NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0259n.06
Case No. 25-5669
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 08, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) RENETE BARNETT-MORGAN, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY INVERNESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION )
Before: GIBBONS, MURPHY, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. Renete Barnett-Morgan started having trouble at work
after her employer, Inverness Technologies, Inc., hired a new office manager. Following reported
problems with Barnett-Morgan’s conduct on the job, her supervisors called her in for an employee-
counseling session. Rather than accept management’s feedback, Barnett-Morgan walked out of
the meeting, said she was done, cursed at another employee, and left the premises without her
access card. Her employment at Inverness ended that day. From these events came the present
Title VII suit, in which Barnett-Morgan asserts claims based on racial discrimination and
retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to Inverness on both claims. We affirm.
I
Inverness Technologies, Inc., has a contract with the United States Army to provide
transition services to soldiers through the Soldier for Life Transition Assistance Program. To that No. 25-5669, Barnett-Morgan v. Inverness Techs., Inc.
end, Inverness employs career counselors to advise and assist veterans, conduct briefings, provide
counseling, and otherwise “[f]acilitate” soldiers’ “transition from the military environment to the
civilian environment.” Career Counselor Position Description, R.32-4, PageID 229.
Career counselors work at call centers and provide around-the-clock service to veterans.
A contract installation manager (installation manager) supervises the career counselors. The
installation manager, in turn, reports up a chain of command to a program manager who oversees
the entire contract.
Because the installation manager cannot always be physically present to supervise the
career counselors, the installation manager chooses one counselor per shift to act as the “shift
lead”—management’s “eyes and ears” on any given shift. Barnett-Morgan Dep., R.32-5, PageID
242-43. Serving as shift lead does not change a career counselor’s formal job description or pay.
Shift leads do “everything the exact same” as the other career counselors, but they have the “added
responsibility of letting [management] know if something happened or is not happening on their
shift.” Vega Dep., R.39-6, PageID 527. That responsibility also includes maintaining schedules,
ensuring compliance with policies and procedures, and informing the installation manager if a
counselor deviates from the code of conduct. Shift leads, however, have no disciplinary or
enforcement authority over their peer counselors.
Barnett-Morgan, a black woman, began working as a career counselor for Inverness at its
call center in Fort Knox, Kentucky in 2017. In 2018, the lead for the third shift at Fort Knox
departed. Barnett-Morgan volunteered to step in as third-shift lead and did so without interviewing
or formally applying.
A few years later, in 2021, Inverness hired Kelley Jeans to be the new installation manager
at the call center. In order to make the call center “the model for all other sites,” Jeans sought to
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ensure that the career counselors under her supervision were “on the same page” about “what [was]
expected” of them. Jeans Expectations Email, R.32-7, PageID 274. To that end, Jeans emailed all
the career counselors a form outlining an updated set of job “expectations.” Id. Those expectations
included, for example, that a counselor must work her “shift as it is scheduled.” Id. at PageID 276.
Jeans requested that each counselor read, sign, and return the form “to indicate understanding” of
the expectations. Id. at PageID 274. Barnett-Morgan signed and returned the form on June 23,
2021.
On August 3, 2021, Jeans announced several employee additions to the call center. Among
them was Tammy Croft, a white woman, who was rejoining the call center as a counselor. Croft
had over eight years of experience working as a career counselor; she had also served as a financial
counselor and an interim installation manager at several stations overseas. The email noted that
Croft would serve as the new third-shift lead—the role that Barnett-Morgan had previously
occupied. Jeans explained that Croft’s “wide breadth of experience across the [Transition
Assistance Program] and in all roles represented at the [call center]” was the reason Croft was
selected as the new third-shift lead. Jeans Staffing-Changes Email, R.39-2, PageID 431.
A few days later, on August 6, Barnett-Morgan found herself in a “heated discussion” with
another third-shift counselor, Francis Schirrmacher. Croft Dep., R.39-4, PageID 455. Consistent
with protocol, Barnett-Morgan and Schirrmacher each prepared a written statement about the
incident for Croft to share with management.
