N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 1. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1999-2000). The court of appeals certified the following issue: Was the supreme court's award of attorney fees to an insured in Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992), premised upon the insurer's contractual breach of the duty to provide coverage or the duty to defend or both?
¶ 2. Before answering the court of appeals certified issue, we point out that Elliott made it clear that "[u]nder the well-established American Rule, parties to litigation are generally responsible for their own attorney fees incurred with respect to the litigation. Attorney fees are generally not awarded to the prevailing party in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor." 169 Wis. 2d at 323. This case is not about consumer protection, contrary to the suggestion by the dissent. See dissenting op. at ¶ 39. The issue before us pertains to the basis of our award of attorney fees in Elliott, and the reasons for diverging from the deeply-rooted dictates of the American Rule in that case.
¶ 3. Our attorney fees award was premised on the equities of the situation in Elliott, which related to the insurer's contractual breach of the duty to defend. The award was inextricably connected to the facts and circumstances of that case; namely, that the insurer failed to comply with the dictates of Mowry v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 385 [662]*662N.W.2d 171 (1986). In Mowry, we indicated that an insurer can avoid the risk of breaching the duty to defend by seeking bifurcation of the coverage and liability issues, and a stay of the liability phase until coverage has been decided. Id. at 528-29. Where an insurer fails to follow that procedure, as the insurer did in Elliott, the insurer does indirectly what it cannot do directly. The insurer breaches the duty to defend by requiring the insured to incur attorney fees to defend him or herself on the issue of liability and to litigate coverage simultaneously.
¶ 4. In this case, American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family) appealed that part of an order for judgment of the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Walter J. Swietlik presiding, which, based upon Elliott, awarded attorney fees to Leanna R. Benz (Benz), an insured of American Family. There is no dispute that American Family followed the procedure established in Mowry. Consequently, the basis for the attorney fees award in Elliott is absent here. Accordingly, that part of the circuit court's order for judgment that awarded attorney fees to Benz is reversed.
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¶ 5. The pertinent facts are not in dispute. In October, 1998, Darryn Reid (Reid) brought the instant action against Benz, American Family, and Transportation Insurance Company.1 Reid alleged that he slipped, fell, and injured himself on the driveway at Benz's home. Benz tendered'her defense to American Family, which had issued a homeowner's policy to [663]*663Benz, and which was in effect at the time of Reid's accident. American Family assigned counsel to defend Benz, subject to a reservation of rights.
¶ 6. In January, 1999, American Family moved to bifurcate the issue of liability from the issue of whether Benz was covered by its policy, claiming that the business pursuits exclusion in the policy applied and, on that basis, Benz was not covered. American Family also requested a stay of any liability proceedings until the coverage issue had been resolved. At the initial pretrial conference, Benz was represented by counsel retained by American Family on the merits, and by separate counsel on the coverage issue. There, the parties, and the circuit court judge, agreed that the coverage issue would be bifurcated and that a motion regarding coverage would be heard in April, 1999.
¶ 7. In March, 1999, American Family moved for summary judgment dismissing Reid's complaint against it, and moved for a declaration that American Family had no further duty to defend or indemnify Benz. In response, Benz filed a brief in opposition to American Family's motion for summary judgment, and a motion for a declaration that American Family was obligated to continue to defend and indemnify her. Benz also sought a declaration that American Family was "obligated to reimburse her for all costs and attorney fees incurred in defending and establishing American Family's duties of defense and indemnification." (R. at 22:1.) This motion was set to be heard at the same time as American Family's motion for summary judgment.
¶ 8. On April 23, 1999, the circuit court heard American Family's summary judgment motion and Benz's declaratory judgment motion. The circuit court found that an exception to the business exclusion [664]*664applied, and, correspondingly, that American Family had a duty to defend and indemnify Benz. The court also found that Benz was entitled to recover the reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred, with respect to American Family's motion for summary judgment and her motion for declaratory judgment.
