Remsburg v. Docusearch et a l . CV-00-211-B 01/31/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Helen Remsburg, Administrator of the Estate of Amy Lynn Bover
v. Civil No. 00-211-B 2002 DNH 035 Docusearch, Inc., et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Helen Remsburg, administrator of the estate of her daughter,
Amy Lynn Boyer, has sued defendants Docusearch, Inc., Wing and a
Prayer, Inc., Daniel Cohn, Kenneth Zeiss and Michele Gambino for
wrongful death; invasion of privacy through intrusion upon
seclusion; invasion of privacy through commercial appropriation
of private information; violation of the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a et sea.; and violation of the
New Hampshire Consumer Protection Statute, N.H. R.S.A. § 358-A:l
et sea. Defendants Docusearch, Inc., and Wing and a Prayer,
Inc., move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). For the reasons that follow, I deny
the motion. I. BACKGROUND1
Docusearch, Inc., and Wing and a Prayer, Inc., jointly own
and operate an internet-based investigation and information
service known as "docusearch.com," which has an office located in
Boca Raton, Florida. Both companies are jointly owned by Cohn
and Zeiss, with each holding 50% of each company's stock. Cohn
serves as the president of both corporations and Zeiss serves as
a director for Wing and a Prayer, Inc.2 Cohn and Zeiss at one
point operated Docusearch from a condominium in Boca Raton where
they both resided. Currently, Zeiss works for Docusearch in Boca
Raton but Cohn lives and works for Docusearch in Ashburn,
Virginia.
Docusearch conducts its business primarily through its
interactive website, where clients can place orders for
information about third parties and pay for their requests with a
1 The background facts are drawn from the parties' evidentiary submissions and are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Foster-Miller. Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995) .
2 Docusearch, Inc., and Wing and a Prayer, Inc., are indistinguishable for jurisdictional purposes. Therefore, I refer to them, as well as the website they operate, collectively as "Docusearch."
- 2 - credit card. Docusearch is incorporated in Florida, and Cohn is
licensed as a private investigator by both the State of Florida
and Palm Beach County, Florida. Neither Docusearch nor its
employees are licensed or registered to do business in any other
state.
On July 29, 1999, New Hampshire resident Liam Youens
contacted Docusearch through its internet website and requested
the date of birth for Amy Lynn Boyer, another New Hampshire
resident. Youens gave Docusearch his name. New Hampshire address
and telephone number. Youens also paid Docusearch's $20 fee by
Mastercard. Zeiss placed a telephone call to Youens in New
Hampshire that day. Zeiss cannot recall the reason for the phone
call, but speculates that it was to verify Youens' order. The
next day, July 30, 1999, Docusearch provided Youens with the
birthdates for several Amy Boyers, but none were for the Amy
Boyer that Youens had in mind. In response, Youens sent
Docusearch another email asking if Docusearch could obtain better
results if it used Boyer's home address, which he provided.
Later that day, Youens contacted Docusearch and placed an
order for Boyer's social security number, paying Docusearch's $45
fee by Mastercard. On August 2, 1999, Docusearch provided Youens
- 3 - with Boyer's social security number. The next day, Youens placed
an order with Docusearch for Boyer's employment information,
paying the $109 fee by Mastercard. Phone records reveal that
Zeiss placed a second phone call to Youens on August 6, 1999.
The phone call lasted for less than a minute, and no record
exists concerning its topic. On August 20, 1999, having received
no response to his latest request, Youens placed another request
for Boyer's employment information, again paying the $109 fee by
Mastercard. On September 1, 1999, Docusearch refunded Youens'
first $109 payment because its effort to obtain Boyer's
employment information had failed.
With his second request for Boyer's employment information
pending, Youens placed yet another order for information with
Docusearch on September 6, 1999. This time, he requested a
"locate by social security number" search for Boyer. Youens paid
the $30 fee by Mastercard, and received the results of the search
- Boyer's Nashua, New Hampshire home address - on September 7,
1999 .
On September 8, 1999, Docusearch informed Youens that Boyer
worked for Dr. John Bednar at 5 Main Street, Nashua, New
Hampshire. Docusearch acquired Boyer's business address through
- 4 - a subcontractor, Michele Gambino. Gambino, in turn, obtained the
information by placing a "pretext" telephone call to Boyer in New
Hampshire. Gambino lied about who she was and the purpose of her
call in order to convince Boyer to reveal her employment
information.
On October 15, 1999, Youens drove to Boyer's workplace and
fatally shot her as she left work. Youens then shot himself in
the head and died immediately. Remsburg has brought this suit
against Docusearch under the theory that Docusearch negligently
provided Youens with information that enabled him to find and
kill Boyer. Docusearch moves to dismiss on the ground that this
court lacks personal jurisdiction.
II . STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a defendant contests personal jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that a basis for asserting jurisdiction exists. See Mass. Sch.
of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n., 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1998); Rodriquez v. Fullerton Tires Corp., 115 F.3d 81, 83
(1st Cir. 1997). Because I have not held an evidentiary hearing,
Remsburg need only make a prima facie showing that the court has
- 5 - personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Sawtelle v.
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1386 n.l (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United
Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. (UE) v. 163 Pleasant St.
Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Pleasant St.
II] ) •
To make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, Remsburg may
not rest on the pleadings. Rather, she must "adduce evidence of
specific facts" that support her jurisdictional claim. Foster-
Miller, 46 F.3d at 145; Pleasant St. II, 987 F.2d at 44. I take
the facts offered by the plaintiff as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff's claim. See Mass.
Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 34; Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145. I do
not act as a fact-finder; instead, I determine "whether the facts
duly proffered, [when] fully credited, support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction." Rodriguez, 115 F.3d at 84 (citing Boit
v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992)) .
While the prima facie standard is liberal, I need not
"'credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences.'"
Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 34 (quoting Ticketmaster-New York,
Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994)). I also
consider facts offered by the defendant, but only to the extent
- 6 - that they are uncontradicted. See id.
When assessing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant in a diversity of citizenship case, "a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction 'is the functional equivalent
of a state court sitting in the forum state.'" Sawtelle, 70 F.3d
at 1387 (quoting Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 204). Accordingly, I
must determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is proper
under both the New Hampshire long-arm statute and the due process
requirements of the federal constitution. See id. ; Foster-
Miller, 46 F.3d at 144. The New Hampshire long-arm statute,
which permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant who "transacts any business within [the] State" or
"commits a tortious act within [the] State," N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 510:4, I (Supp. 1994), is coextensive with the federal due
process standard.3 See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171
3 Remsburg alternatively claims that the court has federal question jurisdiction over her Federal Credit Reporting Act claim and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. Personal jurisdiction in a federal question case is governed by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause rather than by its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the Fifth Amendment, "a plaintiff need only show that the defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a particular state." Id. In a case such as this, however.
- 7 - (1987). Therefore, I proceed directly to the constitutional due
process analysis.
Ill. Analysis
The Due Process Clause precludes a court from asserting
jurisdiction over a defendant unless "the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that [it] should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) . Because
the constitutional inquiry is founded on "''traditional
conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice,'" Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985) (quoting Int'1 Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)) (alteration in
where the federal question arises under a statute that does not provide for nationwide service of process. Rule 4 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to also look to the forum state's long-arm statute to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction. See United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1086 (1st Cir. 1992); Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626- 27 (11th Cir. 1996). Because, as I have noted. New Hampshire's long-arm statute is co-extenstive with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process standard, the personal jurisdiction analysis is the same in this case regardless of whether the court's subject matter jurisdiction rests on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. original), determining personal jurisdiction has always been
"more an art than a science," Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 206
(quoting Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 468 n.7
(1st Cir. 1990) ) .
The "constitutional touchstone" for personal jurisdiction is
"whether the defendant purposefully established ''minimum
contacts' in the forum State." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474
(citing Int'1 Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316); see also Sawtelle, 70 F.3d
at 1388. The inquiry into "minimum contacts" is necessarily
fact-specific, "involving an individualized assessment and
factual analysis of the precise mix of contacts that characterize
each case." Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994) . A
defendant cannot be subjected to a forum state's jurisdiction
based solely on "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 299) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Id. (quoting Hanson v.
- 9- Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
A court may assert authority over a defendant by means of
either general or specific jurisdiction. See Mass. Sch. of Law,
142 F.3d at 34 (citing Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 462-63); Foster-
Miller, 46 F.3d at 144. A defendant who has engaged in
continuous and systematic activity in a forum is subject to
general jurisdiction in that forum with respect to all causes of
action, even those unrelated to the defendant's forum-based
activities. See Phillips Exeter Acad, v. Howard Phillips Fund,
Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984);
Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 462-63). A court may exercise specific
jurisdiction, by contrast, only when the cause of action arises
from, or relates to, the defendant's contacts with the forum.
See id.; Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 60. Here, I evaluate Remsburg's
claim that the court has specific personal jurisdiction.
The First Circuit has developed a three-part test for
determining whether an exercise of specific jurisdiction is
consistent with due process. The analysis consists of an inquiry
into (1) relatedness, (2) purposeful availment, and (3)
reasonableness. See Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 35; Nowak v.
- 10 - Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 712-13 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997). An affirmative finding on each of
these three components is required to support an assertion of
specific jurisdiction. See Phillips Exeter, 196 F.3d at 288.
1. Relatedness
The relatedness requirement dictates that a sufficient nexus
exist between the defendant's contacts with the forum and the
plaintiff's causes of action. See id.; Mass. Sch. of Law, 142
F.3d at 35. With respect to tort claims, the First Circuit has
determined that relatedness in most instances requires a showing
that defendant's forum contacts are both a cause in fact and a
legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See Mass. Sch. of Law,
142 F.3d at 35. Although the court has not explicitly applied
the relatedness requirement to statutory claims such as
Remsburg's claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the New
Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, I conclude that a showing of
both cause in fact and legal cause will also satisfy the
relatedness requirement with respect to Remsburg's statutory
claims.
Remsburg argues that Docusearch's acquisition of Boyer's
business address through a pretext call placed to Boyer in New
- 11 - Hampshire and its transmission of that address to Youens in this
state are causes in fact of Boyer's death because Youens needed
to know where Boyer worked to complete his plan to kill her.
Remsburg supports her argument by averring that Youens feared
stalking Boyer at her home and could not follow her as she moved
about in her day-to-day life because he had limited access to a
vehicle. Thus, she argues, Youens needed to know where Boyer
worked so that he could arrange to confront her away from her
home. Construing these averments in the light most favorable to
Remsburg's jurisdictional claim, as I must at this stage of the
proceedings, they are sufficient to support her argument that
Docusearch's contacts with New Hampshire were a cause in fact of
Boyer's death.
Remsburg has also pleaded sufficient facts to support her
assertion that Docusearch's New Hampshire contacts were a legal
cause of Boyer's death. In addition to the above-described
averments, Remsburg asserts that Docusearch was aware of the fact
that the information it provided Youens could be misused to stalk
and possibly harm the subject of his inquiries. Thus, assuming
without deciding that Remsburg has asserted viable causes of
- 12 - action,4 she has alleged sufficient facts to support a conclusion
that Docusearch's New Hampshire contacts are both a factual and a
legal cause of the injuries on which Remsburg's claims are based.
Therefore, she has satisfied the relatedness requirement.
2. Purposeful Availment
I next must determine whether Docusearch purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in New
Hampshire. In doing so, I focus "on whether a defendant has
'engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum that
would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or
reasonable.'" Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1391 (citing Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)). The factors I consider when making
that determination are voluntariness and foreseeability. See id.
Voluntariness reflects the willingness with which a
defendant engages in activity in the forum. See Ticketmaster, 26
F.3d at 207-08 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (cautioning
that jurisdiction may not rest on the "unilateral activity of
another party or a third person")). Here, Docusearch certainly
4 I take no position as to whether Remsburg has stated viable causes of action under state and federal law. Instead, I merely determine that if any of her causes of action are viable, the court has personal jurisdiction to resolve them.
- 13 - acted voluntarily by responding to Youens' five separate New
Hampshire-based requests for information about Boyer. Although
Youens initiated the contacts, Docusearch eagerly set about
fulfilling his orders knowing that Youens was based in New
Hampshire and that the subject of his inquiries was also a New
Hampshire resident. Docusearch thus cannot claim that it was
involuntarily drawn into New Hampshire through some act of
deception or coercion by Youens.
Courts also must consider the next factor, foreseeability,
because "a defendant's 'conduct and connection with the forum
State [must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.'" Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 207 (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (alteration in original).
When accepting and fulfilling Youens' requests for information,
Docusearch knew that it was selling a New Hampshire client
information about another New Hampshire resident. Docusearch
established a significant business relationship with Youens,
which included accepting five separate orders from him, with fees
totaling $313.5 Docusearch's conduct in fulfilling Youens
5 Youens paid Docusearch $20 to search for Boyer's birthdate; $45 to search for Boyer's social security number; $109
- 14 - requests, including placing phone calls to Youens and Boyer in
New Hampshire, is enough to support Remsburg's claim that
Docusearch should reasonably have anticipated being sued in New
Hampshire. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 717 (finding that "where the
defendant purposefully derives economic benefits from its forum-
state activities" it should foresee being haled into that forum-
state' s court).
3. Reasonableness
Although Remsburg has satisfied both the relatedness and the
purposeful availment requirements, I must still consider the
final portion of the three-part test, reasonableness. The
Supreme Court has identified five factors to consider when
analyzing the fairness of subjecting a nonresident to a court's
jurisdiction. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1394. Known as the
"gestalt factors," they include: "(1) the defendant's burden of
appearing; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
to find Boyer's workplace information; another $109 to search again for Boyer's workplace information; and $30 to perform a "locate by social security number" search on Boyer. Docusearch refunded Youens' first $109 payment when its first attempt to find Boyer's workplace information failed.
- 15 - effective relief; (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most effective resolution of the controversy; and (5) the
common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive
social policies." Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
a . Defendant's Burden of Appearance
Docusearch is based in Florida, and its corporate officers
live in Florida and Virginia. Certainly, litigating in Florida
would be easier for Docusearch, but the mere inconvenience that
litigating in a foreign jurisdiction presents is not sufficient
to make this factor meaningful. A defendant must "demonstrate a
special or unusual burden" before this factor weighs against
jurisdiction. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. Here, Docusearch has
not made such a demonstration.
b . The Forum State's Adjudicatory Interest
The First Circuit has explained that "[t]he purpose of
[this] inquiry is not to compare the forum's interest to that of
some other jurisdiction, but to determine the extent to which the
forum has an interest." Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395 (citing
Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 151) (alteration and emphasis in
original). A state has a demonstrable interest in exercising
jurisdiction over one who causes tortious injury within its
- 16 - borders. Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211. Here, one New Hampshire
resident murdered another New Hampshire resident in New
Hampshire. Remsburg argues that Docusearch's conduct was a
substantial contributing factor in the murder. Given the gravity
of this allegation. New Hampshire's adjudicatory interest weighs
in favor of jurisdiction.
c . Plaintiff's Interest in Obtaining Convenient Relief
" [A] plaintiff's choice of forum must be accorded a degree
of deference with respect to the issue of its own convenience."
Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. Here, it would be more convenient for
Remsburg to litigate in New Hampshire than in Florida.
d . The Administration of Justice
Often, courts conclude that this factor does not weigh in
either direction. See id. at 1395 (citing Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d
at 211). However, in this case, discovery is underway and many
filings have been made in this court. Therefore, the most
efficient manner of resolving this case would be for this court
to retain jurisdiction.
e . Pertinent Policy Arguments
Analysis of this final factor entails considering "the
- 17 - social policies. Here, the most prominent policy implicated is
the ability of a state to provide a convenient forum for its
residents to redress injuries inflicted by out-of-forum actors."
Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473). The injury alleged
in this case is directly linked to the important substantive
social issue of privacy. A New Hampshire resident has been
murdered, and the allegation has been made that negligence and
invasion of the murder victim's privacy by an out-of-state actor
were substantial causes in that murder.
The overall effect of the gestalt factors weighs in favor
jurisdiction. Because the requirements of relatedness and
purposeful availment are also satisfied, I conclude that
Docusearch is subject to specific jurisdiction in this court.
IV. CONCLUSION
I deny Docusearch's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (b)(2) (Doc. No. 7).
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge January 31, 2002
- 18 - cc: David M. Gottesman, Esq. Dona Feeney, Esq. Carol L. Hess, Esq. Michael J. lacopino, Esq. Steven B. Ross, Esq.
- 19 -