PD-00013-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 4/16/2015 11:34:18 AM April 16, 2015 Accepted 4/16/2015 11:42:02 AM PD-0013-15 ABEL ACOSTA CLERK
PD-0015-15
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
_________________________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
vs.
MICHAEL ERIC RENDON,
Appellee
_________________________________
ON PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI
CAUSE NUMBERS 13-13-00665-CR & 13-13-00666-CR
_________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE MICHAEL ERIC RENDON
________________________________
EDWARD F. SHAUGHNESSY, III ATTORNEY-AT-LAW 206 E. LOCUST SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78212 (210) 212-6700 (210) 212-2178 (fax) SBN 18134500 Shaughnessy727@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE(S)
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... i
Table of Interested Parties ....................................................................................... ii
Table of Authorities................................................................................................. iii
Brief for the Appellee ............................................................................................... 4
Response to the Appellant’s Ground for Review………………………………………………6
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................ 16
Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 17
Certificate of Compliance……………………………………………………………………..……..17
i
TABLE OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Mr. James P. Dickens State’s Trial Counsel Assistant Criminal District Attorney 205 N. Bridge Street Suite 301 Victoria, Texas 77901
Mr. Edward A. Bartolomei Trial Counsel Attorney at Law 420 Baltimore San Antonio, Texas 78215
Honorable Robert Cheshire Trial Court Judge Judge Presiding 377th Judicial District Court Victoria County, Texas
Edward F. Shaughnessy, III Appellee’s Counsel Attorney at Law 206 E. Locust Street San Antonio, Texas 78212 (210) 212-6700 Bar No: 18134500
Mr. Brendan W. Guy Appellant’s Counsel Assistant Criminal District Attorney 205 N. Bridge Street Suite 301 Victoria, Texas 77901
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE(S)
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 80 L.Ed2d 210 (1986)……...12
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)…...13
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 11134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987)…..13
FEDERAL CASE(S)
United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014)………………………………….15
STATE CASE(S)
Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)…………………………....11
Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. den. 492 U.S. 927 (1989)……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…13
Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)………………………………..10,11
Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)……………………………..12
Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)…………………………..……...12
Sayers v. State, 433 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2014)…………….15
OUT-OF-STATE CASES(S)
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013)…….14,15
People v. Burns, 25 N.E.3d 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)…………………….15
Perez v. Indiana, ___ NE.3d___ (No. 20A03-1407-CR-236, March 11, 2015, 2015 WL 1068994)………………………15
iii
PD-0013-15 PD-0015-15
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE COURT OF Appellant §
CRIMINAL APPEALS
v. §
MICHAEL ERIC RENDON, § AUSTIN, TEXAS Appellee
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE MICHAEL ERIC RENDON
To the Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals:
Now comes, Michael Eric Rendon, by and through Edward F.
Shaughnessy, III, attorney for the appellee and files this brief in cause numbers
PD-0013-15 and PD-0015-15. The appellant was indicted by a Victoria County
grand jury for the offenses of Money Laundering and Possession of Marijuana
(Four ounces to Five Pounds) in cause numbers 12-8-26806-D and 12-8-26805-
D. Prior to trial, the appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence. A hearing was
conducted on that motion and at the conclusion thereof the trial Court granted
the appellee’s motion. Notice of appeal was filed by the State of Texas and an
appeal, alleging four points of error, followed. On December 4, 2014 the Court
of Appeals, Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the order of the lower Court in
a published opinion authored by Benavides. Rendon v. State (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, No. 13-13-00665-CR & 13-`2-00666-CR, December 4, 2014, 2014 WL
5
6881630)1 The State of Texas, subsequently filed a Petition for Discretionary
Review with this Court. This Court granted that petition on February 4, 2014.
The State of Texas has filed its brief with this Court. The appellant asserts that
the opinion of the lower decided an important question of State and Federal law
that has not been but should be decided by this Court.
1
The opinion of the Court of Appeals treated the appellant’s four allegations of error as a single point of error,
that being whether the trial Court erred in granting the appellee’s motion to suppress.
2
It is the appellee’s position that the order of the trial Court should be upheld under any standard of review this
Court finds applicable to the issue presented.
