on a work permit, which was “the
first time” he had such a permit, id. at 134. However, Petitioner’s written application
listed three departures—March to April 2000, December 2001 to February 2002, and
an unspecified duration in 2003—each time for the purpose of visiting family in
Mexico and each time returning to the United States on an H-2B visa. When asked to
clarify the discrepancies between his application and his testimony, Petitioner stated:
(1) with regard to the departure in 2000, he did not “remember,” id. at 135; and
(2) with regard to the departure in 2001, he was “travelling” but “didn’t leave the
country,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner acknowledged that he
2 initially testified to one departure and explained that he was “not sure how many
times [he] went back to Mexico,” id. at 159, that he could not “seem to recall them
correctly,” id., and that he “might have left more than once, maybe twice,” id. at 160.
He later testified that he had “left perhaps two times,” id. at 183 (internal quotation
marks omitted), and that the last time was in 2002. He was unable to explain why his
passport indicated he entered the United States in September 2003 after having been
issued an H-2B visa a month prior.
The IJ found that the record “includes significant gaps” and that Petitioner’s
testimony was “equivocal,” “shifting,” “vague, conflicting, and insufficient to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not have any departures that
would cut off his physical presence.” Id. at 88-90. The IJ found that the departures
listed on the application suggest “a potential ground of ineligibility based on a more
extended departure” and that Petitioner’s “inability to recall the precise chronology
here calls into question his entire testimony regarding this time period.” Id. at 89.
The IJ concluded Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing continuous
presence for at least ten years preceding service of the NTA on November 13, 2009.
The IJ therefore denied his application for cancellation of removal but granted him
voluntary departure.
On appeal to the BIA, Petitioner argued: (1) the IJ erred in not crediting his
testimony about his presence in the United States; and (2) his NTA failed to specify a
date and time for his hearing and, thus, was deficient under Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), which was issued after the IJ’s decision. In particular, with
3 respect to his Pereira argument, Petitioner contended the putative NTA failed both to
confer jurisdiction on the IJ and to trigger the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(d)(1)(A) for purposes of his continuous presence in the United States. The
BIA found that the IJ’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that
Petitioner’s Pereira arguments lacked merit based on BIA precedent permitting a
two-step process, whereby an NOH can cure a defective NTA. The BIA concluded
Petitioner had failed to establish ten years of continuous physical presence prior the
service of the NOH on November 18, 2009. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed his
appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned this court for review.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner raises two arguments based on Pereira: (1) because the putative
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FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 30, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FERNANDO REYES-LUEVANOS,
Petitioner,
v. No. 19-9545 (Petition for Review) WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General,
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER _________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This matter comes before the panel on the petition for rehearing and rehearing
en banc filed by Fernando Reyes-Luevanos. Upon consideration of the petition, the
panel grants rehearing, withdraws the Order and Judgment filed on July 22, 2020, and
issues in its place the attached substitute Order and Judgment. The panel denies the
government’s request, included in its response to the petition, to hold the case in
abeyance pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Niz-Chavez v. Barr, No. 19-863. In light of the grant of the petition for panel rehearing, the request
for en banc rehearing is denied as unnecessary.
Entered for the Court
CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk
2 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 30, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court FERNANDO REYES-LUEVANOS,
v. No. 19-9545 (Petition for Review) WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Fernando Reyes-Luevanos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from a
decision by an immigration judge (IJ) denying his application for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),
we grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings as requested by
Petitioner.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated
removal proceedings by serving Petitioner with a notice to appear (NTA), alleging he
was removable for having stayed beyond the one year allowed under the H-2B visa
issued to him in 2003. The NTA provided his initial appearance before an IJ would
be at a date and time “to be set.” Admin. R. at 912. Five days later, he was served
with a notice of hearing (NOH), which specified the date and time for his appearance.
At a hearing in June 2010, Petitioner conceded he was removable but requested
cancellation of removal. In September 2010, he filed an application for such relief,
alleging, among other things, that he had been continuously present in the United
States for the preceding ten years, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
At a hearing before an IJ in 2018, Petitioner testified that he originally entered
the United States illegally in 1998, that he travelled to Mexico in 2002 to visit family
for approximately thirty days, and that he returned on a work permit, which was “the
first time” he had such a permit, id. at 134. However, Petitioner’s written application
listed three departures—March to April 2000, December 2001 to February 2002, and
an unspecified duration in 2003—each time for the purpose of visiting family in
Mexico and each time returning to the United States on an H-2B visa. When asked to
clarify the discrepancies between his application and his testimony, Petitioner stated:
(1) with regard to the departure in 2000, he did not “remember,” id. at 135; and
(2) with regard to the departure in 2001, he was “travelling” but “didn’t leave the
country,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner acknowledged that he
2 initially testified to one departure and explained that he was “not sure how many
times [he] went back to Mexico,” id. at 159, that he could not “seem to recall them
correctly,” id., and that he “might have left more than once, maybe twice,” id. at 160.
He later testified that he had “left perhaps two times,” id. at 183 (internal quotation
marks omitted), and that the last time was in 2002. He was unable to explain why his
passport indicated he entered the United States in September 2003 after having been
issued an H-2B visa a month prior.
The IJ found that the record “includes significant gaps” and that Petitioner’s
testimony was “equivocal,” “shifting,” “vague, conflicting, and insufficient to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not have any departures that
would cut off his physical presence.” Id. at 88-90. The IJ found that the departures
listed on the application suggest “a potential ground of ineligibility based on a more
extended departure” and that Petitioner’s “inability to recall the precise chronology
here calls into question his entire testimony regarding this time period.” Id. at 89.
