J-A17003-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
JESSICA C. REITZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW L. FLOWER : : Appellant : No. 2291 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at No(s): DR-0165915, PACSES: 523115701
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2024
Matthew L. Flower appeals pro se from the order finding him in contempt
for failing to pay court-ordered child support obligations to Jessica C. Reitz
and imposing six months of incarceration, contingent upon Appellant paying a
$900 purge condition. Due to Appellant’s failure to adequately develop the
claims in his brief, we affirm.
Based on our disposition, we need not recount the factual and
procedural history of this matter at length. It suffices to state that on April
18, 2023, the domestic relations office in Northampton County filed a petition
for contempt against Appellant for his failure to pay basic support to Ms. Reitz
in the amount of $508 per month and arrears of $102 per month. After several
continuances, the trial court held a hearing on August 15, 2023. The
testimony bore out that Appellant failed to voluntarily remit a single payment
toward his obligations from the period of December 2022 through the date of J-A17003-24
the hearing. The court noted that Appellant “had a total costs and arrears
balance of $12,589.30, having accrued shortages of $4,134.17 from
December 2022 through July 2023.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/24, at 2.
Appellant’s testimony further established that he was working in a limited
capacity during the time in question as a floor cleaner for a brewery and as a
member of the Moore Township Zoning Hearing Board.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant in willful
contempt of a support order and imposed the sentence indicated above. This
timely pro se appeal followed. The court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, and he complied after being granted an extension of time.
The court thereafter issued a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant presents three issues for our consideration:
I. Did [Appellant] have the ability to pay as ordered? Was the non-payment willful?
II. Did any artificial barrier to employment exist, and if so, did [Appellant] make any attempts to resolve them?
III. Were the purge considerations of the trial court reasonable? If so, is it a violation for the trial court to fail to provide an opportunity to payment of a purge amount prior to incarceration?
Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 4 (cleaned up).
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we first look to
whether his brief complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This Court has stated that “when defects in a brief impede our ability to
conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or
-2- J-A17003-24
find certain issues to be waived.” Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 336
(Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Additionally, we “will not act as counsel
and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. Finally, despite
being a pro se litigant, Appellant is nonetheless required to abide by our
appellate rules. See Deek Investment, L.P. v. Murray, 157 A.3d 491, 494
(Pa.Super. 2017) (stating “that pro se status does not entitle a party to any
particular advantage because of his or her lack of legal training, and that pro
se litigants are bound by our procedural rules” (cleaned up)).
Our review of Appellant’s unpaginated brief reveals that it does not
comport with the rules of appellate procedure. Initially, it fails to include
multiple sections required by Pa.R.A.P 2111, such as a statement of
jurisdiction, the order in question, a statement as to the scope of review, and
a summary of the argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1), (2), (3), and (6).
Furthermore, and more critically, the brief flagrantly violates Rule 2119,
concerning the argument section, via severe deficiencies in Appellant’s citation
to case law. Rule 2119 provides that each issue shall be “followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent[,]” and those
citations must comply with Pa.R.A.P. 126.1 See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b).
Throughout his brief, Appellant purports to cite five Pennsylvania cases:
____________________________________________
1 Rule 126 does not require a specific citation format, but rather dictates, in
pertinent part:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-A17003-24
1. Smith v. Jones, 216 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2018); 2. Johnson v. Johnson, 198 A.3d 567 (Pa.Super. 2017); 3. Brown v. Green, 180 A.3d 890 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2016); 4. Wilson v. Davis, 132 A.3d 678 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013); and 5. Miller v. Thompson, 160 A.3d 456 (Pa. 2015).
Appellant’s brief, generally. Appellant refers to these decisions numerous
times throughout his brief to support various legal propositions, such as the
appropriate standard of review for his claims and the purported doctrine of
“artificial barriers” to complying with contempt orders. See, e.g., Appellant’s
brief at unnumbered 4-9.
