Renee Michelle Vock v. FBI

District Court, N.D. California·Decided October 14, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-08544·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 RENEE MICHELLE VOCK, Case No. 25-cv-08544-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS 9 v. PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Defendant. 11

12 13 Renee Michelle Vock, proceeding without an attorney, filed a petition for writ of habeas 14 corpus on court-provided form. (Dkt. No. 1.) While her petition identifies a conviction in 15 Siskiyou County Superior Court for child abuse, her petition also references that she graduated 16 diversion in 2023. She also appears to be challenging the removal of her children. (See, e.g., Dkt. 17 No. 1 at 15 (“I am not allowed to protect my children by any means necessary”). And she makes 18 reference to “unconstitutional conditions of confinement.” (Id. at 16.) In sum, it is unclear 19 whether she is challenging a conviction or something else entirely; indeed, it is unclear whether 20 she is currently incarcerated. She in fact filed a prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis 21 and a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) 22 “A § 1983 action is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are not 23 within the core of habeas corpus,” which are claims that “necessarily challenge the validity or 24 duration of the underlying conviction or sentence.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927, 929 25 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) 26 (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the 27 province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be 1 appear to seek Ms. Vock’s release from custody, so her claims do not lie at the “core of habeas 2 corpus.” See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927, 929 (holding that prisoner’s claim which, if successful, will 3 not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release from custody falls outside the “core of 4 habeas corpus” and must be pursued (if at all) in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 rather than in a habeas action). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims must be brought in a civil rights 6 complaint. 7 If a habeas petition “is amenable to conversion” to a civil rights complaint “on its face, 8 meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief, the court may 9 recharacterize the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of the consequences of the 10 conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or amend his or her 11 [petition].” Jd. at 936 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the instant petition, 12 however, Petitioner does not name the correct defendant. She only names the FBI in the caption 5 13 of the petition, but the FBI does not seem to have anything to do with the conduct she complains 14 about. Also, the petition is very hard to follow and has over 400 pages of attachments. So, it is not 15 “amenable to conversion” as a civil rights case. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 836. 16 Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED without prejudice. If Ms. Vock is challenging a 3 17 conviction for which she is currently in custody or otherwise under sentence, then she may file S 18 such challenge in a habeas corpus petition that names the correct defendant and is limited to her 19 challenge her conviction. It must also identify whether she is currently under a sentence. If she is 20 also (or instead) making civil rights or other claims, those claims must be set forth in a complaint 21 separate from a habeas petition. 23 Dated: October 14, 2025 24

CQWELINE SCOTT CORLEY 26 United States District Judge 27 28

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Related

Muhammad v. Close
540 U.S. 749 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)