The IJ concluded Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing continuous
presence for at least ten years preceding service of the NTA on November 13, 2009.
The IJ therefore denied his application for cancellation of removal but granted him
voluntary departure.
On appeal to the BIA, Petitioner argued: (1) the IJ erred in not crediting his
testimony about his presence in the United States; and (2) his NTA failed to specify a
date and time for his hearing and, thus, was deficient under Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), which was issued after the IJ’s decision. In particular, with
3 respect to his Pereira argument, Petitioner contended the putative NTA failed both to
confer jurisdiction on the IJ and to trigger the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(d)(1)(A) for purposes of his continuous presence in the United States. The
BIA found that the IJ’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that
Petitioner’s Pereira arguments lacked merit based on BIA precedent permitting a
two-step process, whereby an NOH can cure a defective NTA. The BIA concluded
Petitioner had failed to establish ten years of continuous physical presence prior the
service of the NOH on November 18, 2009. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed his
appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned this court for review.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner raises two arguments based on Pereira: (1) because the putative
NTA failed to specify a date and time, the IJ lacked jurisdiction; and (2) the NOH did
not cure the putative NTA and trigger the stop-time rule. We disagree with his first
argument but agree with the second and, therefore, remand for further proceedings.
I. Standard of Review
“We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact
under the substantial evidence standard.” Ramirez-Coria v. Holder, 761 F.3d 1158,
1161 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation mark omitted). When, as here, a single BIA
member issues a brief order affirming the IJ, “we may consult the IJ’s opinion to the
extent that the BIA relied upon or incorporated it,” including “the IJ’s more complete
explanation of [the] same grounds” for the BIA’s decision. Sidabutar v. Gonzales,
503 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 II. Analysis
“An alien seeking relief from removal bears the burden of establishing he
satisfies the eligibility requirements and merits a favorable exercise of discretion.”
Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), an alien subject to removal may
apply to have the removal cancelled if he can show, among other things, ten years of
continuous physical presence in the United States “immediately preceding the date of
such application.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Continuous physical presence requires that
the alien not have left “the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for
any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” Id. § 1229b(d)(2). In addition,
the period of continuous physical presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is
served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” Id. § 1229(d)(1)(A). Section
1229(a) lists the required contents of an NTA, which includes “[t]he time and place
at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.” § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
In Pereira, the Supreme Court addressed whether service of a putative NTA
that “fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings . . . trigger[s]
the stop-rule” under § 1229(d)(1)(A). Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110. The Court
concluded “[t]he answer is as obvious as it seems: No.” Id. The Court held that a
putative NTA that failed to designate the time or place of removal proceedings as
specified by § 1229(a) was “not a notice to appear under section 1229(a).”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a notice therefore did “not trigger the
5 stop-time rule” ending the period of continuous presence in the United States for
purposes of an application for cancellation of removal. Id.; see also id. at 2113-14.
Petitioner first contends his NTA failed to confer jurisdiction on the IJ because
it lacked a date and time and, thus, was not a valid NTA under Pereira. He also
contends “[a] putative NTA which lacks the time or place information is deprived of
[its] essential function as a charging document,” Apt. Opening Br. at 21, and, thus,
“is insufficient to vest jurisdiction with the Immigration Court under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14(a),” id. at 23. But these jurisdictional arguments are firmly foreclosed
by our decisions in Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2020), and
Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2019).
In Lopez-Munoz, we held “8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 does not establish immigration
judges’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 1016. We also rejected application of Pereira to this
context, explaining that “§ 1229(a) is non-jurisdictional,” id. at 1017, and that
Pereira was not “an implicit pronouncement on an immigration judge’s jurisdiction,”
id. at 1018. We later “follow[ed] the lead of Lopez-Munoz and join[ed] the
overwhelming chorus of our sister circuits that have already rejected similar
Pereira-based challenges.” Martinez-Perez, 947 F.3d at 1278 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In particular, we explained “the requirements relating to notices to
appear are non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rules.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]hile
Petitioner’s notice to appear was defective” because it lacked a date and time, “that
did not divest the Immigration Court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 1279.
6 Petitioner’s second Pereira argument is that the BIA erred in permitting a
two-step process to the stop-time rule. Relying on In re Mendoza-Hernandez,
27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 535 (BIA 2019), the BIA concluded Petitioner’s deficient NTA
was perfected by the NOH containing the information missing from the NTA, thereby
triggering the stop-time rule and terminating his period of continuous presence. We
recently rejected the reasoning in Mendoza-Hernandez and held “the stop-time rule is
triggered by one complete notice to appear rather than a combination of documents.”
Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2020); see also id. at 1180
(holding “the stop-time rule is not triggered by the combination of a defective notice
to appear and a notice of hearing”). The BIA therefore erred in concluding that the
NOH triggered the stop-time rule and that Petitioner needed to show ten years of
continuous physical presence prior to service of the NOH on November 18, 2009. 1
1 We decline to determine whether Petitioner otherwise failed to satisfy his burden of showing ten years of continuous presence under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). That is a matter for the BIA to address in the first instance. 7 CONCLUSION
The petition for review is granted and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings based on Petitioner’s request. Petitioner’s unopposed motion for leave
to file a supplemental brief addressing the impact of Banuelos-Galviz is granted. 2
Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge
2 The court has reviewed Petitioner’s supplemental brief, which was attached to his motion, as well as the parties’ letters under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), addressing the impact of Banuelos-Galviz on this appeal.