Reiner v. Guerrero

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 23, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-05515
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARTIN REINER, Case No. 24-cv-05515-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION 9 v. TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF VEXATIOUS 10 PATRICIA GUERRERO, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26 11 Defendants.

12 13 Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss and a motion to declare Plaintiff 14 vexatious. Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26. The Court finds these matters appropriate for disposition without 15 oral argument and the matters are deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 16 detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motions. 17 I. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 18 Defendants have filed requests for judicial notice in support of their motions to dismiss and 19 motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious. See Dkt. Nos. 19, 22, 27. Specifically, Defendants ask the 20 Court to take judicial notice of various court filings discussed in more detail below. Id. The Court 21 GRANTS Defendants’ requests and takes judicial notice of 1) the fact that these cases and 22 documents were filed, and 2) of any judicial findings contained in them. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) 23 (allowing judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” that are “generally known 24 within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or that “can be accurately and readily determined 25 from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned”); see also United States ex rel. 26 Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining 27 that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Pro se Plaintiff Martin Reiner initially filed this case in August 2024. See Dkt. No. 1 3 (“Compl.”). This appears to be just one of many attempts by Plaintiff to challenge the validity of 4 underlying state court orders declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and disbarring him from the 5 practice of law in California. 6 As relevant to the case, and as the parties appear to agree, in 2016 a Los Angeles Superior 7 Court judge declared Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. See Dkt. No. 8 19, Ex. 3 at 18–231; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 18–21. Under the order, unless represented by an 9 attorney, Plaintiff is “prohibited from filing any new litigation in the courts of California without 10 approval of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court in which the action is filed.” See 11 Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 3 at 21. The California Supreme Court also suspended and then disbarred 12 Plaintiff from the practice of law in California in 2017. See Dkt. No. 19, Exs. 1 and 2 at 7–16; see 13 also Dkt. No. 25 at 11–18. 14 Plaintiff argues that these orders were invalid and intended to punish him for uncovering 15 an insurance fraud scheme involving judicial officers and court staff that he discovered while 16 litigating a case before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”). See Dkt. No. 25 17 at 11–13. Plaintiff claims that WCAB “contrive[d] several monetary sanctions” and then filed a 18 professional discipline complaint against Plaintiff with the State Bar for willfully disobeying the 19 sanctions orders when Plaintiff challenged them. See id. at 11–12. Plaintiff claims that WCAB 20 officials exerted undue influence on the State Bar and California Supreme Court based on 21 preexisting and undisclosed relationships, and the State Bar and California Supreme Court 22 wrongly found Plaintiff had violated California Business and Professions Code § 6103 for 23 willfully disobeying the sanctions orders. See id. at 12–18. Plaintiff further explains that he 24 sought “redress and relief” in the Los Angeles Superior Court in Reiner v. Graiwer, Case No. 25 BC593351 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). See id. at 18–19. But he “quickly discerned that the judge 26 assigned to the case, Judge Gregory Alarcon [] was willing to silence [Plaintiff] and the truth,” so 27 1 Plaintiff sought to disqualify him. Id. Plaintiff contends that Judge Alarcon did not timely 2 respond to the disqualification request and therefore was automatically disqualified from the case. 3 See id. at 9–12, 19– 20. But Plaintiff claims that instead of stepping down, Judge Alarcon 4 wrongly declared him a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff asserts that the vexatious litigant order was 5 “procured by extrinsic fraud” because the judge relied on cases in which Plaintiff had actually 6 prevailed or that were not yet final. See id. at 9–12, 20–22. 7 For nearly a decade now, Plaintiff has repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to relitigate 8 the validity of these orders. As part of that effort, in 2021 Plaintiff attempted to file a case in the 9 California Supreme Court to vacate its disciplinary orders against him. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 10 36–52. However, Plaintiff alleges that two deputy clerks with the California Supreme Court 11 wrongfully “obstructed” his ability to file this case, and “adjudicated” the case unilaterally “as 12 being nonmeritorious” and “barred by ‘finality.’” See id. at 31. Plaintiff retained counsel and 13 filed suit in 2022 in San Francisco Superior Court against the two clerks and various unnamed 14 “Doe” defendants, in Reiner v. Ma, Case No. CGC-22-603692 (San Francisco Super. Ct.). See 15 Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to name the Honorable Patricia 16 Guerrero, Chief Justice of California; Jorge Navarrete, Clerk/Executive Officer of the Supreme 17 Court of California; and the California State Bar as Doe defendants. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73– 18 76. Plaintiff’s counsel later withdrew, and Plaintiff represented himself in that matter pro se. See 19 Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 9 at 99–100. 20 Because Plaintiff was no longer represented by counsel, the defendants moved to dismiss 21 Reiner v. Ma under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391.3(b), arguing that the case had no 22 merit and was filed for the purpose of harassment.2 See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 6 at 78–95; Dkt. No. 22, 23 Ex. 10 at 102–19. The court agreed and granted the motions and dismissed the case. See Dkt. No. 24 19, Ex. 8 at 114–16; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 14 at 198–99. Rather than appeal these orders directly, 25 Plaintiff filed this case against Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette, as well as the attorneys 26

27 2 Section 391.3 provides that if a formerly represented vexatious litigant becomes self-represented, 1 representing the defendants in Reiner v. Ma.3 Plaintiff contends that Defendants somehow 2 engaged in a conspiracy and violated his constitutional rights by enforcing the prefiling order, 3 which he claims is “null and void,” was procured by “extrinsic fraud,” and issued by a disqualified 4 judge. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 17. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well 5 as injunctive relief requiring Defendants to engage in discovery, provide him a jury trial, and 6 disclose any relationships Defendants have with federal judges as required “as a matter of law 7 and/or professional ethics.” See id. at ¶¶ 17, 20. 8 Defendants have moved to dismiss the case and to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in 9 the Northern District of California. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26. 10 III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 11 A. Legal Standard 12 i. Rule 12(b)(1) 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss based on the 14 court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Subject matter 15 jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a continuing independent 16 obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” See Leeson v. Transam. 17 Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975, n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The party 18 invoking subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. 19 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 20 ii. Rule 12(b)(6) 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 23 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 24 granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 25

26 3 Defendants here include Ellin Davtyan; Kirsten Galler; Rita Himes; and Anik Banerjee (“State Bar Defendants”), as well as the Honorable Patricia Guerrero; Jorge Navarrete; and attorneys 27 Sarah L. Overton and Lindsay N. Frazier-Krane (“Court Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he is 1 appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 2 a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 3 Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a 4 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 5 A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw 6 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 9 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 10 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, 11 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 12 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 13 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 14 Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). 15 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 16 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation 17 omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential 18 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 19 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure,” 20 Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and plain statement of 21 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 22 B. Discussion 23 i. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 24 Defendants first argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case 25 because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 18 at 7–11; 26 Dkt. No. 21 at 6–9. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority 27 to review state court decisions. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 1 “‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 2 rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 3 rejection of those judgments.’” Mothershed v. Justs. of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 4 2005), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 21, 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 5 Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “The doctrine bars a district court from exercising 6 jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto 7 equivalent’ of such an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). To 8 determine whether a plaintiff is bringing such a de facto appeal, the Court must “pay close 9 attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in 10 original). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker–Feldman when the plaintiff in federal 11 district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief 12 from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 777–78 (quotation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has 13 recently clarified, “Rooker-Feldman applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as [his] 14 injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court 15 judgment.” See Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) (quotation 16 omitted) (emphasis in original). 17 Defendants argue that this case is a de facto appeal because Plaintiff is seeking relief from 18 the Los Angeles Superior Court’s vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer and the San 19 Francisco Superior Court’s orders dismissing the Reiner v. Ma case. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18 at 9– 20 11. Specifically, Defendants urge that Plaintiff yet again argues that the vexatious litigant order is 21 null and void and that Defendants improperly asked the San Francisco Superior Court to enforce 22 the vexatious litigant order and dismiss his case in Reiner v. Ma. Id. 23 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he existence of a prior state court judgment 24 and a federal plaintiff seeking to relitigate a matter already litigated in state court [are] not 25 circumstances sufficient to invoke Rooker-Feldman . . . .” See Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1149 (citing 26 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293). Here, Plaintiff does not explicitly ask the Court to set aside the 27 vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer or the dismissals in Reiner v. Ma. In his opposition 1 34 at 12–13. He appears, at least in part, to seek monetary damages for the “monetary worth” of 2 the Reiner v. Ma case, which he values at $12,777,800.00, as well as for hourly compensation for 3 “harming [his] mental state” at a rate of $300 per hour per day since July 2024. See Compl. at 4 ¶¶ 17, 20. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 5 not apply to such claims. Still, there is some ambiguity in Plaintiff’s requested relief. In the 6 complaint he also seeks “equitable relief” and appears to seek the continuation of the Reiner v. Ma 7 case with ongoing discovery and a jury trial. See id. at ¶ 20. In his opposition brief he also 8 suggests that he is seeking “[c]onfirmation that the subject [vexatious litigant] order . . . was 9 procured by extrinsic fraud” and is somehow null and void. Dkt. No. 25 at 9, 25–26. Plaintiff 10 thus appears to be requesting a declaration that the prior orders are null and void. Any such claims 11 are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 12 Plaintiff raises several arguments why the doctrine should still not apply here, see id. at 13 24–27, but the Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff suggests, for example, that the Rooker-Feldman 14 doctrine cannot apply to a “null and void” order” See id. at 24–25. However, in Rooker itself, the 15 litigant sought to have a state court decision declared “null and void.” See 263 U.S. at 414–16. 16 “[A] request to declare [a] state court judgment void seeks redress from an injury caused by the 17 state court itself” and is “squarely barred by Rooker-Feldman.” See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 18 474 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff urges that the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker- 19 Feldman doctrine applies here too. See Dkt. No. 25 at 26. “[E]xtrinsic fraud” in this context “is 20 conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.” See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 21 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). But in the complaint, Plaintiff 22 provides no information about the nature of the alleged fraud and does not allege that he was 23 prevented from presenting his claims in court as a result. To the extent Plaintiff suggests that 24 Defendants committed extrinsic fraud by citing the vexatious litigant order in seeking dismissal of 25 the Reiner v. Ma case, the parties briefed this issue extensively before the San Francisco Superior 26 Court before it dismissed the case. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 97–112. Plaintiff also urges 27 that the doctrine cannot apply to the San Francisco Superior Court’s order dismissing the Reiner v. 1 Ma. See Dkt. No. 25 at 25. But as explained above, Plaintiff is clearly challenging the state 2 court’s dismissal of Reiner v. Ma, even if he filed this case a few days before the dismissal was 3 finalized. See Marciano v. White, 431 F. App’x 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The fact that [the 4 plaintiff] filed his federal suit before his state court appeals have concluded cannot be enough to 5 open the door for a federal district court to review the state court decisions.”).4 6 The Court therefore GRANTS the motions to dismiss to the extent that part of Plaintiff’s 7 requested relief actually includes overturning the vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer or 8 state court dismissal in Reiner v. Ma. 9 ii. Collateral Estoppel 10 Defendants next argue that collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims. See Dkt. No. 21 at 11 9–11; Dkt. No. 18 at 12–13. Federal courts are required to give state court judgments the same 12 preclusive effect in federal court as they would have in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 13 (requiring “full faith and credit” to state court judgments); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1166–67 14 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “prohibits the 15 relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different 16 causes of action.” DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (Cal. 2015). “[I]ssue 17 preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and 18 necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or 19 one in privity with that party.” Id. at 825. In short, “once an issue has been finally decided 20 against [] a party, that party should not be allowed to relitigate the same issue in a new lawsuit.” 21 Id. at 827. 22 Here, Defendants point out that in Reiner v. Ma Plaintiff argued—as he does here—that the 23 vexatious litigant order was null and void and therefore unenforceable against him because it was 24 allegedly procured by extrinsic fraud and issued by disqualified judge. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 25 97–112. The San Francisco Superior Court considered this argument in granting the motions to 26 dismiss in the Ma case, and explicitly “reject[ed] Reiner’s attempt to collaterally attack the 27 1 prefiling order.” See id., Ex. 8 at 115; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 14 at 198. Plaintiff’s opposition brief 2 makes this identical argument again, urging that collateral estoppel is inapplicable here because 3 the vexatious litigant order and the San Francisco Superior Court dismissal orders “have each been 4 procured by extrinsic fraud upon the institution of the court and are legally null and void.” See 5 Dkt. No. 25 at 27. But under California law, allegations of “extrinsic fraud” may only prevent the 6 application of collateral estoppel where the fraud prevented the party from actually presenting his 7 case. See Hudson v. Foster, 68 Cal. App. 5th 640, 664–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021). As already 8 discussed above, the complaint does not include any allegations about the supposed extrinsic fraud 9 or how such fraud actually prevented from Plaintiff from presenting his case in Reiner v. Ma. To 10 the contrary: the record shows that Plaintiff presented his argument that the vexatious litigant 11 order was null and void to the San Francisco Superior Court, and the court simply rejected it. See 12 Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 97–112; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 11 at 121–142. 13 Because he believes that the vexatious litigant order was null and void, Plaintiff appears to 14 argue that any court that disagrees with him and enforces the order is equally culpable, making 15 that court’s orders similarly unenforceable. But litigants may not ignore court orders with which 16 they disagree and “try again” with another court. The Court finds that collateral estoppel bars 17 Plaintiff’s claims and the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss on this basis. 18 iii. Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity 19 Even assuming anything remains of Plaintiff’s claims, Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette 20 argue that they are absolutely immune from liability in this lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 18 at 13–15. 21 Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. 22 See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, absolute quasi-judicial 23 immunity applies to court personnel for “administrative tasks if these tasks are judicial in nature 24 and an integral part of the judicial process.” See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002), 25 as amended (Sept. 6, 2002) (quotation omitted). 26 A plaintiff’s ability to overcome this immunity is limited. “A judge will not be deprived of 27 immunity because the action he [or she] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess 1 immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its 2 consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.’” Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Cleavinger 3 v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985)). A plaintiff may only overcome judicial immunity if 4 the judge acts outside his or her judicial capacity or acts in the “complete absence of all 5 jurisdiction.” See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). “[W]hether an act by a judge is a 6 ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally 7 performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge 8 in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 12 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362); see also Duvall v. Cnty. of 9 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001) 10 (identifying factors relevant to the determination of whether an act is judicial in nature). 