Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Facebook, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 26, 2021
Docket5:20-cv-00363
StatusUnknown

This text of Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Facebook, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Facebook, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 REVEAL CHAT HOLDCO LLC, et al., Case No. 20-cv-00363-BLF

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 FACEBOOK, INC., [Re: ECF 71] 11 Defendant.

12 13 Three web developers—Reveal Chat Holdco LLC (“Reveal Chat”), USA Technology and 14 Management Services, Inc. (“Lenddo”), and Beehive Biometric, Inc. (“Beehive”) (collectively 15 “Plaintiffs”)—have brought this lawsuit against Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) for 16 removing access to a set of application programming interfaces (“APIs”) in 2015 that Plaintiffs 17 relied on for their mobile applications. See Am. Compl., ECF 62. Plaintiffs allege that Facebook’s 18 removal of these APIs was part of an elaborate scheme that violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 19 See id. The Court previously found that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred and granted them leave 20 to amend their complaint. See Order (“Prior MTD order”), ECF 61. Facebook has again filed a 21 motion to dismiss that includes the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 22 See Mot., ECF 71. Plaintiffs oppose this motion. See Opp’n, ECF 73. The Court held a two-hour 23 oral argument on December 3, 2020, giving Plaintiffs ample opportunity to discuss the viability of 24 their claims. See Min Entry, ECF 78. For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS 25 Facebook’s motion. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiffs allege that between 2004 and 2010, Facebook vanquished a number of rivals in 1 Facebook stood alone as the dominant player in the newly emergent market for social data (the 2 ‘Social Data Market’)—a market in which Facebook’s own users provided Facebook with a 3 constant stream of uniquely valuable information, which Facebook in turn monetized through the 4 sale of social data (for example, through advertising, monetizing APIs, or other forms of 5 commercializing access to Facebook’s network).” Am. Compl. ¶ 90. Facebook sold access to 6 social data to developers and sold advertisements targeting Facebook’s network of engaged and 7 active users. Am. Compl. ¶ 91. Because user data made Facebook’s network more valuable and 8 thus attracted more customers, which then led to more data and more customers, a feedback loop 9 emerged. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92-95. Data provided by users made Facebook’s network more valuable, 10 thereby attracting more users to the network. Am. Compl. ¶ 92. A barrier to entry emerged from 11 this feedback loop—to compete with Facebook, a new entrant would have to rapidly replicate both 12 the breadth and value of the Facebook network by building its own vast network and duplicating 13 the active user engagement on the same massive scale. Am. Compl. ¶ 95. Plaintiffs allege that this 14 “Social Data Barrier to Entry” allows Facebook to control and increase prices in the Social Data 15 and Social Advertising Markets without the pressures of price competition from existing 16 competitors or new entrants. Am. Compl. ¶ 96. 17 In 2012, Facebook coined the term “Open Graph” “to describe a set of tools developers 18 could use to traverse Facebook’s network of users, including the social data that resulted from user 19 engagement.” Am. Compl. ¶ 131. Open Graph contained a set of APIs, which “allowed those 20 creating their own social applications to query the Facebook network for information.” Am. 21 Compl. ¶ 132. Beginning in the fall of 2011, to allegedly address the threat posed by mobile 22 applications, Facebook devised a scheme to attract third-party developers to build for their 23 platform and then remove access to the APIs that were central to these applications. Am. Compl. ¶ 24 157. For example, the “Friends API” allowed third-party developers to search through a user’s 25 friends, as well as their friends of friends. Am. Compl. ¶ 158. Plaintiffs consider the Friends API, 26 News Feed API, and certain Messaging APIs the “Core APIs.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Without access to 27 this data, third-party applications “would be abruptly left with none of the social data they needed 1 party applications from buying social data from Facebook. Am. Compl. ¶ 167. Facebook even 2 identified direct, horizontal competitors in the Social Data and Social Advertising Markets. Am. 3 Compl. ¶ 168. In November 2012, Facebook announced that it would block competitors or require 4 full data reciprocity for continued access to its data. Am. Compl. ¶ 176. Plaintiffs allege that 5 Facebook’s statements from September 2011 through April 2014 about the functionality of the 6 Core APIs were false, half-truths that created a duty to speak fully and truthfully about the Core 7 APIs. Am. Compl. ¶ 450. 8 In April 2014, Facebook announced that it would remove access to several “rarely used” 9 APIs, including the Friends and News Feed APIs. Am. Compl. ¶ 242. Plaintiffs allege that these 10 APIs were in fact quite popular and relied on by tens of thousands of third-party applications. Am. 11 Compl. ¶ 243. After this announcement and through the full removal of the APIs in April 2015, 12 Facebook entered into Whitelist and Data Sharing Agreements with certain third-party developers 13 that allowed continued access to the Friends or News Feed APIs and included a provision 14 acknowledging that the covered APIs were not available to the general public. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15 247-248. These agreements “were only offered in exchange for massive purchases of Facebook’s 16 social data through mobile advertising and/or through the provision of the developer’s own social 17 data back to Facebook (so-called ‘reciprocity’).” Am. Compl. ¶ 249. Plaintiffs allege that 18 Facebook covered up the real reason for the removal of the APIs—while Facebook publicly stated 19 that the change was made to give users more control over their data, Plaintiffs allege that the real 20 reason for the change was to kill applications that were competitive or potentially competitive 21 with Facebook. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 461-62, 469. Plaintiffs allege that they first learned that 22 Facebook’s purported reasons for the removal of the APIs was false on November 6, 2019, when 23 NBC News posted a trove of internal Facebook documents seized by the United Kingdom 24 Parliament that allegedly showed that Facebook internally viewed the purported withdrawal as 25 lacking any legitimate business or technical justification and that the scheme had a broad impact 26 on competition. Am. Compl. ¶ 475. 27 A. Reveal Chat 1 Plaintiff Reveal Chat1 was a dating platform whose business model was to consume social 2 data through Facebook’s APIs to provide match-making services and create a platform from which 3 it could sell advertising. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Reveal Chat learned in late 2014 that Facebook had 4 slated APIs it relied on for removal. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. In 2015, Reveal Chat allegedly contacted 5 Facebook “to determine if there was a way forward.” Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Facebook allegedly 6 referred Reveal Chat to its official policy documents and developer documentation, which 7 suggested that the APIs were being removed for user control and privacy reasons. Am. Compl. ¶ 8 25. Reveal Chat then allegedly “contacted acquaintances that worked at Facebook to get more 9 clarity as to the APIs and to determine whether [Reveal Chat] could obtain an exemption from the 10 decision.” Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Reveal Chat never obtained an exception and accepted Facebook’s 11 explanation that the APIs were being removed due to user privacy concerns. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. 12 One of Reveal Chat’s founders reviewed Facebook’s blog post in December 2018, which 13 responded to documents released as part of a United Kingdom Parliament investigation that again 14 allegedly misled him into believing the APIs had been removed due to user privacy and control 15 concerns. Am. Compl. ¶ 30.

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Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Facebook, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reveal-chat-holdco-llc-v-facebook-inc-cand-2021.