Barnett-Morgan also emailed Inverness’s human-resources department (HR) directly about
the incident. In her correspondence, Barnett-Morgan claimed that Schirrmacher had “created a
hostile work environment” and that the August 6 incident was “not the first time” that Barnett-
Morgan “had to encounter this type of behavior” from Schirrmacher. Barnett-Morgan Emails with
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HR, R.39-9, PageID 613. As evidence, Barnett-Morgan claimed that in March 2020 Schirrmacher
“sprayed Lysol in the face of another counselor.” Id. In response to Barnett-Morgan’s email, HR
employees repeatedly asked Barnett-Morgan to provide more details or examples to substantiate
her complaint. But Barnett-Morgan never provided that information, instead stating only that she
“worr[ied] about retaliation” because Schirrmacher was supposedly dating the supervisor for
another shift. Id. at PageID 612. Without any additional information corroborating Barnett-
Morgan’s allegation regarding a hostile work environment, the HR employees replied that they
would have no choice but to consider the matter closed. Barnett-Morgan never responded with
the requested information.
On August 11, Croft sent a written statement to management regarding issues that she was
having with Barnett-Morgan and two other third-shift counselors, both of whom are white. Croft
explained that the three counselors had, among other issues, swapped schedules without obtaining
the required prior approval, discussed out-of-office coverage with one another instead of with
Croft, responded combatively to Croft’s requests, failed to cover one of the call center’s virtual-
messaging programs, and taken inappropriately timed lunch breaks.
So, on August 26, Program Manager Crystal Vega held an employee-counseling session
with Barnett-Morgan. During her meeting with Barnett-Morgan, Vega issued a written
disciplinary warning to Barnett-Morgan for switching schedules without her shift lead’s approval.
Going forward, Vega explained, Barnett-Morgan was to work her schedule as assigned, and any
changes would require prior approval from the shift lead. Barnett-Morgan, however, refused to
sign the employee-counseling form. She “pushed her chair back” and said, “I’m done.” Vega
Dep., R.39-6, PageID 539. Vega tried to convince her to sit down and talk things through, but
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Barnett-Morgan refused. Instead, Barnett-Morgan again said, “I’m done,” and walked out of the
meeting. Barnett-Morgan Dep., R.32-5, PageID 262.
From Vega’s perspective, “it looked like [Barnett-Morgan] was quitting.” Vega Dep.,
R.39-6, PageID 539. It is standard procedure for Inverness staff to collect an employee’s access
card when they resign, because the card grants the employee access to the job site and work
computers. So after Barnett-Morgan left the meeting, Vega told Randy Trombley—the
information technology liaison officer—something along the lines of: “If she is quitting, you need
to collect her [access] card.” Trombley Dep., R.39-7, PageID 574.
The parties disagree on what happened next. According to Trombley, he approached
Barnett-Morgan’s cubicle to ask her if she was leaving and further stated that if Barnett-Morgan
was resigning, he would need to collect her access card. In response, Barnett-Morgan allegedly
said, “F**k you, I am tired of you motherf**kers,” before throwing her access card to the ground.
Id. at PageID 572. Trombley also testified that Barnett-Morgan pushed him “off to the side so she
could get through” before heading for the exit. Id. at PageID 575.
According to Barnett-Morgan, Trombley did not ask if she was quitting; rather, he just
walked up and asked for her access card. She admits that she cursed while speaking to Trombley.
But she disputes that she threw the access card—she claims that the access card “fell to the floor”
when she tried to hand it to Trombley. Barnett-Morgan Affidavit, R.39-1, PageID 426. And she
denies shoving Trombley on her way out of the building.
Based on Barnett-Morgan’s actions and Trombley’s report, Vega believed that Barnett-
Morgan had voluntarily resigned. Vega emailed HR to let them know that Barnett-Morgan had
“walked out and quit” following her employee-counseling session. Vega Email to HR, R.32-18,
PageID 315. She also requested that Barnett-Morgan be placed on a do-not-hire list. Later that
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day, Barnett-Morgan emailed HR asking for an explanation of the grounds for her termination.