11 Plaintiff attempts to sidestep the application of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity by 12 arguing that he is only suing Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette in their personal capacities as 13 litigants in Reiner v. Ma, and not for any judicial or quasi-judicial acts. See Dkt. No. 25 at 27–28; 14 see also Compl. at ¶¶ 5–6. But such artful pleading cannot overcome immunity here. The 15 complaint in this case is premised entirely on Reiner v. Ma. Plaintiff alleges that but for 16 Defendants’ reference to the vexatious litigant order and the resulting dismissal, Plaintiff would 17 have been entitled to over $12 million and other equitable relief against Justice Guerrero and Mr. 18 Navarette in the Reiner v. Ma case. See Compl. at ¶¶ 14–18. The merits of Plaintiff’s claims and 19 his entitlement to relief in this case, therefore, are entirely premised on his entitlement to relief in 20 Reiner v. Ma. But his claims in Reiner v. Ma rest entirely on Justice Guerrero’s and Mr. 21 Navarette’s judicial and quasi-judicial acts: rejecting his motion to vacate the California Supreme 22 Court disciplinary orders. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 25–33. Plaintiff even explicitly sued Justice 23 Guerrero “in her administrative capacity” in Reiner v. Ma. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73. 24 The Court finds that Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette are immune from liability in this 25 case based on absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, and GRANTS the motion to dismiss 26 on this basis. 27 // 1 iv. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 2 Defendants next argue that the claims against the attorneys—both the State Bar counsel 3 and Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette’s attorneys—are barred under the Noerr-Pennington 4 doctrine. See Dkt. No. 18 at 15–17; Dkt. No. 21 at 9–11. “Under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, 5 those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from 6 statutory liability for their petitioning conduct.” See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 7 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the doctrine arose in the antitrust context, courts have applied it more 8 broadly, including to § 1983 claims. See id. at 929–30; see also Empress LLC v. City & Cnty. of 9 San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2005). The doctrine applies “in the litigation 10 context, not only [to] petitions sent directly to the court in the course of litigation, but also [to] 11 conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit . . . .” Sosa, 437 F.3d at 934 (quotation omitted). 12 Here, Plaintiff is seeking to impose liability on the attorneys for petitioning the San Francisco 13 Superior Court to dismiss the Reiner v. Ma case under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391.3, 14 arguing that the case had no merit and was filed for the purpose of harassment. This falls squarely 15 within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 16 Plaintiff urges that the doctrine is inapplicable here because the “sham” exception applies. 17 See, e.g., Dkt. No. 25 at 28. The Ninth Circuit has identified several circumstances in which the 18 sham exception may apply in the context of litigation. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 19 1056, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff appears to argue that the sham exception applies here 20 because Defendants made “intentional misrepresentations to the court.” See id. at 1060. Such 21 intentional misrepresentations may be considered a “sham” if the “party’s knowing fraud upon, or 22 its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the litigation of its legitimacy.” Id. 23 (quotations omitted). For this exception to apply, Plaintiff must plead facts that permit a plausible 24 inference that Defendants engaged in intentional misrepresentation to the San Francisco Superior 25 Court. And such allegations are subject to a heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 9(b). See Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 646–47 (9th Cir. 27 2009). 1 nature of the alleged misrepresentation or how it rendered Reiner v. Ma illegitimate. Even 2 construing the complaint liberally, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff appears simply to argue 3 that Defendants made intentional misrepresentations by citing the vexatious litigant order in 4 asking the San Francisco Superior Court to dismiss the Reiner v. Ma case. Plaintiff claims the 5 order is “null and void,” and presumably believes Defendants should never have cited it at all. But 6 no court has found the vexatious litigant order unenforceable. And in any event, the San Francisco 7 Superior Court did not simply rely on the vexatious litigant order in dismissing the case, but rather 8 addressed the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not plausibly pled any basis for the sham 9 exception to apply here, and the Court finds that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine bars Plaintiff’s 10 claims against the attorney Defendants. 