¶ 9. American Family moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's order regarding attorney fees and costs. In response, Benz requested an additional award of fees incurred in connection with American Family's motion for reconsideration. While these motions were pending, American Family petitioned the court of appeals for leave to appeal the circuit court's order denying American Family's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals denied the petition for interlocutory appeal, and Benz moved the circuit court for an additional award of attorney fees incurred in responding to American Family's petition for leave to appeal.
¶ 10. The circuit court denied American Family's motion for reconsideration, and found that Benz was entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in responding to American Family's motion for reconsideration. The court also denied Benz's motion for attorney fees for opposing American Family's petition for leave to appeal.
¶ 11. Reid, American Family, and Benz settled the underlying action, and judgment was entered in favor of Benz and against American Family for attorney fees and costs.2 American Family appealed the [665]*665judgment, and Benz cross-appealed the circuit court's denial of her request for attorney fees and costs, incurred in opposing American Family's petition for leave to appeal. The court of appeals certified the issue of attorney fees in American Family's appeal for our review and determination, and we accepted the appeal.3
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¶ 12. We review the circuit court's decision to award Benz attorney fees de novo. "Whether an insured can recover attorney's fees as damages is a question of law which this court decides independently and without deference to the lower courts." DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 559, 568, 547 N.W.2d 592 (1996) (citing Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 824, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993)). In addition, the question before us concerns our rationale for the award of attorney fees in Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d 310. This necessarily involves a question of law [666]*666that we review, or determine, independently of a lower court's decision, but benefiting from the analysis of the court. See Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 527; see also Smith v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶ 7, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882.
¶ 13. We begin, as we must, with Elliott. The facts and circumstances that gave rise to our decision in Elliott are particularly significant, because our reasoning therein is inextricably connected to those facts and circumstances. Karen Elliott had brought an action against Michael Donahue, among others, to recover for her injuries caused by an automobile accident in which Donahue was involved. Donahue had been driving an uninsured car owned by David Mikrut. Donahue tendered his defense to Heritage Mutual Insurance Company (Heritage), based upon an insurance policy his stepmother had from Heritage which covered Donahue while he was operating another's car, so long as he had the reasonable belief that he had permission to do so. Heritage responded that it was denying coverage, based upon a non-permissive use exclusion in the policy, because Donahue did not have Mikrut's permission to be driving the car. Heritage advised Donahue to retain counsel at his own expense, which he did. Heritage then requested a bifurcated trial to determine the coverage issue separate from the issues of liability and damages, and bifurcation was subsequently ordered. "However, proceedings on the claim for damages were not suspended pending resolution of the coverage issue. Donahue's counsel represented him on both the claims for damages as well as in the coverage dispute." Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 315.
¶ 14. At the bifurcated trial on coverage, the jury found that Donahue did have permission to drive Mikrut's vehicle. The circuit court entered judgment [667]*667that Donahue was covered by the Heritage policy. Heritage assumed Donahue's defense and settled the claims against him. Donahue then sought to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred, which motion the circuit court denied. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the determination that Donahue could not recover attorney fees and costs with respect to the coverage issue, but reversed the circuit court and held that Donahue could recover attorney fees and costs incurred in defending himself on the merits. Id. This court reversed the court of appeals, insofar as it concluded that Donahue was not entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in defending coverage. Id. at 314.
¶ 15. Before this court, Donahue contended that he was entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in defending coverage, because Heritage breached its duty to defend by denying coverage. Heritage responded that it had not breached its duty to defend, because coverage was fairly debatable, and it had acted consistent with the requirements of Mowry.4 Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 316.
¶ 16. We agreed that Heritage had not breached its duty to defend when it contested coverage. "An insurer does not breach its contractual duty to defend by denying coverage where the issue of coverage is fairly debatable as long as the insurer provides coverage and defense once coverage is established." Id. at 317. However, we disagreed that Heritage had complied with the dictates oí Mowry.