An HR employee responded by explaining that her actions during and after her employee-
counseling session led Inverness to believe that she had voluntarily resigned.
On December 3, 2021, Barnett-Morgan filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She alleged that she experienced race
discrimination at Inverness between August 2 and August 21, 2021. She further alleged that she
“was demoted from a Shift Lead to a Counselor” and that she was eventually “terminated.” EEOC
Charge, R.32-23, PageID 332. Barnett-Morgan continued, “I believe I was discriminated against
because of my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. She did
not check the box for retaliation or otherwise mention retaliation in her charge.
Inverness received notice of Barnett-Morgan’s EEOC charge on December 6, 2021. In its
response, Inverness asserted that Barnett-Morgan was not “demoted” from her role as shift lead
because that position “does not include a pay increase for the additional duties[.]” Inverness
Response to EEOC Charge, R.39-12, PageID 649. Inverness further stated that Barnett-Morgan
was not “terminated” because she voluntarily “walked off the job,” and that “there is absolutely
no evidence of racial discrimination by Inverness.” Id. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to
Barnett-Morgan on April 27, 2022.
Shortly thereafter, Barnett-Morgan filed this lawsuit against Inverness and Vega in state
court, bringing claims of race discrimination and retaliation under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
Inverness timely removed the case to federal court. Barnett-Morgan filed an amended complaint,
adding claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The district court dismissed all
claims save for the Title VII race-discrimination and retaliation claims against Inverness.
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Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Inverness. Barnett-Morgan
timely appealed.
II
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Briggs v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498, 507 (6th Cir. 2021). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In conducting this analysis, we must “draw all justifiable inferences” in
favor of the nonmoving party. Briggs, 11 F.4th at 507 (citation omitted). “However, mere
allegations are not enough to show a genuine issue of fact. There must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Smith v. City of Toledo, 13 F.4th 508, 514 (6th Cir.
2021) (cleaned up). “This court can affirm a decision of the district court on any grounds supported
by the record, even if different from those relied on by the district court.” Brown v. Tidwell, 169
F.3d 330, 332 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
III
Barnett-Morgan asserts claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. We affirm the grant
of summary judgment to Inverness on both fronts.
A
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, “the record contains no direct evidence of
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discrimination,” we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Levine v. DeJoy,
64 F.4th 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2023).1
That framework “proceeds in three steps.” Smith, 13 F.4th at 515. Barnett-Morgan must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To do so, Barnett-Morgan must show that
“(1) [she] is a member of a protected group; (2) [she] was subjected to an adverse employment
decision; (3) [she] was qualified for the position; and (4) similarly situated non-protected
employees were treated more favorably.” Id. (citation omitted). If she makes that threshold
showing, the burden shifts to Inverness “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for”
the adverse employment action. Id. If Inverness does so, the burden then shifts back to Barnett-
Morgan to show “that the reason the employer gave was not its true reason, but merely a pretext
for discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted).
As the grounds for her race-discrimination claim, Barnett-Morgan challenges her removal
from the shift-lead role and her alleged subsequent termination. In granting summary judgment to
Inverness, the district court provided alternative bases for its decision. First, the district court
concluded that Barnett-Morgan’s removal from service as a shift lead did not alter the terms or
conditions of her employment and therefore was not an adverse employment action. The district
court further determined that Barnett-Morgan failed to establish that she was replaced by someone
outside of her protected class or treated differently than similarly situated employees. For those
reasons, the district court concluded that Barnett-Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, the district court concluded that, in any event, Inverness had provided a
1 Though Barnett-Morgan critiques the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, she does not dispute that it continues to govern. Barnett-Morgan Br. 45-47. Regardless, for the reasons below, Barnett-Morgan would not prevail even if we followed her preferred approach and asked only whether she “present[ed] sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the employer’s stated” non-race-based reasons for the challenged employment actions “w[ere] pretextual.” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 323 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for terminating Barnett-Morgan. Because Barnett-
Morgan failed to put forward evidence to demonstrate that Inverness’s cited justification was
pretextual, the district court held that her discrimination claim failed on that independent ground.