11 * * * 12 Plaintiff’s renewed attempt to challenge the vexatious litigant order fails. The Court 13 GRANTS the motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 18, 21. 14 IV. MOTION TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF VEXATIOUS 15 Defendants also move to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. See Dkt. Nos. 26, 32. 16 Specifically, Defendants seek an order precluding Plaintiff from filing any new action arising out 17 of (1) the WCAB sanctions order; (2) Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment from the practice of law 18 in California; (3) the vexatious litigant order; or (4) any prior lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed 19 challenging the above decisions. Id. 20 A. Legal Standard 21 “The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the inherent power 22 to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 23 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “However, such pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that 24 should rarely be used.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “[c]ourts should not enter pre- 25 filing orders with undue haste because such sanctions can tread on a litigant’s due process right of 26 access to the courts.” Id. At the same time, however, “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process 27 cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly 1 (alteration in original). 2 The Ninth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test to determine whether a pre-filing review 3 order is warranted: (1) the plaintiff was given adequate notice and an opportunity to oppose the 4 order; (2) there is an adequate record for review; (3) the Court makes substantive findings as to the 5 frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions; and (4) the order is narrowly tailored “to 6 closely fit the specific vice encountered.” Id. at 1057–58. All for requirements are met here. 7 B. Discussion 8 Plaintiff has been given adequate notice of this motion and had an opportunity to respond. 9 See Dkt. No. 36. He filed an opposition brief that the Court has reviewed in detail. Dkt. No. 36. 10 The Court further finds that there is an adequate record for review. “An adequate record for 11 review should include a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude 12 that a vexatious litigant order was needed.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059. Here, the parties appear to 13 agree that Plaintiff has filed nineteen cases, including this one, regarding the California 14 disciplinary actions and the vexatious litigant order. See Dkt. No. 26 at 1–2, & n.1; Dkt. No. 36 at 15 7–8. Just a small sampling of these cases is sufficient to support the motion to declare Plaintiff 16 vexatious here: 17 18 • As already discussed above, in September 2015 Plaintiff filed a case in Los 19 Angeles Superior Court, in Reiner v. Graiwer, Case No. BC593351 (Los Angeles 20 Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 35 at 105. Plaintiff brought the case against 21 over 60 defendants, including several justices of the California Supreme Court; 22 judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court; attorneys from the WCAB case; WCAB 23 judges and employees; and State Bar judges and employees. See Dkt. No. 27-3, 24 Ex. 36 at 107–127. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were involved in an 25 ongoing criminal conspiracy, which involved issuing the WCAB sanctions and 26 suspending Plaintiff from the practice of law in California. See id. Judge Alarcon 27 who presided over the case granted the defendants’ special motion to strike under 1 California’s anti-SLAPP statute and declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.5 See 2 Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 37 at 129–137. When Plaintiff failed to post security, the case 3 was dismissed. See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 38 at 138–39. 4 5 • In March 2016, Plaintiff filed another case in Los Angeles Superior Court against 6 WCAB and various State Bar judges and their employees, in Reiner v. Caplan, 7 Case No. BC613627 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 27-4, Ex. 46 at 16–31. 8 Plaintiff similarly alleged that the defendants engaged in “criminal and civil 9 malfeasance” by issuing sanctions against him and suspending him from the 10 practice of law in California. See id. The court granted the defendants’ special 11 motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and entered judgment in 12 favor of the defendants. See Dkt. No. 27-4, Exs. 47–48 at 33–42. 13 14 • In April 2020, Plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the 15 District of Columbia against Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, two 16 clerks of the United States Supreme Court, and the California State Bar, in Reiner 17 v. John Roberts, Case No. 20-cv-00031 (D.D.C.). See Dkt. No. 27-4, Ex. 50 at 49– 18 120. Once again, Plaintiff alleged that there was a “conspiracy” among Defendants 19 to deprive him of his law license without due process based on “extrinsic fraud.” 20 See id. Plaintiff challenged the WCAB sanctions as well as his suspension and 21 disbarment from the practice of law in California. Id. He further argued that he 22 sought relief from these orders in the United States Supreme Court, which 23 wrongfully rejected his filings. See id. The district court dismissed the complaint 24 as frivolous. See Dkt. No. 27-4, Exs. 51 & 52 at 122–25. 25 26

27 5 Plaintiff was also declared vexatious by the Central District of California in Reiner v. Graiwer, 1 • In February 2021, Plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the 2 Southern District of California against multiple defendants, including several 3 present and former justices of the California Supreme Court; judges from the Los 4 Angeles Superior Court, including Judge Alarcon; the California State Bar; and 5 several attorneys, in Reiner v. Cantil-Sakauye, Case No. 21-cv-00219-DMS-MSB 6 (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 54 at 2–56. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants 7 had engaged in “criminally illegal racketeering activities” in retaliation against him. 8 Id. Specifically, Plaintiff appeared to argue that the justices had wrongfully denied 9 Plaintiff’s petitions to review his suspension and disbarment from the practice of 10 law in California. Id. In doing so, Plaintiff suggested that the justices had 11 “ratified” the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also challenged the 12 vexatious litigant order and the judges who had denied his motions to vacate that 13 order. Id. The district court dismissed the case based on the Rooker-Feldman 14 doctrine. See Dkt. No. 27-5, Exs. 55 and 56 at 58–68. 15 16 • In August 2021, Plaintiff filed another case in the United States District Court for 17 the Southern District of California against, among others, present and former 18 justices of the California Supreme Court, in Reiner v. Holton, Case No. 21-cv- 19 01454-DMS-MSB (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 58 at 87–98. Plaintiff again 20 argued that he had been wrongfully suspended and disbarred from the practice of 21 law in California. Id. He also argued that the defendants had engaged in a 22 “conspiracy” to violate his rights and retaliate against him through their actions in 23 moving to dismiss Reiner v. Cantil-Sakauye and in initiating State Bar proceedings 24 against him for the unauthorized practice of law. Id. The district court dismissed 25 the case as to the justices based on absolute judicial immunity. See Dkt. No. 27-5, 26 Exs. 59–60 at 103–112. The court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to state a 27 claim against any of the other defendants. Id. 1 • In December 2021, Plaintiff filed yet another case in the United States District 2 Court for the Southern District of California, in Reiner v. Navarrete, Case No. 3 3:21-cv-02077-LL-MSB (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 62 at 137–180. 4 Plaintiff sued, among others, two deputy clerks for the California Supreme Court, 5 Tayuan Ma and Tom Zhang; present and former justices of the California Supreme 6 Court; and the California State Bar. See id. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants 7 were “co-conspirator[s] in a conspiracy of criminal and civil malfeasance.” Id. 8 Plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongfully suspended and disbarred from the 9 practice of law in California, and that in October 2021 Ms. Ma and Messrs. Zhang 10 and Navarette had wrongfully “obstructed” the filing of his motion to vacate the 11 suspension and disbarment orders and rejected the motion as untimely. Id. The 12 district court dismissed the case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. 13 No. 27-5, Exs. 63–64 at 182–190. The district court denied Plaintiff’s repeated 14 motions for reconsideration, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s orders, but the 15 Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. See Reiner v. Navarette, Case No. 23- 16 3993 (9th Cir.), Dkt. No. 29. 17 18 • As already detailed above, Plaintiff retained counsel and filed suit in December 19 2022 in San Francisco Superior Court against the same two deputy clerks for the 20 California Supreme Court (Ms. Ma and Mr. Zhang), Justice Guerrero, Mr. 21 Navarette, and the California State Bar, in Reiner v. Ma, Case No. CGC-22-603692 22 (San Francisco Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4; Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73–76. 23 Plaintiff argued that the clerks wrongfully “obstructed” his ability to file this case, 24 and “adjudicated” the case unilaterally “as being nonmeritorious” and “barred by 25 ‘finality.’” See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 31. The San Francisco Superior Court 26 dismissed the case as frivolous. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 8 at 114–16; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 27 14 at 198–99. 1 Plaintiff urges that this case is meritorious and that the Court cannot consider his prior 2 cases frivolous or harassing because the merits of the claims were never adjudicated. See Dkt. No. 3 36 at 7–8. The Court has already explained above that this case is not meritorious. See Section 4 III.B above. As to the other cases, Plaintiff states that many were dismissed on the basis of the 5 Rooker-Feldman doctrine without reaching the merits at all. See id. But Plaintiff’s argument 6 misses the point. Over the past decade or more, he has continually challenged the same State Bar 7 disciplinary orders and vexatious litigant order, claiming that the orders are “null and void.” He 8 has repeatedly asked federal courts to review these decisions, even after being told that the federal 9 district courts have no authority to review state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman 10 doctrine. Plaintiff has demonstrated a consistent pattern of disregarding court orders, attributing 11 any adverse rulings against him to a conspiracy or other criminal conduct, and then pursuing 12 further litigation against anyone who disagrees with him. Plaintiff’s cases are both frivolous and 13 have been used to harass the defendants. 