Republic of Transkei v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

923 F.2d 175, 287 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 90

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 1991
• Docket: 89-5357
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge WALD.

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WALD, Chief Judge:

The Washington Bureau of the Republic of Transkei (“Bureau”) appeals from a district court ruling affirming the denial of the Bureau’s “L-l” visa petition by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). Because we find that the INS’ denial was not arbitrary and capricious, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background

The Republic of Transkei is one of the “homelands” created by the Republic of South Africa; it is not recognized by the United States or most other countries as a sovereign nation. Transkei has, however, established the Washington Bureau, a small non-profit corporation which disseminates trade, tourism, and political information and which encourages investment in and trade with Transkei.

Chief Jeremiah Moshoeshoe has served for more than twenty-five years in various cabinet positions in the Transkei government. In 1987, the government of Trans-kei appointed Chief Moshoeshoe, then Consul General of the Transkei Consulate in Durban, South Africa, to be President of the Washington Bureau.

The Bureau then filed a petition with the INS to change Moshoeshoe’s (and his family’s) nonimmigrant classification from B-l (a visitor status) to L-l (an “intra-company transferee” status). After requesting and receiving additional information, the Acting Director of the INS’ Eastern Regional Service Center denied the petition. The Bureau appealed, and the INS’ Administrative Appeals Unit (“AAU”) affirmed the Director’s decision, ruling, in part, that the Bureau had “not established [that] the beneficiary’s duties in the United States will be primarily executive or managerial in nature.”

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., the Bureau sought judicial review in the District Court for the District of Columbia. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the INS. The Bureau appeals.

II. Analysis

A. The Relevant Statute and Regulations

The Immigration and Nationality Act and INS regulations define an “intra-company transferee” as

an alien who, immediately preceding the time of his/her application ... has been employed abroad continuously for the immediate prior year by a ... legal entity ... and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his/her services to ... the same employer ... in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i )(l)(ii)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The Director ruled, and the AAU affirmed, that the Bureau had failed to establish that Moshoesh-oe both had been and would be employed in a “managerial” or “executive” capacity.¹ INS regulations define those terms as follows:

“Managerial capacity” means an assignment ... in which the employee primarily directs the organization ..., supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional or managerial employees, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions ..., and exercises discretionary authority over day-to-day operations. The term ... does not include a first-line supervisor unless the employees supervised are professional, nor does it include an employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce the product and/or to provide the service(s) of the organization....

“Executive capacity” means an assignment ... in which the employee primarily directs the management of an organization ..., establishes the goals and policies of the organization ..., exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making, and receives only general supervision or direction....

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i )(l)(ii)(B)-(C) (emphasis supplied).

B. The Decisions of the Director and the AAU

Our review of the INS’ application of these definitions to the Bureau's petition for Moshoeshoe’s reclassification is limited. We may vacate the INS’ decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). More precisely, this court will examine the administrative record to ensure that the agency’s decision “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors” and that the decision was not “a clear error.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823-24, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); see Richards v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C.Cir.1977).

Upon such review, we find that the Director and the AAU clearly considered the relevant factors. Affirming the Director, the AAU found three deficiencies in the Bureau’s petition. First, the AAU ruled that the Bureau had submitted insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mosh-oeshoe's earlier position as Consul General was primarily executive or managerial in nature.² Although the Bureau submitted many letters and documents attesting to Moshoeshoe’s accomplishments as Consul General, the AAU found that the statute and regulations required more precise evidence concerning Moshoeshoe’s authority as Consul General. In particular, the AAU noted, the Bureau had not specified the names or specific duties of persons supervised by Moshoeshoe as Consul General; as a result, the Director could not determine if Moshoeshoe served as more than a “first-line supervisor” as required by the regulations.

Second, the AAU also found that the Bureau had failed to establish that Mosh-oeshoe’s duties in the Washington office would be primarily executive or managerial.³ In support of its petition, the Bureau provided letters from high government officials stating that Moshoeshoe would “manage and direct the entire operation of the Washington Bureau” and “have ultimate decision making authority ... [and] control of the budget which exceeds $550,-000.” However, as the AAU noted, the record also reflected that Moshoeshoe would have 7ion-managerial/?zcm-executive duties—duties, in the words of the regulation, “necessary to ... provide the service^) of the organization”; these include “directpng] the preparation of and presentation of all cultural, economic and trade information" and "initiatpng] and maintaining] contacts with international organizations and foreign governments.” Accordingly, the AAU affirmed the denial of the Bureau’s petition because the Bureau failed to document what proportion of Moshoeshoe’s duties would be managerial/executive functions and what proportion would be non-managerial/non-executive. Cf. National Hand Tool Corp. v. Pasquarell, 889 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming denial of visa petition because employee was not primarily engaged in managerial activities).

The agency’s decision in this regard is wholly consistent with its position that persons whose duties include executive-level public relations and lobbying will not be disqualified from obtaining 1^1 status simply because of those activities.⁴ In order to apply that policy to a corporation whose very business is public relations and lobbying, the INS must distinguish between lobbying that is the business of the organization and lobbying that is “normally done by” top managers and executives. 51 Fed. Reg. at 5,739. Thus, contrary to the implication of the dissent, lobbying duties may disqualify an L-l applicant, if those duties are not at an executive level.⁵ In this case, the record indicates precisely that: at least some of Moshoeshoe’s public relations and lobbying duties are not at an executive level. The Bureau functions as an embassy, and Moshoeshoe functions as an ambassador; embassies and ambassadors provide diplomatic services, including tasks such as attracting foreign investment and negotiating trade agreements. When Moshoeshoe conducts these activities, he is engaged both in public relations and lobbying and in providing the services for which the Bureau was established.⁶ Although his responsibility for such nonexecutive duties does not necessarily doom Moshoeshoe’s L-l application, it does place on him the burden of documenting what proportion of his duties would be nonexecutive. The INS found that, in the application materials before it, Moshoeshoe failed to do so.