As discussed below, we may assume arguendo that Barnett-Morgan has established a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. Barnett-Morgan’s race-discrimination claim
nonetheless fails because she has not provided evidence to establish that Inverness’s cited, non-
discriminatory rationales for its challenged employment decisions were pretextual.
The parties devote much of their appellate briefs to debating whether Barnett-Morgan made
out a prima facie case—and in particular, whether her reassignment from the shift-lead role was
an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. This issue implicates Muldrow v. City of
St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), which clarified the threshold for asserting discriminatory
employment actions subject to Title VII review. Relevant here, Muldrow instructs that an adverse
employment action is something that brings “about some disadvantageous change in an
employment term or condition.” Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
Muldrow does not neatly answer how to characterize Barnett-Morgan’s reassignment from
service as a shift lead. As the district court noted, Barnett-Morgan neither applied nor was
interviewed for the shift-lead role; she received it because she volunteered for it. Nor did Barnett-
Morgan’s reassignment out of the shift-lead role alter her day-to-day job duties, disciplinary
authority, formal title, pay, or benefits. Still, there is evidence that serving as a shift lead came
with the power to set schedules, monitor co-employees’ breaks, report behavioral concerns to
management (which could trigger investigation), and require all employees to confer with the shift
lead as the “first point of contact” prior to reporting issues with another employee or policy. Croft
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Dep., R.39-4, PageID 456-57. Shifting such authority away from Barnett-Morgan and to someone
else would arguably leave Barnett-Morgan “worse off respecting employment terms or
conditions.” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355.
Given the posture of this case, we need not resolve how Muldrow maps onto Barnett-
Morgan’s reassignment from shift lead. Even assuming that Barnett-Morgan suffered an adverse
employment action, her race-discrimination claim fails for independent reasons. We therefore
assume without deciding that Barnett-Morgan established a prima facie case with respect to her
reassignment from shift lead and termination.
Having accepted that Barnett-Morgan established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, Inverness must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” the adverse
employment actions. Smith, 13 F.4th at 515. If Inverness does so, the burden shifts back to
Barnett-Morgan to put forth sufficient evidence to show that Inverness’s cited reasons are a mere
pretext “fabricated to conceal an illegal motive.” Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400
(6th Cir. 2009). We conclude that Inverness has offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
reassigning Barnett-Morgan from the shift-lead role and for her later alleged termination. We
further conclude that Barnett-Morgan has failed to offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
Inverness’s cited justifications were pretextual. That failure forecloses her race-based
discrimination claim.
Shift-lead reassignment. We begin by addressing the shift-lead reassignment. At the time
of the reassignment, Inverness’s then-installation manager, Kelley Jeans, explained that Croft was
being selected as third-shift lead “[g]iven” her “wide breadth of experience across the [Transition
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Assistance Program] and in all roles represented at the [call center].” Jeans Staffing-Changes
Email, R.39-2, PageID 431.
The district court concluded that any race-discrimination claim arising from Barnett-
Morgan’s reassignment from the shift-lead role failed on threshold grounds. So it declined to
specifically address Inverness’s stated justification for selecting Croft. We may, however, affirm
on any ground apparent in the record. Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635, 644 (6th Cir.
2025). Inverness has urged—both in the summary judgment proceedings and on appeal—that
Croft’s superior experience and breadth of roles constitute legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for replacing Barnett-Morgan as shift lead. We agree. Such reasons, “if believed by the trier of
fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment
action.” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993)).
To prevail, then, Barnett-Morgan needed to come forward with evidence demonstrating
that Inverness’s cited reasons for selecting Croft were pretext for racial discrimination. To make
that showing, Barnett-Morgan could have sought to demonstrate that Inverness’s proffered reason
“(1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain” Inverness’s
actions. Levine, 64 F.4th at 798 (citation omitted). So too, “an employer’s shifting termination
rationales” can serve as “evidence that the proffered rationale may not have been the true
motivation for the employer’s actions.” Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883,
890 (6th Cir. 2020). No matter Barnett-Morgan’s chosen approach, she “must produce sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject [Inverness’s] explanation of why it” replaced
her as shift lead. Chen, 580 F.3d at 400. “Mere personal beliefs, conjecture and speculation” do
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not suffice. Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 724 (6th Cir. 2006) (cleaned
up).