14 Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to declare him vexatious further underscores his 15 improper tactics. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ reliance on the vexatious litigant order in this 16 case “is new and further federal criminal malfeasance in violation of Title 18 United States Code 17 Sections 241, 242, 1341, and 1343.” See Dkt. No. 36 at 6. He attaches a letter to his opposition 18 brief that is directed to various U.S. representatives and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See 19 Dkt. No. 36 at 8, & Ex. 1. The subject line reads “Complaint of Criminal Public Corruption 20 involving California Supreme Court Justice Patricia Guerrero and her Co-Conspirators,” and the 21 body of the letter states that Plaintiff is writing: 22 regarding an ongoing scandal of criminal malfeasance in violation of 23 federal law which is occurring in the Northern District of California in which the participants include California Supreme Court Justice 24 Patricia Guerrero in her capacity as a litigant in which she, and her co-conspirators are knowingly and willfully using fabricated evidence 25 in the form of falsified court records to obstruct and evade justice. 26 27 See Dkt. No. 36 at 8, & Ex. 1. Plaintiff further states that he is writing so the FBI “immediately 1 Plaintiff also suggests that if this Court disagrees with him—either in granting the motion to 2 dismiss or the motion to declare him vexatious—the Court would thus become “a willing and 3 knowing participant[] in the criminal malfeasance conspiracy of the Defendants . . . .” See id. at 4 6–7. In other words, Plaintiff appears to threaten the Court with a lawsuit and criminal 5 investigation if it does not find in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 6–9. 6 It is clear that Plaintiff is attempting to bend courts and parties to his will by filing 7 frivolous complaints against all who disagree with him, and that he will continue to do so absent 8 judicial intervention. This is the definition of harassment. The Court therefore GRANTS the 9 motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious.6 10 V. CONCLUSION 11 The Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 18 and 21. Given the nature of the 12 deficiencies identified above, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile. The 13 Court therefore DISMISSES the case without leave to amend. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 14 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not 15 possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se 16 plaintiffs.”) (quotations omitted). The Court further GRANTS the motion to declare Plaintiff 17 vexatious in this district. Dkt. No. 26. 18 The Clerk of this Court may not file or accept without pre-filing approval any further 19 complaint filed by or on behalf of Plaintiff Martin Reiner if the complaint arises out of or relates 20 to (1) the sanctions order issued against Plaintiff in the Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board 21 (“WCAB”); (2) Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment from the practice of law in California; (3) the 22 order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in California state court; or (4) any prior lawsuit filed 23 by Plaintiff that arises from the sanctions order in the WCAB, Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment 24

25 6 Defendants suggest that the Court should declare Plaintiff vexatious in this district and in all United States District Courts in California. See Dkt. No. 26 at 3, 21–22. However, absent some 26 Ninth Circuit authority, the Court questions the legal basis for an order reaching beyond this Court’s jurisdiction, especially since Defendants seek an order that would require the Chief Judge 27 of other districts to implement a pre-filing review process. The Court notes that all of the cases 1 from the practice of law in California, or the order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in 2 || California state court. 3 If Plaintiff wishes to file a complaint regarding these subjects, he shall provide a copy of 4 any such complaint, a letter requesting that the complaint be filed, and a copy of this Order to the 5 Clerk of this Court. The Clerk shall then forward the complaint, letter, and copy of this Order to 6 || the Duty Judge for a determination whether the complaint should be accepted for filing. Plaintiff 7 || is warned that any violation of this Order will expose him to contempt proceedings and 8 appropriate sanctions, and any action filed in violation of this Order will be subject to dismissal. 9 || The Clerk is directed to entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff and to close 10 || the case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: 6/23/2025

4 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28