Finally, the AAU stated that the Bureau had failed to demonstrate that the Washington office, which has a total staff of four, “requires full-time executive or managerial direction.” The AAU indicated that the fact that there were one or two executive-managerial staff in the office did not conclusively establish that Moshoeshoe’s duties, as President of the office, would primarily be executive or managerial. The Bureau, the AAU emphasized, retained the burden of proving that an organization of its small “size and scope requires an employee whose duties are executive and managerial to the exclusion of most ... other duties.” Thus, from our review of the administrative ■ record, it is clear that the INS, in ruling on the Bureau’s petition, has considered the relevant factors required by statute and regulation.

The Bureau also contends that denial of its petition constituted clear error. We do not agree. The Bureau presented a substantial amount of information documenting Moshoeshoe’s duties in Washington. Much of the information indicated managerial and executive authority; however, much of the evidence also suggested that Moshoeshoe would, in the words of the district court, “conduct the business of the Washington Bureau as well as oversee it.” Mem. op. at 10 (emphasis in original). For example, a letter from the President of Transkei stated that “while managing the operations of the Bureau” Moshoeshoe would also “undertake the task of disseminating cultural and economic information on Transkei, developing trade and investment opportunities ... and advancing the cause for international recognition.” Based on this mix of information, it was not clearly erroneous for the INS to rule that the Bureau had not provided sufficient information that Moshoeshoe would be primarily charged with managerial and executive duties.⁷

Although the INS regulations may appear to some as narrow or unduly burdensome, and their application as overly formalistic, our review of the agency’s decision — as we have noted — is limited. The Supreme Court has reminded us that “[enforcing the immigration laws ... is becoming more difficult.... [T]he INS is the agency primarily charged by Congress to implement the public policy underlying these laws.... Appropriate deference must be accorded its decisions.” Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 283-84, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). Under these circumstances, we find that the denial of the Bureau’s petition was neither arbitrary and capricious nor clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision.

1 . The Bureau concedes that, under the current interpretation of INS regulations, Moshoeshoe does not qualify for an L-l visa under the "specialized knowledge" provision. Memorandum Opinion ("Mem. op.’’) at 5.

2 .Moshoeshoe’s duties as Consul General in Durban are relevant to the reclassification petition because INS regulations require a petitioner to file with its petition

[ejvidence that the alien’s prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, executive, or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States....

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(/)(3)(iv).

3 . Initially the INS proposed regulations that defined "managerial” and "executive” capacity to require that “virtually all of the employee’s time [ ] be spent in performing managerial or executive duties.” 51 Fed.Reg. at 18,591, 18,592 (1986) (emphasis supplied). After receiving numerous comments criticizing this requirement, the INS promulgated final regulations requiring only that the employee’s duties be primarily managerial or executive. See 52 Fed.Reg. at 5,738-39 (1987).

4 . See note 6 infra.

5 . We agree with our dissenting colleague that Congress intended L-l status to "reach) ] inter-corporate transfers as well as intracorporate ones." Post at 181. We only note that when the primary purpose of an organization is public relations and lobbying, it makes no sense for all such activity to be considered "executive" or "managerial.” Under the dissent’s reasoning, it appears that if a large foreign widget manufacturer maintained a U.S. subsidiary staffed by fifty lobbyists, all fifty would be eligible for L-l status, because none of the lobbyists performed tasks necessary to widget manufacturing and their remaining duties were "direct executive functions.” Clearly this cannot be so. In such a situation, some lobbying must be executive, and some nonexecutive; and in¹ evaluating an L-l application, the INS must distinguish between these.

6 . In introducing its final revised L-l regulations, the agency noted:

It was the Service’s intention to include in the duties of a manager or executive activities that are normally done by persons in these positions, such as customer and public relations and lobbying and contracting.

51 Fed.Reg. at 5,739. As the dissent indicates, this language, taken alone, is somewhat ambiguous. In this case, however, the AAU can hardly be faulted for avoiding this ambiguity. Regardless of how the agency treats public relations and lobbying generally, such activities are plainly nonmanagerial and nonexecutive insofar as they are deemed necessary, as they must be in this case, to provide the services of the organization.

7 .The Bureau also contends that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard. As the Bureau notes, the trial court stated that Mosh-oeshoe “will not be exclusively engaged in executive and managerial tasks." Mem. op. at 10 (emphasis supplied). The Bureau’s claim, however, turns on a misreading of the opinion. In the quoted passage, the trial court was not articulating the relevant legal standard, but rather responding to the Bureau's claim that Mosh-oeshoe would "spend all of his time overseeing” Bureau activities. Mem. op. at 9 (emphasis supplied). It was in the context of rejecting that claim that the district court stated that Mosh-oeshoe would “not be exclusively engaged” in managerial or executive work. Moreover, elsewhere in the opinion, the district court correctly stated the governing statutes, regulations, and burden of proof.

1 . Chief Moshoeshoe was transferred here from Durban, where he performed quite similar duties under the title of Consul General. See Administrative Record at 32, 61.