[668]*668While a bifurcated trial was ordered in this case, the coverage and liability issues were litigated simultaneously, forcing Donahue to retain counsel to simultaneously defend him in both aspects of the case. To be entirely consistent with Mowry, the insurer should not only request a bifurcated trial on the issues of coverage and liability, but it should also move to stay any proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is resolved. Heritage failed to do so. The Mowry court advised that an "insurer may need to provide a defense to its insured when the separate trial on coverage does not precede the trial on liability and damages." [129 Wis. 2d at 528] Because Heritage did not provide such needed defense, it is liable to Donahue for the attorney fees incurred by Donahue with respect to the liability issue. See Meiser v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233, 240-41, 98 N.W.2d 919 (1959).
Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 318.
¶ 17. In Meiser, as in Elliott, we concluded that, under the circumstances, the insured was entitled to recover attorney fees incurred not only with regard to liability, but also in regard to coverage. There, the insurer wrongfully refused to defend the insured against the claim. Meiser v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233, 240, 98 N.W.2d 919 (1959). The insured retained counsel, who negotiated a settlement with the claimant for the loss, and who then filed a lawsuit to establish coverage. We affirmed the circuit court's decision that the loss was covered, and further affirmed the court's award of reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending against the loss and establishing coverage. The fee award was tied to the insurer's refusal to defend.
[669]*669[The insurer] denied the claim. Thus, [the insured] was obliged to engage the services of attorneys to protect his interests, and the trial court found that negotiations for settlement of the loss were undertaken by said attorneys and this action was commenced to recover damages of the [insurer] by reason of its breach of contract in failing to investigate, adjust, and defend the [insured] against the loss.
Id.
¶ 18. Meiser, however, was decided long before Mowry. In Mowry, we held that an insurer has not breached its contractual duty to defend when it "initially denied coverage because it believed that coverage under the policy was fairly debatable." 129 Wis. 2d at 528. Also, the insurer not only had requested bifurcation of coverage and liability, and that a trial on coverage would precede a trial on liability, but also had stipulated that "the issues of liability and damages were to be held in abeyance until the resolution of the coverage issue." Id. at 506. In contrast, in Elliott, Heritage had requested bifurcation, but "proceedings on the claim for damages were not suspended pending resolution of the coverage issue." 169 Wis. 2d at 315. Donahue thus needed a defense on the merits, but Heritage did not provide him such a defense. As we pointed out in Mowry, and repeated in Elliott, "[a]n insurer may need to provide a defense to its insured when the separate trial on coverage does not precede the trial on liability and damages." Mowry, 129 Wis. 2d at 528. Heritage failed to move for a stay of proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Donahue needing a defense — a defense Heritage failed to provide.
[670]*670¶ 19. Even though our conclusion to award attorney fees in Elliott was premised upon Heritage's failure to follow the dictates of Mowry, that conclusion is intertwined with the equitable considerations that arise where an insurer refuses to defend the insured and the coverage and liability phases proceed simultaneously. See Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 322-23. Those equitable considerations arise from the scope of the insurer's duty to defend, as compared to its duty to indemnify. We reiterated in Elliott that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. "The duty of defense depends on the nature of the claim and has nothing to do with the merits of the claim." Id. at 321. The duty to indemnify, in contrast, arises when a claim is shown to be within the parameters of the terms of the policy, that is the claim is within the parameters of the policy and the insured is adjudged liable. Id. at 320-21; see also Smith v. Katz, 218 Wis. 2d 442, 448 n.3, 578 N.W.2d 202 (1998) (an insurance policy imposes a duty to indemnify the insured if the insured is found liable); General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 176, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997) (the duty to indemnify is dependent upon whether the claim is resolved in favor of, or against, the insured). Although coverage was disputed, the duty to indemnify did not arise in Elliott because once there was a determination that Donahue was covered, Heritage settled the pending claims against him. 169 Wis. 2d at 315.
¶ 20. In particular, it was the equities related to the duty to defend that prompted us to award attorney fees to the insured in Elliott.