6
APPELLEE’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S GROUND
FOR REVIEW
The State’s sole ground for review, when distilled to its essence, asserts
that the trial Court erred in granting the appellee’s motion to suppress because
appellee’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated. In support of
that allegation the State argues that the lower Court utilized an inappropriate
standard of review, resulting in a legal conclusion as to what constituted the
“curtilage” of the appellee’s residence for purposes of deciding whether the area
searched was within that “curtilage” for purposes of protection under the Fourth
Amendment.
STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE FACTS
The trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the appellee’s motion
to suppress which featured the testimony of a single police officer, along with the
nest-door neighbor of the appellee’s. In addition, the contested search warrant
and the accompanying affidavit were admitted along with photographs depicting
the exterior of the appellee’s apartment. The facts pertinent to the issue before
this court relate to only a portion of those presented to the trial Court: those
relating to what the trial Court and the Court of Appeals found to constitute
“curtilage” of the appellee’s apartment for purposes of ascertaining whether law
enforcement improperly entered within that zone of privacy and as a result
illegally obtained incriminatory facts utilized in the obtaining the subsequent
7
search warrant that was the subject of the appellee’s claim that the search was
conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and Art. I, §§ 9, 10, 19 Tex. Const.
Those facts are detailed in the opinion of the lower Court in the following
fashion:
On May 8, 2012 Victoria, Texas police officers conducted a drug investigation at an apartment complex located on Bingham Street following a confidential informant’s tip. The police’s target suspect was Rendon, who was a resident of the apartment complex. Victoria Police Detective Jason Stover and his police-trained dog, Baco, assisted other officers in the investigation.
Detective Stover testified that Baco initially conducted a warrantless “open air sniff’ of the exterior of Rendon’s parked vehicle, which was located in the apartment complex’s parking lot. Following the sniff, Baco exhibited a “positive alert to the presence of narcotics.” At that point, other Victoria police officers approached Rendon’s apartment, but Rendon exited his apartment and greeted the officers before they were able to knock on the apartment door.
The other officers spoke to Rendon outside of his apartment, and the officers later advised Detective Stover “by radio” to approach Rendon’s residence with Baco. Detective Stover and Baco arrived at Rendon’s apartment door, and Baco again conducted a warrantless sniff of the apartment’s door and “alerted [Detective Stover] to the odor of illegal narcotics.” After the positive alert, Detective Stover returned Baco to his police unit and joined the other officers outside of Rendon’s apartment. Police officers then requested Rendon’s consent to search his apartment, but Rendon declined. Detective Stover testified that because Rendon declined consent to search his apartment, he applied for a search warrant of Rendon’s apartment and vehicle.
8
In his search warrant affidavit, Detective Stover noted Baco’s “positive” alerts to the odor of narcotics from the “open-air sniff” outside of Rendon’s vehicle, as well as after sniffing the “bottom left portion” of Rendon’s apartment door. Detective Stover’s application for search warrant was granted by a magistrate and executed the same day. Rendon v. State, supra at slip op. pgs 2, 3.
The opinion of the Court below also detailed the physical characteristics of
the apartment, which was the focus of the contested issue. The Court described
that apartment in the following terms:
The record establishes that the rectangular building holds four separate apartment units over two floors. The first two units are located on the ground floor, and the remaining two units are located on the second floor. A straight continuous staircase leads visitors and residents to the second floor. At the stairway’s landing the path splits left and right. Each second floor apartment has a patio area immediately in front of its doorway. Rendon’s apartment was located on the left side of the second floor. Rendon v. State, supra at slip n.2.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing the trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court made a factual finding that the
sniff search by Baco the drug dog was a warrantless search of the curtilage of the
appellee’s apartment and as a consequence the subsequent search warrant relied
upon illegally obtained evidence. Subsequently, the appellee’s motion to
suppress was granted. As noted above the State of Texas appealed that ruling by
the trial Court, asserting among other things that the trial Court had erred in
granting the appellee’s motion because the area of the premises that was the
9
subject of Baco’s sniff search was not part of the curtilage of the appellee’s
apartment.
