MARTIN REINER, Case No. 24-cv-05515-HSG
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION v. TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF VEXATIOUS PATRICIA GUERRERO, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26 Defendants.
Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss and a motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious. Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26. The Court finds these matters appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matters are deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motions. Defendants have filed requests for judicial notice in support of their motions to dismiss and motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious. See Dkt. Nos. 19, 22, 27. Specifically, Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of various court filings discussed in more detail below. Id. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ requests and takes judicial notice of 1) the fact that these cases and documents were filed, and 2) of any judicial findings contained in them. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (allowing judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” that are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned”); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal Pro se Plaintiff Martin Reiner initially filed this case in August 2024. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). This appears to be just one of many attempts by Plaintiff to challenge the validity of underlying state court orders declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and disbarring him from the practice of law in California. As relevant to the case, and as the parties appear to agree, in 2016 a Los Angeles Superior Court judge declared Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 3 at 18–231; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 18–21. Under the order, unless represented by an attorney, Plaintiff is “prohibited from filing any new litigation in the courts of California without approval of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court in which the action is filed.” See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 3 at 21. The California Supreme Court also suspended and then disbarred Plaintiff from the practice of law in California in 2017. See Dkt. No. 19, Exs. 1 and 2 at 7–16; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 11–18. Plaintiff argues that these orders were invalid and intended to punish him for uncovering an insurance fraud scheme involving judicial officers and court staff that he discovered while litigating a case before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”). See Dkt. No. 25 at 11–13. Plaintiff claims that WCAB “contrive[d] several monetary sanctions” and then filed a professional discipline complaint against Plaintiff with the State Bar for willfully disobeying the sanctions orders when Plaintiff challenged them. See id. at 11–12. Plaintiff claims that WCAB officials exerted undue influence on the State Bar and California Supreme Court based on preexisting and undisclosed relationships, and the State Bar and California Supreme Court wrongly found Plaintiff had violated California Business and Professions Code § 6103 for willfully disobeying the sanctions orders. See id. at 12–18. Plaintiff further explains that he sought “redress and relief” in the Los Angeles Superior Court in Reiner v. Graiwer, Case No. BC593351 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). See id. at 18–19. But he “quickly discerned that the judge assigned to the case, Judge Gregory Alarcon [] was willing to silence [Plaintiff] and the truth,” so Plaintiff sought to disqualify him. Id. Plaintiff contends that Judge Alarcon did not timely respond to the disqualification request and therefore was automatically disqualified from the case. See id. at 9–12, 19– 20. But Plaintiff claims that instead of stepping down, Judge Alarcon wrongly declared him a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff asserts that the vexatious litigant order was “procured by extrinsic fraud” because the judge relied on cases in which Plaintiff had actually prevailed or that were not yet final. See id. at 9–12, 20–22. For nearly a decade now, Plaintiff has repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to relitigate the validity of these orders. As part of that effort, in 2021 Plaintiff attempted to file a case in the California Supreme Court to vacate its disciplinary orders against him. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 36–52. However, Plaintiff alleges that two deputy clerks with the California Supreme Court wrongfully “obstructed” his ability to file this case, and “adjudicated” the case unilaterally “as being nonmeritorious” and “barred by ‘finality.’” See id. at 31. Plaintiff retained counsel and filed suit in 2022 in San Francisco Superior Court against the two clerks and various unnamed “Doe” defendants, in Reiner v. Ma, Case No. CGC-22-603692 (San Francisco Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to name the Honorable Patricia Guerrero, Chief Justice of California; Jorge Navarrete, Clerk/Executive Officer of the Supreme Court of California; and the California State Bar as Doe defendants. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73– 76. Plaintiff’s counsel later withdrew, and Plaintiff represented himself in that matter pro se. See Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 9 at 99–100. Because Plaintiff was no longer represented by counsel, the defendants moved to dismiss Reiner v. Ma under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391.3(b), arguing that the case had no merit and was filed for the purpose of harassment.2 See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 6 at 78–95; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 10 at 102–19. The court agreed and granted the motions and dismissed the case. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 8 at 114–16; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 14 at 198–99. Rather than appeal these orders directly, Plaintiff filed this case against Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette, as well as the attorneys
