Reinheimer v. Panama Canal Co.

342 F. Supp. 315, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13664
CourtDistrict Court, Canal Zone
DecidedMay 19, 1972
DocketCiv. No. 2668
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 342 F. Supp. 315 (Reinheimer v. Panama Canal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, Canal Zone primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reinheimer v. Panama Canal Co., 342 F. Supp. 315, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13664 (canalzoned 1972).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN FIRST HEARING STATEMENT OF CASE

CROWE, District Judge.

This is a class action brought by five Panama Canal Company pilots on behalf of themselves and all other persons employed by the defendant as Panama Canal pilots and pilots-in-training, seeking a declaratory judgment on the grounds that their wages, including a tropical differential, were not properly computed and established.

As stated in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, rendered in this case on June 20, 1969, 413 F.2d 153, “The appellants’ complaint alleged two different theories — referred to as causes of action — for arriving at the base salary upon which to compute the tropical [316]*316differential.” In the first, it was alleged that the Canal Zone statute and regulations issued pursuant thereto required the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, who are United States citizens, a tropical differential which was the same as that paid to its other employees, and that it was required to add this to the plaintiffs’ base pay.'

The complaint alleged that the defendant had never computed and added the tropical differential to plaintiffs’ pay and that when the amount of the differential for other employees was reduced to 15% in 1964 and a fixed differential was established, defendant not only did not add the differential but claimed that 20% of plaintiffs’ base salary was their differential.

The second cause of action alleged that the defendant failed to set the plaintiffs’ base wage as required by the statute and regulations and had failed to establish rates of pay for the Canal pilots in relation to the same or similar work performed for the United States Government in the continental United States.

The relief sought on the first cause of action was a declaration and judgment that defendant pay to plaintiffs the tropical differential in addition to the sums previously paid and redetermine the fixed differential as of July 20, 1964, and on the second cause of action, that defendant determine the wages it should have paid plaintiffs in relation to the same or similar work performed for the United States Government in the continental United States, and pay plaintiffs such additional sums as it should have paid.

The action was begun on January 8, 1965 and the Canal Zone Statute of Limitations limits claims of this nature to three years prior to the commencement of the action, although the effective date of the regulations of the Secretary of the Army was the first pay period for plaintiffs, which began more than 60 days after January 15, 1959.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Rule 56(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court granted partial summary judgment on the second cause of action holding that defendant had discretionary authority to fix the pilots’ and pilots’-in-training base pay and that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact relative to the second cause of action. The Court failed to hold that the regulations of the Secretary of the Army limited the Company’s discretion and required it to set the pilots’ pay in any specific way or gave plaintiffs enforceable rights.

Motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action was denied, and it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive a differential to be added to their base pay, and that issues of fact were to be determined upon trial. Defendant argued that it was not required to pay the differential to the pilots because it had the permissive authority to pay its vessel employees in accordance with the wage practices of the maritime industry. [5 U.S.C. Section 5342(a)] This permissive statute was held not to authorize defendant to disregard the statutes and regulations applicable to its United States citizen employees employed in the Canal Zone.

After a full trial on the merits, the Court then granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis of Leber v. Canal Zone Central Labor Union & Metal Trades Council, 383 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1967), which was handed down after the trial but before judgment.

The plaintiffs appealed the decision of this court and the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the making of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

There is still pending a motion for Partial Summary Judgment made by defendant on April 17, 1970. This motion [317]*317is to the effect that, as decided in Leber, the plaintiffs have no statutory right to have their base pay fixed in any particular way or to receive any overseas differential and that such right is dependent on the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Army, 253.131(b) and 253.135 of Title 35, Code of Federal Regulations, and that the claim is limited by his new regulations effective February 20, 1970 establishing a new method of computation of plaintiffs’ salaries.

Briefs were filed supporting the motion and opposing it but no decision was ever rendered as it was not brought to the Court’s attention for a ruling, although throughout the pretrial hearings and subsequent proceedings it appears that the parties tacitly accepted that the final date of the plaintiffs’ claim is the effective date of the new regulation.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In compliance with the mandate of the appellate court, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are made. These findings are relative to the trial which was conducted in the Canal Zone on April 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1967, and are filed prior to the entry of findings and final judgment in the case as the result of the trial, which was conducted as a consequence of the appellate opinion, beginning on February 28 and terminating on April 30, 1972. (This trial was delayed because of an intensive study conducted by the defendant pursuant to this Court’s order which will be dealt with in the findings as a consequence of that trial.) The filing of the findings in the first trial will not prejudice the parties as to the beginning of the running of the time for taking of an appeal. The time for taking of an appeal as to all matters in the case will begin running upon the entry of the findings and judgment pertaining to the “second trial”.

1. This is a civil action commenced on January 8, 1965, against the Panama Canal Company, a corporate agency and instrumentality of the United States. The Company was established for the purpose of maintaining and operating the Panama Canal, and of conducting business operations incident thereto. [2 C.Z.C. Section 61, 76A Stat.]

2. The plaintiffs, Walter A. Reinheimer, John M. Stuart, William T. Clute, Norman M. Currier, and Dean K. Bruch, are men employed or formerly employed by the defendant as vessel pilots on the Canal and adjacent Canal Zone waters. The plaintiffs, who sue on behalf of themselves and as representatives of a class consisting of all Panama Canal pilots and pilots-in-training, seek a declaratory judgment concerning their compensation and ask money damages for certain elements of back pay.

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Related

Reinheimer v. Panama Canal Co.
344 F. Supp. 510 (District Court, Canal Zone, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
342 F. Supp. 315, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reinheimer-v-panama-canal-co-canalzoned-1972.