The lower Court rejected the argument advanced by the appellant
regarding the issue of whether Baco’s warrantless sniff search was in fact within
the protected “curtilage” of the appellee’s residence. The court reasoned as
follows:
Rendon argues that this sniff search occurred in the curtilage of his apartment, and was, thus, unreasonable under Jardines and the Fourth Amendment. The State argues that because Baco’s sniff occurred in the passageway leading up to Rendon’s apartment it was a “common area” of the apartment complex, and not protected by the Fourth Amendment. We agree with Rendon.
*********************
Based on this, record we conclude that the area immediately in front of Rendon’s apartment is no different from the front porch of a free-standing home. Thus, bringing a trained police dog to sniff the bottom left portion of the Rendon’s apartment door in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence exceeded the scope of any express or implied license allowed under the Fourth amendment. Rendon v. State, supra at slip op. pgs 7, 8.
The State of Texas asserts that the holding of the Thirteenth Court has
decided and important question of State and Federal law which has not been,
but should be, decided by this Court. The appellee does not disagree with the
broad characterization of the issue in question when considered in the context of
whether this unique fact scenario has ever been presented to this Court for a
determination of whether the area searched was within the protected “curtilage”
10
of a particular residence. The appellee would submit that in the context of the
facts presented herein the holding of the lower Court is wholly consistent with
the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and this Court regarding what
constitutes “curtilage” for purposes of protection under the Fourth Amendment.
As a result, the holding of the Court below along with the ruling of the trial court
should be upheld in all respects.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
The issue that presents itself to this Court appears to whether or not the
Baco “air sniff” was conducted within an area that constitutes the “curtilage” of
the appellee’s residence. Also before the Court is the issue as to whether the
lower Court utilized the correct standard of review in answering the ultimate
issue in favor of the appellee. The appellee will initially address the question of
what standard of review should be applied to the ruling of the trial Court.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The opinion of the lower Court appears to have considered the matter
before it as one involving a bifurcated standard of review. This Court has
defined the bifurcated standard of review to be utilized by reviewing court’s
when passing on the propriety of a trial ruling on a motion to suppress. See:
Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A ruling by a trial court 2
It is the appellee’s position that the order of the trial Court should be upheld under any standard of review this
Court finds applicable to the issue presented.
11
on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed by an appellate court for abuse of
discretion, with almost complete deference to be given to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts, especially if those determinations are founded
upon an assessment of witness credibility. Crain v. State, supra. The same
deference is afforded to the trial court regarding its rulings on the application of
the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution
of those issues requires an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. Crain v.
State, supra. Mixed questions of law and fact that do not require
determinations of credibility of the witnesses are subject to de novo review.
Crain v. State, supra. In the absence of express factual findings from the trial
court, a reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
ruling of the trial court, and engage in a presumption that the trial court made
implied findings that are supported by the record. Arguellez v. State, 409
S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). De novo review is employed when a
reviewing court is called upon to review rulings of a trial court that are questions
of law and mixed questions of law that are not dependent upon determinations
of credibility on the part of the witnesses. Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
12
APPLICATION OF STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the instant case the issue presented to the trial question was not a
“pure” question of law. 3 That issue would be whether “curtilage” enjoys any
protections under the Fourth Amendment. That argument was not raised in the
trial Court or the Court of Appeals and is not raised before this Court. As a result
de novo review is not required on the theory that this Court is presented with a
“pure” question of law. On the other extreme this was not a dispute in the trial
court, which was wholly factual in nature. That scenario would have involved a
dispute as to how the search was conducted. Such as a dispute as to whether
consent was given, whether the appellee had standing in the premises searched
or possibly whether the search was conducted pursuant to a search or arrest
warrant. It would appear that the instant case involves a mixed question of fact
and law that turns to a small degree on witness credibility. The question of law
appears to be what constitutes the “curtilage” of an apartment. The question of
fact being, was Baco’s “open-air sniff” within that protected area. The Court of
Appeals apparently viewed the standard to be applied as one involving giving
almost total deference to the historical facts found by the trial Court, yet
reviewing the application of those facts to the law in a de novo fashion.
The appellee would submit that the Court below properly determined the
appropriate standard of review. Hence this court should give almost total
3
The Supreme Court has definitively answered the question as to whether or not the “curtilage” of a given
premises is given protection under the Fourth Amendment in the affirmative. See: California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, !06 S.Ct. 1809, 80 L.Ed2d 210 (1986).
