Reisinger v. Commonwealth

399 A.2d 1160, 41 Pa. Commw. 553, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1429
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 10, 1979
DocketAppeal, No. 1988 C.D. 1977
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 399 A.2d 1160 (Reisinger v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reisinger v. Commonwealth, 399 A.2d 1160, 41 Pa. Commw. 553, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1429 (Pa. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge Blatt,

Gerald M. Reisinger (petitioner) appeals here from an order of the State Board of Medical Education and [555]*555Licensure (Board) denying Mm a license to practice Naturopathy or Drugless Therapy.1

The petitioner received a doctor’s degree in chiropractic medicine from Palmer College of Chiropractic Medicine in 1974 and a doctor’s degree in Naturopathy from the National College of Naturopathic Medicine in 1975. In December 1974, he directed a written inquiry to the Board regarding licensure requirements for Naturopaths or Drugless Therapists and he was notified by the Board Secretary in February of 1975 that the Board had no jurisdiction under The Medical Practice Act of 19742 (Act) to license Drugless Therapists. In March 1976, he requested an opportunity to appear before the Board to demonstrate why he ought to be examined and licensed as a Drugless Therapist, and a formal hearing was begun before the Board on September 1, 1976. At that time the head administrator of the National College of Naturopathic Medicine testified as to the educational program of that institution, the petitioner was examined on his [556]*556qualifications and expertise in dealing with, specific medical problems, and the Board Secretary testified that no Drugless Therapists had been licensed since 1951. The hearing was then continued until October 21, 1976 when the Commonwealth presented Dr. Jack Ederken as a witness, a physician who had worked on a report for the Congress regarding Independent Practitioners Under Medicare. Dr. Ederken testified as to the conclusions reached in his report regarding the state of the art of Naturopathy today and the reasons for denying payment of Medicare benefits to Naturopaths. The petitioner presented another witness whose testimony related to the role of nutrition in medical care, and the record was then closed. After a review of the notes of testimony, the Board voted unanimously to deny licensure to the petitioner as a Drugless Therapist or Naturopath, and issued its order to this effect on September 14, 1977. This appeal followed.

Our scope of review is, of course, limited to a determination of whether or not constitutional rights were violated, and as to whether or not the adjudication was in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. §704.

The Board maintains that before the petitioner can practice Naturopathy in the Commonwealth, he must first obtain a license to practice medicine, for which this petitioner is not qualified to receive. Its position is based on a literal reading of the definition of medicine found in the Act and the conclusion that the practice of Naturopathy is incorporated therein. Medicine is defined in Section 2 of the Act as follows:

(3) ‘Medicine and surgery’. The art and science having for its object the cure of the diseases of and the preservation of the health of man including all practice of the healing art with or without drugs. . . .

63 P.S. §421.2.

[557]*557The petitioner would concede that he is not qualified under the statute to he licensed to practice medicine. He argues, however, that he should be licensed as a “drugless therapist” pursuant to Section 4(4) of the Act which provides:

(4) Midwifery, Physical Therapy and Drug-less Therapy. Nothing in this act shall be constructed to preclude the board from continuing to license, register and regulate persons engaged in the practice of midwifery and/or physical therapy or to register or regulate persons engaged in the practice of drugless therapy in accordance with existing rules and regulations lawfully promulgated by said board prior to the effective date of this act.

63 P.S. §421.4.

With respect to this contention, the Board argues that it lacks the authority under the section of the Act quoted to license drugless therapists and that, in the alternative, the petitioner is not a Drugless Therapist as envisioned by the Act. In support of its first argument, the Board contends that the absence of the word “license” before the grant of authority indicates a legislative intent that the Board shall not license (i.e., grant a license, as distinct from “continuing to license”) such persons. It argues that this interpretation is supported by the inclusion in the same section of the clear power to license midwives and physical therapists, and we agree. The obvious exclusion of the word “license” with respect to Drug-less Therapists clearly indicates a legislative intent that such a procedure is no longer to be available.

Having determined that the Board lacks the authority now to license Drugless Therapists,3 we need [558]*558not reach the question of whether or not the petitioner is in fact snch a therapist. We also agree that the legislature’s broad and comprehensive definition of medicine includes the practice of a healing art such as that advocated by the petitioner. The Naturopathic profession’s own definition of their calling as “a system of treatment of human disease,”4 clearly falls within that formulated by the legislature5 and, therefore, we must hold that the the petitioner does not meet the licensure requirements for the practice of medicine.

Several constitutional issues concerning the Board’s interpretation of the statute have also been raised by the petitioner. He first contends that to require him to qualify for an unlimited medical license [559]*559in order to practice Ms more limited profession violates rights guaranteed to Mm by tbe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article One, Section 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Specifically, he argues that he has a constitutional property right to practice his profession which is being denied to him in an unreasonable and discriminatory manner by the Commonwealth. "While it is true that the right to practice a profession has been characterized as a property right with constitutional protection, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), it is equally true that there exists no vested right to practice medicine, rather it is a conditional right subordinate to the police power of the state to protect and preserve the public health. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1909). It is well established that a state may set reasonable standards for determining the qualifications of those who hold themselves out as practitioners of the healing arts and may also grant to an administrative body the authority to enforce standards. New Jersey Chiropractic Ass’n v. State Board, 79 F.Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1948). As long as the requirement of learning, skill and examination for obtaining a license to practice medicine bear a direct, substantial and reasonable relationship to the practice of medicine, a Naturopath or anyone else intending to practice the act of healing can be required to meet the standards set for the medical profession. Stuart v. Wilson, 211 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Texas 1962), aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. Carr, 371 U.S. 576 (1963).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Green v. Pennsylvania State Board of Veterinary Medicine
116 A.3d 1164 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2015)
Boulis v. State Board of Chiropractic
729 A.2d 645 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1999)
Barran v. State Board of Medicine
670 A.2d 765 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)
Allen v. DEPT. OF STATE, BUR. OF PROF.
595 A.2d 771 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)
Feingold v. COM., ST. BD. OF CHIROPRACTIC
568 A.2d 1365 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH v. Hinze
441 N.W.2d 593 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1989)
Quintana v. Commonwealth
466 A.2d 250 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Corsello v. Commonwealth, State Dental Council & Examining Board
460 A.2d 1226 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Rabino v. State Registration Board for Professional Engineers
450 A.2d 773 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1982)
Millili v. Millili
24 Pa. D. & C.3d 479 (Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, 1982)
Oliver v. Commonwealth
404 A.2d 1386 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
399 A.2d 1160, 41 Pa. Commw. 553, 1979 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reisinger-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-1979.