Reuben Thompson v. John McHugh

Ninth Circuit

Reuben Thompson v. John McHugh

671 F. App'x 980

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedDecember 22, 2016

Docket14-17160

StatusUnpublished

This text of 671 F. App'x 980 (Reuben Thompson v. John McHugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Reuben Thompson v. John McHugh, 671 F. App'x 980 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Reuben James Thompson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his employment action alleging constitutional claims and discrimination in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Arrington v. Wong, 287 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s constitutional claims because Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.” See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thompson’s Title VII race discrimination claim because Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and, even assuming that Thompson had established a prima facie case, Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Moran, 447 F.3d at 753-58 (affirming summary judgment on Title VII claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case and, alternatively, failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext).

The district court did hot abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s motion for reconsideration because Thompson failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record Thompson’s contention that the district court improperly held private meetings with defendant.

We treat Thompson’s request that case law be established, set forth in his reply brief, as a request for publication of the memorandum disposition, and deny his request.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as proyid-ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Reuben James Thompson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his employment action alleging constitutional claims and discrimination in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Arrington v. Wong, 287 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s constitutional claims because Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.” See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thompson’s Title VII race discrimination claim because Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and, even assuming that Thompson had established a prima facie case, Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Moran, 447 F.3d at 753-58 (affirming summary judgment on Title VII claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case and, alternatively, failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext).

The district court did hot abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s motion for reconsideration because Thompson failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record Thompson’s contention that the district court improperly held private meetings with defendant.

We treat Thompson’s request that case law be established, set forth in his reply brief, as a request for publication of the memorandum disposition, and deny his request.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as proyid-ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Neomagic Corporation v. Trident Microsystems, Inc.

287 F.3d 1062 (Federal Circuit, 2002)

Moran v. Selig

447 F.3d 748 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)

Padgett v. Wright

587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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