Rex Computing, Inc. v. Cerebras Systems Inc.

District Court, D. Delaware·Decided January 21, 2025·No. 1:21-cv-00525·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

REX COMPUTING SYSTEMS, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 21-525 (MN) ) CEREBRAS SYSTEMS INC., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

At Wilmington, this 21st day of January 2025: The Court heard continued argument about the constructions of the disputed claim terms of U.S. Patent No. 10,355,975. (D.I. 287). As announced at the hearing on January 09, 2025, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the disputed claim terms of the ’975 Patent are construed as follows: 1. “optimization module ” is a means-plus-function term subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), the claimed function is “determine optimal function assignment configurations for groups of tiles, and assign two or more functions, which communicate at least unilaterally more frequently with one another than with other functions, to groups of adjacent tiles based on an optimal function assignment configuration determination,” and the corresponding structures are: the flowcharts of steps for optimization in Figures 7A and 7B as explained in the corresponding text and equivalents thereof. Figures 7A and 7B each individually provide alternative corresponding structures sufficient to implement the optimization module. Both are not required. (’975 Patent, cls. 1 and 13); 2. “when the function executes optimally” means “when the function executes best based on a metric relevant to a given criteria,” where the construction requires determination of the best configuration out of those configurations that are considered. (’975 Patent, cls. 1 and 13). The parties submitted a joint letter (D.I. 276) regarding their disputes over the Court’s previous (D.I. 173) constructions. The Court carefully reviewed all submissions in connection with the parties’ additional contentions regarding the disputed claim terms, heard oral argument (D.I. 287), and applied the legal standards below in reaching its decision. I. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Claim Construction “[T]he ultimate question of the proper construction of the patent [is] a question of law,” although subsidiary fact-finding is sometimes necessary. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 325 (2015). “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning [which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill

in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Although “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” the context of the surrounding words of the claim must also be considered. Id. at 1314. “[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The patent specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis . . . [as] it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). It is also possible that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. “Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, [however,] the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In addition to the specification, a court “should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The prosecution history, which is “intrinsic evidence, . . . consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO [Patent and

Trademark Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. In some cases, courts “will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and [] consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva, 574 U.S. at 331. Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d

at 980. Expert testimony can be useful “to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. Nonetheless, courts must not lose sight of the fact that “expert reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.” Id. Overall, although extrinsic evidence “may be useful to the court,” it is “less reliable” than intrinsic evidence, and its consideration “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1318-19. Where the intrinsic record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). II. THE COURT’S RULING The Court’s ruling resolving the disputes over the previously construed terms of the ’975 Patent was announcing during the continued Markman hearing on January 09, 2025, as follows:

Presently before me is the parties’ continued dispute over the scope of two terms that I previously construed: “optimization module” and “when the function executes optimally.”[1]

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Rex Computing, Inc. v. Cerebras Systems Inc., (D. Del. 2025).

Rex Computing, Inc. v. Cerebras Systems Inc. (Rex Computing, Inc. v. Cerebras Systems Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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