Where an insurer failed to defend until after an adverse decision in a declaratory judgment action [671]*671instituted by it, such insurer was held not liable to pay the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the insured in the declaratory judgment action, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or stubborn litigiousness on the part of the insurer. Some courts have qualified this rule on the assumption that the expenses were incurred at "the request of the insurer" and therefore came within the policy provision for reimbursement of the insured for reasonable expenses, or on the theory that since suit was brought by a third party, the insurer owes a duty to defend. But, despite the qualifications placed upon this rule by the court, it still appears to be unfair to the insured. After all, the insurer had contracted to defend the insured, and it failed to do so. It guessed wrong as to its duty, and should be compelled to bear the consequences thereof. If the rule laid down by these courts should be followed by other authorities, it would actually amount to permitting the insurer to do by indirection that which it could not do directly. That is, the insured has a contract right to have actions against him defended by the insurer, at its expense. If the insurer can force him. into a declaratory judgment proceeding and, even though it loses in such action, compel him to bear the expense of such litigation, the insured is actually no better off financially than if he had never had the contract right mentioned above. Other courts have refused to impose such a burden upon the insured.
Id. at 322-23 (quoting Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, sec. 4691, at 281-83 (Berdal ed. 1979) (emphasis added)).5
[672]*672¶ 21. It was the inequity of the circumstances facing us in Elliott — that the insurer was attempting to avoid its duty to defend indirectly by adjudicating coverage without seeking a stay of liability — that prompted us to award the attorney fees the insured incurred. We reasoned that it was only fair that the insurer be held liable for the attorney fees that the insured incurred, when the insurer denied coverage in such a way that forced the insured to incur fees to defend himself. That was contrary to the dictates of Mowry.
¶ 22. We have directed insurers to follow Mowry to avoid such exposure.
In Elliott, we clearly stated that the proper procedure for an insurance company to follow when coverage is disputed is to request a bifurcated trial on the issues of coverage and liability and move to stay any proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is resolved. [169 Wis. 2d at 318.] When this procedure is followed, the insurance company runs no risk of breaching its duty to defend.
Newhouse, 176 Wis. 2d at 836. Newhouse aptly illustrates that an insurer breaches the duty to defend when it fails to follow the procedure laid out in Mowry [673]*673and Elliott. In Newhouse, the insurer "did not follow the proper procedure. [The insurer] refused to accept the circuit court's offer to stay the liability trial until the appeal on the coverage issue was final." 176 Wis. 2d at 836. The insurer also refused to provide a defense to the insured at the liability trial, and thereby breached the duty to defend. Id. at 837.
¶ 23. Newhouse and other cases concern an insurer's direct breach of the duty to defend, that is, the insurer wrongfully refuses to provide the insured with a defense. See Newhouse, 176 Wis. 2d at 836; see also Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 201 Wis. 2d 260, 269-70, 548 N.W.2d 64 (1996). Elliott, in contrast, involves an insurer's indirect breach. Heritage did not comply with the procedure approved in Mowry. Consequently, even though Heritage had legitimately contested coverage, it forced Donahue to defend himself, at his expense, by refusing to seek an order staying the liability phase, while the coverage phase was being tried. Heritage did "by indirection that which it could not do directly," — avoid its duty to defend. Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 323 (quoting Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, sec. 4691, at 281-83 (Berdal ed. 1979)). Hence, it was the inherent unfairness of Heritage's tactic, which justified our award of attorney fees.
¶ 24. The "necessary and proper" provision (Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8)) (1999-2000) of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provided the means by which we awarded Donahue attorney fees.6 "[Section] 806.04(8), [674]*674Stats., permits a recovery of attorney fees in this case because the recovery is proper under the principles of equity." Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 324. Because § 806.04(8) allowed the court to award such supplemental relief, the court did not have to "fashion an exception to the American Rule...." Id. at 325.