2 Section 391.3 provides that if a formerly represented vexatious litigant becomes self-represented, representing the defendants in Reiner v. Ma.3 Plaintiff contends that Defendants somehow engaged in a conspiracy and violated his constitutional rights by enforcing the prefiling order, which he claims is “null and void,” was procured by “extrinsic fraud,” and issued by a disqualified judge. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 17. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief requiring Defendants to engage in discovery, provide him a jury trial, and disclose any relationships Defendants have with federal judges as required “as a matter of law and/or professional ethics.” See id. at ¶¶ 17, 20. Defendants have moved to dismiss the case and to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in the Northern District of California. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 21, 26. A. Legal Standard i. Rule 12(b)(1) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss based on the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Subject matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a continuing independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” See Leeson v. Transam. Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975, n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The party invoking subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). ii. Rule 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
3 Defendants here include Ellin Davtyan; Kirsten Galler; Rita Himes; and Anik Banerjee (“State Bar Defendants”), as well as the Honorable Patricia Guerrero; Jorge Navarrete; and attorneys Sarah L. Overton and Lindsay N. Frazier-Krane (“Court Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure,” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). B. Discussion i. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Defendants first argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 18 at 7–11; Dkt. No. 21 at 6–9. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority to review state court decisions. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, “‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Mothershed v. Justs. of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 21, 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “The doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of such an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). To determine whether a plaintiff is bringing such a de facto appeal, the Court must “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker–Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 777–78 (quotation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has recently clarified, “Rooker-Feldman applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as [his] injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” See Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Defendants argue that this case is a de facto appeal because Plaintiff is seeking relief from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer and the San Francisco Superior Court’s orders dismissing the Reiner v. Ma case. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18 at 9– 11. Specifically, Defendants urge that Plaintiff yet again argues that the vexatious litigant order is null and void and that Defendants improperly asked the San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the vexatious litigant order and dismiss his case in Reiner v. Ma. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he existence of a prior state court judgment and a federal plaintiff seeking to relitigate a matter already litigated in state court [are] not circumstances sufficient to invoke Rooker-Feldman . . . .” See Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1149 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293). Here, Plaintiff does not explicitly ask the Court to set aside the vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer or the dismissals in Reiner v. Ma. In his opposition 34 at 12–13. He appears, at least in part, to seek monetary damages for the “monetary worth” of the Reiner v. Ma case, which he values at $12,777,800.00, as well as for hourly compensation for “harming [his] mental state” at a rate of $300 per hour per day since July 2024. See Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 20. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to such claims. Still, there is some ambiguity in Plaintiff’s requested relief. In the complaint he also seeks “equitable relief” and appears to seek the continuation of the Reiner v. Ma case with ongoing discovery and a jury trial. See id. at ¶ 20. In his opposition brief he also suggests that he is seeking “[c]onfirmation that the subject [vexatious litigant] order . . . was procured by extrinsic fraud” and is somehow null and void. Dkt. No. 25 at 9, 25–26. Plaintiff thus appears to be requesting a declaration that the prior orders are null and void. Any such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff raises several arguments why the doctrine should still not apply here, see id. at 24–27, but the Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff suggests, for example, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot apply to a “null and void” order” See id. at 24–25. However, in Rooker itself, the litigant sought to have a state court decision declared “null and void.” See 263 U.S. at 414–16. “[A] request to declare [a] state court judgment void seeks redress from an injury caused by the state court itself” and is “squarely barred by Rooker-Feldman.” See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff urges that the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker- Feldman doctrine applies here too. See Dkt. No. 25 at 26. “[E]xtrinsic fraud” in this context “is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.” See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). But in the complaint, Plaintiff provides no information about the nature of the alleged fraud and does not allege that he was prevented from presenting his claims in court as a result. To the extent Plaintiff suggests that Defendants committed extrinsic fraud by citing the vexatious litigant order in seeking dismissal of the Reiner v. Ma case, the parties briefed this issue extensively before the San Francisco Superior Court before it dismissed the case. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 97–112. Plaintiff also urges that the doctrine cannot apply to the San Francisco Superior Court’s order dismissing the Reiner v. Ma. See Dkt. No. 25 at 25. But as explained above, Plaintiff is clearly challenging the state court’s dismissal of Reiner v. Ma, even if he filed this case a few days before the dismissal was finalized. See Marciano v. White, 431 F. App’x 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] filed his federal suit before his state court appeals have concluded cannot be enough to open the door for a federal district court to review the state court decisions.”).4 The Court therefore GRANTS the motions to dismiss to the extent that part of Plaintiff’s requested relief actually includes overturning the vexatious litigant order in Reiner v. Graiwer or state court dismissal in Reiner v. Ma. ii. Collateral Estoppel Defendants next argue that collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims. See Dkt. No. 21 at 9–11; Dkt. No. 18 at 12–13. Federal courts are required to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect in federal court as they would have in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring “full faith and credit” to state court judgments); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (Cal. 2015). “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” Id. at 825. In short, “once an issue has been finally decided against [] a party, that party should not be allowed to relitigate the same issue in a new lawsuit.” Id. at 827. Here, Defendants point out that in Reiner v. Ma Plaintiff argued—as he does here—that the vexatious litigant order was null and void and therefore unenforceable against him because it was allegedly procured by extrinsic fraud and issued by disqualified judge. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 97–112. The San Francisco Superior Court considered this argument in granting the motions to dismiss in the Ma case, and explicitly “reject[ed] Reiner’s attempt to collaterally attack the prefiling order.” See id., Ex. 8 at 115; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 14 at 198. Plaintiff’s opposition brief makes this identical argument again, urging that collateral estoppel is inapplicable here because the vexatious litigant order and the San Francisco Superior Court dismissal orders “have each been procured by extrinsic fraud upon the institution of the court and are legally null and void.” See Dkt. No. 25 at 27. But under California law, allegations of “extrinsic fraud” may only prevent the application of collateral estoppel where the fraud prevented the party from actually presenting his case. See Hudson v. Foster, 68 Cal. App. 5th 640, 664–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021). As already discussed above, the complaint does not include any allegations about the supposed extrinsic fraud or how such fraud actually prevented from Plaintiff from presenting his case in Reiner v. Ma. To the contrary: the record shows that Plaintiff presented his argument that the vexatious litigant order was null and void to the San Francisco Superior Court, and the court simply rejected it. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 7 at 97–112; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 11 at 121–142. Because he believes that the vexatious litigant order was null and void, Plaintiff appears to argue that any court that disagrees with him and enforces the order is equally culpable, making that court’s orders similarly unenforceable. But litigants may not ignore court orders with which they disagree and “try again” with another court. The Court finds that collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s claims and the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss on this basis. iii. Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity Even assuming anything remains of Plaintiff’s claims, Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette argue that they are absolutely immune from liability in this lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 18 at 13–15. Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies to court personnel for “administrative tasks if these tasks are judicial in nature and an integral part of the judicial process.” See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 6, 2002) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff’s ability to overcome this immunity is limited. “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he [or she] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.’” Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985)). A plaintiff may only overcome judicial immunity if the judge acts outside his or her judicial capacity or acts in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction.” See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). “[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 12 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362); see also Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001) (identifying factors relevant to the determination of whether an act is judicial in nature). Plaintiff attempts to sidestep the application of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity by arguing that he is only suing Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette in their personal capacities as litigants in Reiner v. Ma, and not for any judicial or quasi-judicial acts. See Dkt. No. 25 at 27–28; see also Compl. at ¶¶ 5–6. But such artful pleading cannot overcome immunity here. The complaint in this case is premised entirely on Reiner v. Ma. Plaintiff alleges that but for Defendants’ reference to the vexatious litigant order and the resulting dismissal, Plaintiff would have been entitled to over $12 million and other equitable relief against Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette in the Reiner v. Ma case. See Compl. at ¶¶ 14–18. The merits of Plaintiff’s claims and his entitlement to relief in this case, therefore, are entirely premised on his entitlement to relief in Reiner v. Ma. But his claims in Reiner v. Ma rest entirely on Justice Guerrero’s and Mr. Navarette’s judicial and quasi-judicial acts: rejecting his motion to vacate the California Supreme Court disciplinary orders. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 25–33. Plaintiff even explicitly sued Justice Guerrero “in her administrative capacity” in Reiner v. Ma. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73. The Court finds that Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette are immune from liability in this case based on absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, and GRANTS the motion to dismiss on this basis. // iv. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Defendants next argue that the claims against the attorneys—both the State Bar counsel and Justice Guerrero and Mr. Navarette’s attorneys—are barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Dkt. No. 18 at 15–17; Dkt. No. 21 at 9–11. “Under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct.” See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the doctrine arose in the antitrust context, courts have applied it more broadly, including to § 1983 claims. See id. at 929–30; see also Empress LLC v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2005). The doctrine applies “in the litigation context, not only [to] petitions sent directly to the court in the course of litigation, but also [to] conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit . . . .” Sosa, 437 F.3d at 934 (quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff is seeking to impose liability on the attorneys for petitioning the San Francisco Superior Court to dismiss the Reiner v. Ma case under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391.3, arguing that the case had no merit and was filed for the purpose of harassment. This falls squarely within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Plaintiff urges that the doctrine is inapplicable here because the “sham” exception applies. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 25 at 28. The Ninth Circuit has identified several circumstances in which the sham exception may apply in the context of litigation. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff appears to argue that the sham exception applies here because Defendants made “intentional misrepresentations to the court.” See id. at 1060. Such intentional misrepresentations may be considered a “sham” if the “party’s knowing fraud upon, or its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the litigation of its legitimacy.” Id. (quotations omitted). For this exception to apply, Plaintiff must plead facts that permit a plausible inference that Defendants engaged in intentional misrepresentation to the San Francisco Superior Court. And such allegations are subject to a heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 646–47 (9th Cir. 2009). nature of the alleged misrepresentation or how it rendered Reiner v. Ma illegitimate. Even construing the complaint liberally, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff appears simply to argue that Defendants made intentional misrepresentations by citing the vexatious litigant order in asking the San Francisco Superior Court to dismiss the Reiner v. Ma case. Plaintiff claims the order is “null and void,” and presumably believes Defendants should never have cited it at all. But no court has found the vexatious litigant order unenforceable. And in any event, the San Francisco Superior Court did not simply rely on the vexatious litigant order in dismissing the case, but rather addressed the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not plausibly pled any basis for the sham exception to apply here, and the Court finds that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims against the attorney Defendants. * * * Plaintiff’s renewed attempt to challenge the vexatious litigant order fails. The Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 18, 21. Defendants also move to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. See Dkt. Nos. 26, 32. Specifically, Defendants seek an order precluding Plaintiff from filing any new action arising out of (1) the WCAB sanctions order; (2) Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment from the practice of law in California; (3) the vexatious litigant order; or (4) any prior lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed challenging the above decisions. Id. A. Legal Standard “The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the inherent power to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “However, such pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “[c]ourts should not enter pre- filing orders with undue haste because such sanctions can tread on a litigant’s due process right of access to the courts.” Id. At the same time, however, “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly (alteration in original). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test to determine whether a pre-filing review order is warranted: (1) the plaintiff was given adequate notice and an opportunity to oppose the order; (2) there is an adequate record for review; (3) the Court makes substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions; and (4) the order is narrowly tailored “to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” Id. at 1057–58. All for requirements are met here. B. Discussion Plaintiff has been given adequate notice of this motion and had an opportunity to respond. See Dkt. No. 36. He filed an opposition brief that the Court has reviewed in detail. Dkt. No. 36. The Court further finds that there is an adequate record for review. “An adequate record for review should include a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059. Here, the parties appear to agree that Plaintiff has filed nineteen cases, including this one, regarding the California disciplinary actions and the vexatious litigant order. See Dkt. No. 26 at 1–2, & n.1; Dkt. No. 36 at 7–8. Just a small sampling of these cases is sufficient to support the motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious here: • As already discussed above, in September 2015 Plaintiff filed a case in Los Angeles Superior Court, in Reiner v. Graiwer, Case No. BC593351 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 35 at 105. Plaintiff brought the case against over 60 defendants, including several justices of the California Supreme Court; judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court; attorneys from the WCAB case; WCAB judges and employees; and State Bar judges and employees. See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 36 at 107–127. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were involved in an ongoing criminal conspiracy, which involved issuing the WCAB sanctions and suspending Plaintiff from the practice of law in California. See id. Judge Alarcon who presided over the case granted the defendants’ special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.5 See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 37 at 129–137. When Plaintiff failed to post security, the case was dismissed. See Dkt. No. 27-3, Ex. 38 at 138–39. • In March 2016, Plaintiff filed another case in Los Angeles Superior Court against WCAB and various State Bar judges and their employees, in Reiner v. Caplan, Case No. BC613627 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 27-4, Ex. 46 at 16–31. Plaintiff similarly alleged that the defendants engaged in “criminal and civil malfeasance” by issuing sanctions against him and suspending him from the practice of law in California. See id. The court granted the defendants’ special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. See Dkt. No. 27-4, Exs. 47–48 at 33–42. • In April 2020, Plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, two clerks of the United States Supreme Court, and the California State Bar, in Reiner v. John Roberts, Case No. 20-cv-00031 (D.D.C.). See Dkt. No. 27-4, Ex. 50 at 49– 120. Once again, Plaintiff alleged that there was a “conspiracy” among Defendants to deprive him of his law license without due process based on “extrinsic fraud.” See id. Plaintiff challenged the WCAB sanctions as well as his suspension and disbarment from the practice of law in California. Id. He further argued that he sought relief from these orders in the United States Supreme Court, which wrongfully rejected his filings. See id. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous. See Dkt. No. 27-4, Exs. 51 & 52 at 122–25.