This Court has reached a similar conclusion. Gonzalez v. State, 588
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
13
deference to the finding of the trial court as to where Baco was when he
conducted his “open-air sniff” (warrantless search) and then review, in a de novo
fashion, the conclusion of the trial Court that the “open-air sniff” was conducted
within the “curtilage” of the appellee’s apartment. With these precepts of
appellate review taken into consideration, the issue appears to have been
distilled to a question of whether the door frame/threshold to the appellee’s
apartment was within the constitutionally protected “curtilage” of the appellee’s
residence.
CURTILAGE
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined the boundaries of
constitutionally protected “curtilage” as the area around the home to which the
activity of home life extends. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct.
1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). See: Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989), cert. den. 492 U.S. 927 (1989). The factors to be considered in
ascertaining whether or not a given area falls within that definition include the
following: 1) the proximity of the area claimed to curtilage to the residence, 2)
whether or not the contested area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the residence, 3) the nature of the uses to which the contested area is utilized,
and 4) the steps taken by the occupant to minimize the possibility of outside
observation. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 11134, 94 L.Ed.2d
326 (1987). The ultimate issue, in deciding whether the contested area is to be
14
treated as “curtilage” of the residence, is whether the contested area is so
immediately tied to the residence itself that it should be placed under the
residence’s “umbrella” of protection as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
United State v. Dunn, supra.
The most recent application of these principles relating to the issue of
“curtilage” and the boundaries of protection under the Fourth Amendment is the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct.
1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013).
In Jardines, a detective, a canine officer and the officer’s drug sniffing dog
walked up to the front door of the defendant’s home. The officers did not
possess a search warrant. While at the front of the door the drug dog alerted for
the presence of illegal substances. Based upon that alert the officers sought and
obtained a search warrant for the interior of the residence. After executing the
warrant the officers found and seized marijuana at the location. The Florida
courts suppressed the marijuana on the grounds of a Fourth Amendment
violation. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Florida court.
The Jardines court noted that “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment,
the home is the first among equals” and “at the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands
‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ “ Jardines, id. at S.Ct. 1414. The Court
noted that the curtilage of the residence (the area immediately surrounding and
15
associated with the home) is treated as part of the residence itself for purposes of
an analysis under the Fourth Amendment. Jardines, id. at S.Ct. 1414.
The facts underlying the instant prosecution, do not differ in any
significant fashion from those that were presented in Jardines. That was the
conclusion of the lower Court when it concluded “police conducted an
unreasonable search by using a trained police dog to investigate the curtilage of
Rendon’s apartment.” Rendon v. State, supra, slip op, at pg 9. A de novo review
of that question of law by this Court is wholly consistent with holding in
Jardines. Compare: United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014);
People v. Burns, 25 N.E.3d 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Perez v. Indiana, ___
NE.3d___ (No. 20A03-1407-CR-236, March 11, 2015, 2015 WL 1068994). See
also: Sayers v. State, 433 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2014).
The appellant’s sole ground for review is without merit and should be
overruled, and the holding of the Court below should be affirmed in all respects.
16
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Wherefore premises considered the appellee, Michael Eric Rendon, would
respectfully request that this Court affirm the judgment of the Thirteenth Court
of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
__/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy, III___
Edward F. Shaughnessy, III Attorney at Law 206 E. Locust San Antonio, Texas 78212 (210) 212-6700 (210) 212-2178 (fax) SBN 18134500 Shaughnessy727@gmail.com
Attorney for the appellee Michael Eric Rendon
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edward F. Shaughnessy, III, attorney for the appellee hereby certify that
a true and correct copy of the instant brief was delivered to Brendan W. Guy,
attorney for the appellant, by use of the U.S. Mail, at 205 N. Bridge Street, Suite
301, Victoria, Texas, 77901, counsel for the appellant, on the _16__ day of April,
2015.
____/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy,III____
Edward F. Shaughnessy, III
CERTIFIVATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, Edward F. Shaughnessy, III, attorney for the appellee, hereby certify
that the instant document contains 3370 words.
__/s/Edward F. Shaughnessy,III___
Edward F. Shaughnessy. III