Barnett-Morgan has not presented any evidence that Inverness’s explanation for replacing
her as third-shift lead was pretext for discrimination. Indeed, she makes no argument on appeal
that Inverness’s decision to select Croft as the third-shift lead was motivated by anything other
than Croft’s resume. Nor did she identify evidence of pretext in the summary judgment
proceedings.
At most, Barnett-Morgan takes issue with Inverness’s characterization of Croft as more
qualified. In her view, Croft was “highly inexperienced.” Barnett-Morgan Br. 9. But Barnett-
Morgan does not dispute that Croft had over eight years of experience working as a counselor in
the Transition Assistance Program, including time spent as a transition counselor on the third shift.
Nor does she dispute that Croft had prior managerial experience with Inverness as an interim
installation manager at several stations overseas. Thus, whatever Barnett-Morgan’s “personal
beliefs, conjecture and speculation” about Croft’s appointment, Snyder v. Pierre’s French Ice
Cream Co., 589 F. App’x 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803
F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1986)), they “do not refute the undisputed evidence in the record that Croft
worked on the Transition Assistance Program for a longer period of time and across a wider variety
of roles than Barnett-Morgan,” SJ Order, R.63, PageID 880 n.7. Barnett-Morgan has therefore
failed to demonstrate that Inverness’s explanation for its decision to substitute Croft as shift lead
was pretextual.
Termination. Barnett-Morgan also asserts that Inverness terminated her employment based
on her race. Barnett-Morgan’s employment ended following her August 26, 2021, counseling
session with Vega. While some events of that day (like whether Barnett-Morgan threw her access
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card on the floor or accidentally dropped it) are disputed, others are not. Specifically, all parties
agree that Barnett-Morgan (i) prematurely walked out of the counseling session after repeatedly
saying “I’m done,” (ii) refused to sign the counseling form, (iii) cursed at Trombley, a fellow
employee, and (iv) left the call center without her access card. Barnett-Morgan Dep., R.32-5,
PageID 262-64; Barnett-Morgan Affidavit, R.39-1, PageID 424-26. Based on those events, Vega
informed HR that Barnett-Morgan had “quit” and that her last day was August 26, 2021. Vega
Emails with HR, R.32-18, PageID 315. A few hours later, an HR manager cited these same events
in response to Barnett-Morgan’s email seeking clarification for the grounds of her termination.
Inverness asserts that Barnett-Morgan’s behavior on August 26 provided it with a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” basis for her termination. Inverness Br. 40-41. Barnett-Morgan
does not dispute that such behavior would constitute a legitimate basis for terminating an
employment relationship. Instead, she asserts on appeal that Inverness’s justification was
pretextual because Inverness has maintained that the end of Barnett-Morgan’s employment
followed her voluntary resignation rather than her termination. From there, Barnett-Morgan
claims that Inverness’s explanation is conflicting and thus indicative of pretext.
Barnett-Morgan’s resignation-versus-termination response misses the point: Inverness has
never wavered in its explanation of the underlying conduct that precipitated Barnett-Morgan’s
departure. In short, Inverness’s “rationales” have not “shifted.” Miles, 946 F.3d at 890. Its
explanation has instead depended on the events of August 26, 2021. Those events, according to
multiple witnesses, included Barnett-Morgan’s unprofessional behavior, unwillingness to
participate in counseling, use of disrespectful language towards another employee, and storming
out of the office. The day’s events reflected a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for Barnett-
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Morgan’s employment ceasing on August 26. That remains true no matter whether the
employment action is framed as a resignation or termination.
In short, Barnett-Morgan “has not produced evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could doubt that she was fired” or replaced as shift lead for reasons other than race. Chen, 580
F.3d at 402; see also SJ Order, R.63, PageID 880-83. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Inverness on Barnett-Morgan’s race-discrimination claim.
B
Barnett-Morgan also contends that Inverness retaliated against her because of her
complaint that Schirrmacher was creating a hostile work environment. But Barnett-Morgan failed
to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to that claim before the EEOC. We therefore
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim.
Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for engaging in Title VII
protected activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). But before an employee can bring a Title VII claim in
federal court, she must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing “an administrative charge
with the EEOC.” Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010); see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). “The charge must be ‘sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to
describe generally the action or practices complained of.’” Younis, 610 F.3d at 361 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)). “As a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that
were not included in [her] EEOC charge.” Id.
“Because employees often file EEOC charges pro se,” we construe those charges “liberally
in favor of the employee when evaluating exhaustion.” Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th
772, 782 (6th Cir. 2024). Even so, the charge must at least “put the EEOC on notice” that the
employee may have suffered the claim alleged, “such that the agency can investigate that claim if
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it so chooses.” Id. (citation omitted). Providing notice gives “the employer information
concerning the conduct about which the employee complains,” as well as affords “the EEOC and
the employer an opportunity to settle the dispute through conference, conciliation, and persuasion”
before a suit is filed. Younis, 610 F.3d at 361.
Barnett-Morgan failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her retaliation claim. In
her formal EEOC charge, Barnett-Morgan did not check the box for retaliation, made no mention
of retaliation, and did not use “any language” that “would prompt the EEOC to investigate” an
“uncharged” claim of retaliation. Id. at 362-63 (citation omitted). The charge instead focused
exclusively on Barnett-Morgan’s allegation that Inverness discriminated against her based on her
race. See EEOC Charge, R.32-23, PageID 332 (“I believe I was discriminated against because of
my race.”). Even construed liberally, her charge was insufficient to “put the EEOC or the employer
on notice” that Barnett-Morgan was separately alleging protected-activity retaliation by Inverness.
Younis, 610 F.3d. at 363; see also Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th
Cir. 1998).
Barnett-Morgan criticizes the district court for giving “no weight to” her “initial inquiry to
the EEOC where she specifically selected retaliation as a basis for her complaint.” Barnett-Morgan
Br. 48. Likewise, she argues that the district court failed to “examine the effect” of an email
Barnett-Morgan sent to the EEOC. Id. Neither document demonstrates that Barnett-Morgan
exhausted her administrative remedies.
When considering whether a plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, the district
court is required to consider only those communications that constitute a “charge” of
discrimination. Younis, 610 F.3d at 361. To be sure, our Court has held that “a wide range of
documents might be classified as charges.” Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc., 643 F.3d 502, 509
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(6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Still, a document or communication sent to the EEOC must
meet at least three requirements to qualify as a “charge that is necessary to exhaust an employee’s
administrative remedies.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). First, it “must be verified—that is,
submitted under oath or penalty of perjury”; second, it “must contain information that is
sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices
complained of”; and third, “an objective observer must believe that the filing taken as a whole
suggests that the employee requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Barnett-Morgan’s cited communications with EEOC do not satisfy those criteria. Barnett-
Morgan notes that she submitted an EEOC inquiry via an online form. There is no evidence that
the online form was verified; it does not precisely describe how Inverness allegedly retaliated
against Barnett-Morgan; and Barnett-Morgan does not request any intervention or relief in the
document. Inverness further claims that it never received the inquiry and became aware of Barnett-
Morgan’s allegations only months later when it received a formal notice of the EEOC charge;
Barnett-Morgan has cited no contrary evidence in the record. As for the email Barnett-Morgan
provided to the EEOC during its investigation, that correspondence was also not verified and it
does not seek any particular action by the EEOC on the basis of a separate retaliation claim. The
inquiry and email therefore implicate the concern that “allowing a Title VII action to encompass
claims outside the reach of the EEOC charges would deprive the charged party of notice and would
frustrate the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory role.” Younis, 610 F.3d at 362. Because
neither the EEOC inquiry nor Barnett-Morgan’s email to the EEOC constitutes a “charge,” those
communications are insufficient to satisfy Barnett-Morgan’s obligation to exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to her retaliation claim. See id. at 361-62.
- 16 - No. 25-5669, Barnett-Morgan v. Inverness Techs., Inc.
* * *
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
- 17 -