¶ 25. In addition to contending that he was entitled to an attorney fees award, because Heritage had breached its contractual duty to defend, and that the principles of equity demanded the award, Donahue also argued that Heritage was required to reimburse him because he had, in effect, incurred the fees at Heritage's request. Id. at 318-19. We considered that "[cjourts in several other jurisdictions have held that attorney fees are recoverable by the insured in defending against an insurer's declaratory judgment action where the insurance policy provides reimbursement for all reasonable expenses incurred at the request of the insurance company." Id. at 319. However, we expressly declined to adopt this approach because Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8) provided the court the means to recognize the equities of the situation, and, according to those equities, allow for a recovery of attorney fees. Id. at 323-24 (citing and quoting Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984)).
¶ 26. Since Elliott, we have emphasized that the insurer there, Heritage, had failed to fulfill its contractual duty to defend. Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, [675]*675S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 511, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998); DeChant, 200 Wis. 2d at 569; see also Ledman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 Wis. 2d 56, 70, 601 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1999).7 We also have emphasized that it was the "limited circumstances" presented in Elliott that prompted the court to exercise its equitable power to award attorney fees to the insured. DeChant, 200 Wis. 2d at 569 (emphasis added); see also Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 512; Ledman, 230 Wis. 2d at 70.
¶ 27. Awarding attorney fees, as we did in Elliott, should not be the usual result. The circumstances in Elliott^-tlnat coverage was not decided before liability, and that the liability proceeding was not held in abeyance while coverage was being considered — is atypical. Over thirty years ago, we noted that "in many cases policy defenses are now tried before the liability issue. . . ." Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 168 N.W.2d 610 (1969). In
[676]*676Mowry, we observed that "once an order to bifurcate has been made, a trial on a coverage issue should be a relatively simple matter." 129 Wis. 2d at 529 n.4. We also encouraged a court which has ordered bifurcation to expedite resolution of the coverage issue. Id.
¶ 28. It is because of the unusual situation presented in Elliott, that "we have expressly declined 'to extend Elliott beyond its particular facts and circumstances.' " Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 512 (quoting DeChant, 200 Wis. 2d at 569). And yet, this is exactly what is asked of us here.
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¶ 29. Benz contends that she is entitled to recover attorney fees expended in establishing that American Family's policy covers Reid's claim against her. She does not contend that she incurred attorney fees in defending against Reid's claim. The issue is whether Elliott permits recovery of attorney fees expended solely in establishing coverage, where there has been no breach of the duty to defend.
¶ 30. During oral argument, Benz and American Family, through respective counsel, agreed that an insured's entitlement to attorney fees should not stand or fall based upon the procedural device used to present the coverage issue in a case. We agree. It makes no difference whether the parties seek to resolve a coverage dispute via a declaratory judgment action or a summary judgment motion.8 In Elliott, we awarded attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(8), the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, even though there appar[677]*677ently was no declaratory judgment action there. A jury decided the driving-with-permission issue and the judge entered judgment finding coverage. Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 315. In Scottish Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Dwyer, 19 F.3d 307, 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1994), coverage was determined via a declaratory judgment action and an award of attorney fees was made, based upon our decision in Elliott.9
¶ 31. Benz makes three basic contentions as to why she is entitled to recover attorney fees here: (1) Benz was deprived of a benefit she bargained for by paying premiums, namely, indemnity, by having to incur attorney fees to establish coverage; (2) the same equitable principles that supported the award of attorney fees in Elliott exist in this case; and, (3) Benz essentially incurred expenses — attorney fees — at the request of American Family, when American Family contested coverage. We.address each in turn.
¶ 32. Benz's first contention is based upon a misreading of Elliott. We said in Elliott that " [indemnification and defense for claims falling within the parameters of the insurance policy are the two primary benefits received by the insured from a contract of insurance." 169 Wis. 2d at 321 (emphasis added). We made it clear that, in return for premiums paid, the insurer provides indemnification of those claims found to be valid and to be covered by the policy. Elliott did not, as Benz suggests, fashion a rule that the duty to indemnify requires the insurer to pay the [678]*678insured's attorney fees, when it loses a contest over coverage.10 Notably, Benz has provided no authority that reasonably disputing coverage is a breach of the duty to indemnify. Nor are we aware of any such authority. Also, Benz has failed to point us to a provision in her policy, or language in Elliott, that requires the insurer to underwrite not only any claims falling within the parameters of the insurance policy, but also any contest regarding whether the claims are actually within the parameters of the policy.
¶ 33. In essence, Benz is arguing that if she had to incur attorney fees to establish coverage, she was denied the benefit of indemnity. How can this be? The benefit of indemnity is to pay for claims "falling within the parameters of the insurance policy." Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 321. Here, American Family has apparently made a payment to settle the claim against Benz, so she has not been denied the benefit of indemnity.
¶ 34. Benz, joined by amicus Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, makes a related argument that insurance companies should pay the insured's attorney fees when they do not prevail in a coverage contest, because they are better situated to assume, and spread, the risk of contesting coverage. The relative abilities of the parties to assume the risk of the cost of litigation is not a valid reason for extending Elliott by permitting fee-shifting for coverage contests. To shift the established allocation of attorney fees to the party who is better able to assume the cost of that litigation is well beyond the limited exception to the American Rule adopted in [679]*679Elliott.11 More importantly, such an approach is antithetical to the American Rule, that, regardless of the relative situation of the parties, "parties to litigation are generally responsible for their own attorney fees incurred with respect to the litigation." Id. at 323. We acknowledge that there are exceptions to the American Rule, but only where statutes or contracts provide for fee-shifting, or this court has found that special circumstances warrant recognizing an exception. See, e.g., Elliott.
¶ 35. Benz's second argument, that the equitable principles in Elliott are also present in this case, is not persuasive. In Elliott, it was the indirect breach of the duty to defend — -by not following the dictates of Mowry — which gave rise to the equities compelling an award of attorney's fees. See Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 318, 322-23. This is not the case here. The equities that Benz relies upon — that she spent at least as much, if not more, litigating coverage, than American Family paid to settle the case — do not compel extending Elliott. The equitable principles in Elliott related to the duty to defend. Id. at 322-32. There is no contention that American Family has breached its duty to defend here, nor is there any argument that American Family's challenge to coverage was unfair or unreasonable, or in bad faith. American Family did not attempt to avoid its duty to defend Benz by refusing to defend Benz, and then, simultaneously, litigating coverage and liability.
[680]*680¶ 36. Finally, Benz contends that the attorney fees she incurred to establish coverage were essentially incurred at the request of American Family, and that the provision of her policy which requires American Family to reimburse her for expenses incurred at its request, provides a basis for the attorney fees award. We expressly declined to adopt this approach in Elliott, as Benz concedes. 169 Wis. 2d at 319. Instead of relying upon a provision of the insurance contract, we relied upon the supplemental relief provision of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the insurer's failure to follow Mowry,12 Id. at 318, 322-24. The instant case presents even less compelling circumstances than Elliott to induce us to adopt an approach based upon a [681]*681provision in the policy now.13 Unlike the situation in Elliott, there was no attempt on the part of American Family to avoid its duty to defend.14
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¶ 37. Elliott presented circumstances that prompted us to award attorney fees to the insured as a matter of equity. The insurer failed to follow the dictates of Mowry, and the insured was forced, therefore, to litigate the coverage issue and defend on liability simultaneously. Here, unlike the situation in Elliott, the insurer, American Family, followed the dictates of Mowry. American Family sought to have the fairly debatable question of coverage determined before the liability phase of the case proceeded, and obtained a [682]*682stay of the liability phase. We thus do not have the inequitable circumstances before us here that were before us in Elliott. Accordingly, Elliott does not support the circuit court's award of attorney fees to Benz. We thus reverse the order for judgment of the circuit court awarding such fees.
By the Court. — The order for judgment of the circuit court awarding attorney fees is reversed.