The problem is that not a single one of these citations corresponds to
any existing Pennsylvania case, or even one remotely resembling the name
provided by Appellant. Rather, two of the citations lead to decisions from the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The other three direct the reader to opinions
from the appellate courts in Connecticut. While two of the citations correspond
to the start of an actual opinion, the remainder plant a reviewer into the middle
of an opinion.
(a) When citing authority, a party should direct the court’s attention to the specific part of the authority on which the party relies. A party citing authority that is not readily available shall attach the authority as an appendix to its filing. If a party cites a decision as authorized in paragraph (b), (c), or (d), the party shall indicate the value or basis for such citation in a parenthetical following the citation.
Pa.R.A.P. 126.
-4- J-A17003-24
After additional scrutiny, we find it a striking coincidence that the
starting page number for all five cases cited in Appellant’s brief contain
sequential three- or four-digit numbers. For example, Smith v. Jones is
alleged to begin on page 1234 of the reporter, whereas Johnson v. Johnson
is asserted to start at page 567, and so on. Additionally, it is difficult to
overlook the generic commonality in the names of the various parties in all
the cases (i.e., Smith, Jones, Davis, and Wilson), or the happenstance that
Appellant’s appellate claims would be supported by legal propositions
espoused in a suit purportedly between Brown and Green.
By all accounts, it appears that Appellant cites these fictional cases in
an attempt to mislead this Court as to the viability and merit of his arguments
on appeal. In any event, none of the legal authority identified in his brief
upholds the legal principles that Appellant suggests. 2 As such, he has failed
to properly support any of the arguments or positions he raises therein.
Appellant’s noncompliance has “impede[d] our ability to conduct meaningful
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-A17003-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
JESSICA C. REITZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW L. FLOWER : : Appellant : No. 2291 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at No(s): DR-0165915, PACSES: 523115701
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2024
Matthew L. Flower appeals pro se from the order finding him in contempt
for failing to pay court-ordered child support obligations to Jessica C. Reitz
and imposing six months of incarceration, contingent upon Appellant paying a
$900 purge condition. Due to Appellant’s failure to adequately develop the
claims in his brief, we affirm.
Based on our disposition, we need not recount the factual and
procedural history of this matter at length. It suffices to state that on April
18, 2023, the domestic relations office in Northampton County filed a petition
for contempt against Appellant for his failure to pay basic support to Ms. Reitz
in the amount of $508 per month and arrears of $102 per month. After several
continuances, the trial court held a hearing on August 15, 2023. The
testimony bore out that Appellant failed to voluntarily remit a single payment
toward his obligations from the period of December 2022 through the date of J-A17003-24
the hearing. The court noted that Appellant “had a total costs and arrears
balance of $12,589.30, having accrued shortages of $4,134.17 from
December 2022 through July 2023.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/24, at 2.
Appellant’s testimony further established that he was working in a limited
capacity during the time in question as a floor cleaner for a brewery and as a
member of the Moore Township Zoning Hearing Board.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant in willful
contempt of a support order and imposed the sentence indicated above. This
timely pro se appeal followed. The court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, and he complied after being granted an extension of time.
The court thereafter issued a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant presents three issues for our consideration:
I. Did [Appellant] have the ability to pay as ordered? Was the non-payment willful?
II. Did any artificial barrier to employment exist, and if so, did [Appellant] make any attempts to resolve them?
III. Were the purge considerations of the trial court reasonable? If so, is it a violation for the trial court to fail to provide an opportunity to payment of a purge amount prior to incarceration?
Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 4 (cleaned up).
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we first look to
whether his brief complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This Court has stated that “when defects in a brief impede our ability to
conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or
-2- J-A17003-24
find certain issues to be waived.” Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 336
(Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Additionally, we “will not act as counsel
and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. Finally, despite
being a pro se litigant, Appellant is nonetheless required to abide by our
appellate rules. See Deek Investment, L.P. v. Murray, 157 A.3d 491, 494
(Pa.Super. 2017) (stating “that pro se status does not entitle a party to any
particular advantage because of his or her lack of legal training, and that pro
se litigants are bound by our procedural rules” (cleaned up)).
Our review of Appellant’s unpaginated brief reveals that it does not
comport with the rules of appellate procedure. Initially, it fails to include
multiple sections required by Pa.R.A.P 2111, such as a statement of
jurisdiction, the order in question, a statement as to the scope of review, and
a summary of the argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1), (2), (3), and (6).
Furthermore, and more critically, the brief flagrantly violates Rule 2119,
concerning the argument section, via severe deficiencies in Appellant’s citation
to case law. Rule 2119 provides that each issue shall be “followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent[,]” and those
citations must comply with Pa.R.A.P. 126.1 See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b).
Throughout his brief, Appellant purports to cite five Pennsylvania cases:
____________________________________________
1 Rule 126 does not require a specific citation format, but rather dictates, in
pertinent part:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-A17003-24
1. Smith v. Jones, 216 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2018); 2. Johnson v. Johnson, 198 A.3d 567 (Pa.Super. 2017); 3. Brown v. Green, 180 A.3d 890 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2016); 4. Wilson v. Davis, 132 A.3d 678 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013); and 5. Miller v. Thompson, 160 A.3d 456 (Pa. 2015).
Appellant’s brief, generally. Appellant refers to these decisions numerous
times throughout his brief to support various legal propositions, such as the
appropriate standard of review for his claims and the purported doctrine of
“artificial barriers” to complying with contempt orders. See, e.g., Appellant’s
brief at unnumbered 4-9.
The problem is that not a single one of these citations corresponds to
any existing Pennsylvania case, or even one remotely resembling the name
provided by Appellant. Rather, two of the citations lead to decisions from the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The other three direct the reader to opinions
from the appellate courts in Connecticut. While two of the citations correspond
to the start of an actual opinion, the remainder plant a reviewer into the middle
of an opinion.
(a) When citing authority, a party should direct the court’s attention to the specific part of the authority on which the party relies. A party citing authority that is not readily available shall attach the authority as an appendix to its filing. If a party cites a decision as authorized in paragraph (b), (c), or (d), the party shall indicate the value or basis for such citation in a parenthetical following the citation.
Pa.R.A.P. 126.
-4- J-A17003-24
After additional scrutiny, we find it a striking coincidence that the
starting page number for all five cases cited in Appellant’s brief contain
sequential three- or four-digit numbers. For example, Smith v. Jones is
alleged to begin on page 1234 of the reporter, whereas Johnson v. Johnson
is asserted to start at page 567, and so on. Additionally, it is difficult to
overlook the generic commonality in the names of the various parties in all
the cases (i.e., Smith, Jones, Davis, and Wilson), or the happenstance that
Appellant’s appellate claims would be supported by legal propositions
espoused in a suit purportedly between Brown and Green.
By all accounts, it appears that Appellant cites these fictional cases in
an attempt to mislead this Court as to the viability and merit of his arguments
on appeal. In any event, none of the legal authority identified in his brief
upholds the legal principles that Appellant suggests. 2 As such, he has failed
to properly support any of the arguments or positions he raises therein.
Appellant’s noncompliance has “impede[d] our ability to conduct meaningful
appellate review,” and accordingly, we conclude that all his issues are waived. 3
2 Moreover, the cases from the foreign jurisdictions do not address matters
involving contempt of court orders, let alone the points of law Appellant attributes to them.
3 Even if we were to consider the merits of Appellant’s arguments, we conclude
that he would not prevail. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant in willful contempt of a support order when Appellant did not remit a single voluntary payment for six months, despite working during that time. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/24, at 6. Furthermore, Appellant’s challenge as (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5- J-A17003-24
See Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d at 336 (finding that the appellant waived an
issue on appeal when he failed to cite any legal authority to support his
arguments or provide citations to the record, hence hampering this Court’s
ability to conduct meaningful review).
Based on the inadequate advocacy provided by Appellant, we have no
cause to disturb the trial court’s order holding him in contempt.
Order affirmed.
Date: 10/3/2024
to the reasonableness of the $900 purge amount likewise fails because, despite his assertions, the court was not required to allow him to pay this amount in installments before imposing incarceration.
-6-