5 Plaintiff was also declared vexatious by the Central District of California in Reiner v. Graiwer, • In February 2021, Plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against multiple defendants, including several present and former justices of the California Supreme Court; judges from the Los Angeles Superior Court, including Judge Alarcon; the California State Bar; and several attorneys, in Reiner v. Cantil-Sakauye, Case No. 21-cv-00219-DMS-MSB (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 54 at 2–56. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in “criminally illegal racketeering activities” in retaliation against him. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff appeared to argue that the justices had wrongfully denied Plaintiff’s petitions to review his suspension and disbarment from the practice of law in California. Id. In doing so, Plaintiff suggested that the justices had “ratified” the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also challenged the vexatious litigant order and the judges who had denied his motions to vacate that order. Id. The district court dismissed the case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 27-5, Exs. 55 and 56 at 58–68. • In August 2021, Plaintiff filed another case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against, among others, present and former justices of the California Supreme Court, in Reiner v. Holton, Case No. 21-cv- 01454-DMS-MSB (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 58 at 87–98. Plaintiff again argued that he had been wrongfully suspended and disbarred from the practice of law in California. Id. He also argued that the defendants had engaged in a “conspiracy” to violate his rights and retaliate against him through their actions in moving to dismiss Reiner v. Cantil-Sakauye and in initiating State Bar proceedings against him for the unauthorized practice of law. Id. The district court dismissed the case as to the justices based on absolute judicial immunity. See Dkt. No. 27-5, Exs. 59–60 at 103–112. The court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against any of the other defendants. Id. • In December 2021, Plaintiff filed yet another case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in Reiner v. Navarrete, Case No. 3:21-cv-02077-LL-MSB (S.D. Cal.). See Dkt. No. 27-5, Ex. 62 at 137–180. Plaintiff sued, among others, two deputy clerks for the California Supreme Court, Tayuan Ma and Tom Zhang; present and former justices of the California Supreme Court; and the California State Bar. See id. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were “co-conspirator[s] in a conspiracy of criminal and civil malfeasance.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongfully suspended and disbarred from the practice of law in California, and that in October 2021 Ms. Ma and Messrs. Zhang and Navarette had wrongfully “obstructed” the filing of his motion to vacate the suspension and disbarment orders and rejected the motion as untimely. Id. The district court dismissed the case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 27-5, Exs. 63–64 at 182–190. The district court denied Plaintiff’s repeated motions for reconsideration, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s orders, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. See Reiner v. Navarette, Case No. 23- 3993 (9th Cir.), Dkt. No. 29. • As already detailed above, Plaintiff retained counsel and filed suit in December 2022 in San Francisco Superior Court against the same two deputy clerks for the California Supreme Court (Ms. Ma and Mr. Zhang), Justice Guerrero, Mr. Navarette, and the California State Bar, in Reiner v. Ma, Case No. CGC-22-603692 (San Francisco Super. Ct.). See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4; Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 5 at 73–76. Plaintiff argued that the clerks wrongfully “obstructed” his ability to file this case, and “adjudicated” the case unilaterally “as being nonmeritorious” and “barred by ‘finality.’” See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 4 at 31. The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed the case as frivolous. See Dkt. No. 19, Ex. 8 at 114–16; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. 14 at 198–99. Plaintiff urges that this case is meritorious and that the Court cannot consider his prior cases frivolous or harassing because the merits of the claims were never adjudicated. See Dkt. No. 36 at 7–8. The Court has already explained above that this case is not meritorious. See Section III.B above. As to the other cases, Plaintiff states that many were dismissed on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine without reaching the merits at all. See id. But Plaintiff’s argument misses the point. Over the past decade or more, he has continually challenged the same State Bar disciplinary orders and vexatious litigant order, claiming that the orders are “null and void.” He has repeatedly asked federal courts to review these decisions, even after being told that the federal district courts have no authority to review state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff has demonstrated a consistent pattern of disregarding court orders, attributing any adverse rulings against him to a conspiracy or other criminal conduct, and then pursuing further litigation against anyone who disagrees with him. Plaintiff’s cases are both frivolous and have been used to harass the defendants. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to declare him vexatious further underscores his improper tactics. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ reliance on the vexatious litigant order in this case “is new and further federal criminal malfeasance in violation of Title 18 United States Code Sections 241, 242, 1341, and 1343.” See Dkt. No. 36 at 6. He attaches a letter to his opposition brief that is directed to various U.S. representatives and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See Dkt. No. 36 at 8, & Ex. 1. The subject line reads “Complaint of Criminal Public Corruption involving California Supreme Court Justice Patricia Guerrero and her Co-Conspirators,” and the body of the letter states that Plaintiff is writing: regarding an ongoing scandal of criminal malfeasance in violation of federal law which is occurring in the Northern District of California in which the participants include California Supreme Court Justice Patricia Guerrero in her capacity as a litigant in which she, and her co-conspirators are knowingly and willfully using fabricated evidence in the form of falsified court records to obstruct and evade justice. See Dkt. No. 36 at 8, & Ex. 1. Plaintiff further states that he is writing so the FBI “immediately Plaintiff also suggests that if this Court disagrees with him—either in granting the motion to dismiss or the motion to declare him vexatious—the Court would thus become “a willing and knowing participant[] in the criminal malfeasance conspiracy of the Defendants . . . .” See id. at 6–7. In other words, Plaintiff appears to threaten the Court with a lawsuit and criminal investigation if it does not find in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 6–9. It is clear that Plaintiff is attempting to bend courts and parties to his will by filing frivolous complaints against all who disagree with him, and that he will continue to do so absent judicial intervention. This is the definition of harassment. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious.6 The Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 18 and 21. Given the nature of the deficiencies identified above, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile. The Court therefore DISMISSES the case without leave to amend. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.”) (quotations omitted). The Court further GRANTS the motion to declare Plaintiff vexatious in this district. Dkt. No. 26. The Clerk of this Court may not file or accept without pre-filing approval any further complaint filed by or on behalf of Plaintiff Martin Reiner if the complaint arises out of or relates to (1) the sanctions order issued against Plaintiff in the Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”); (2) Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment from the practice of law in California; (3) the order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in California state court; or (4) any prior lawsuit filed by Plaintiff that arises from the sanctions order in the WCAB, Plaintiff’s suspension or disbarment
6 Defendants suggest that the Court should declare Plaintiff vexatious in this district and in all United States District Courts in California. See Dkt. No. 26 at 3, 21–22. However, absent some Ninth Circuit authority, the Court questions the legal basis for an order reaching beyond this Court’s jurisdiction, especially since Defendants seek an order that would require the Chief Judge of other districts to implement a pre-filing review process. The Court notes that all of the cases 1 from the practice of law in California, or the order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in 2 California state court. 3 If Plaintiff wishes to file a complaint regarding these subjects, he shall provide a copy of 4 any such complaint, a letter requesting that the complaint be filed, and a copy of this Order to the 5 Clerk of this Court. The Clerk shall then forward the complaint, letter, and copy of this Order to 6 the Duty Judge for a determination whether the complaint should be accepted for filing. Plaintiff 7 is warned that any violation of this Order will expose him to contempt proceedings and 8 appropriate sanctions, and any action filed in violation of this Order will be subject to dismissal. 9 The Clerk is directed to entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff and to close the case. 12 Dated: 6/23/2025
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge