Reid v. Baker

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 22, 2021
• Docket: 3:17-cv-00532
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 RAFAEL REID, Case No. 3:17-cv-00532-HDM-CLB

6 Petitioner, v. ORDER 7 WILLIAM GITTERE, et al., 8 Respondents. 9 10 This counseled habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 11 comes before the court on the respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF 12 No. 36). The petitioner, Rafael Reid (“Reid”), has opposed (ECF 13 No. 48), and the respondents have replied (ECF No. 54). 14 I. Procedural Background 15 Reid challenges his 2015 Nevada state court conviction, 16 pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempt sexual assault and robbery. 17 (Exs. 30 & 47).1 After filing, and failing to prevail on, a motion 18 to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, Reid filed a direct 19 appeal through counsel Michael Sanft. (Exs. 42-44 & 50). The Nevada 20 Court of Appeals affirmed on May 17, 2016, and the Nevada Supreme 21 Court issued remittitur on June 13, 2016. (Exs. 63 & 64). 22 Reid asserts that he did not learn of the decision on his 23 direct appeal until more than a year later – on July 25, 2017. By 24

25 1 The exhibits containing the relevant state court record cited in this order are located at ECF Nos. 17, 19, 37-40 and 49-50. The 26 court will cite to the respondents’ exhibits (located at ECF Nos. 37-40) by exhibit number and to the petitioner’s exhibits (located 27 at ECF Nos. 17, 19 and 49) by ECF number. 1 then, the deadline for filing a state court postconviction petition 2 had passed and the deadline for a federal habeas petition was 3 looming. 4 Reid filed the instant federal petition on August 29, 2017. 5 The court appointed counsel, and counsel filed an amended petition 6 on July 24, 2018. (ECF No. 16). Counsel also moved to stay and 7 abey proceedings so that Reid could exhaust his claims through a 8 state court postconviction petition. The court granted Reid’s 9 motion, and proceedings were stayed while Reid pursued his state 10 court petition. 11 The state court denied Reid’s petition on the grounds it was 12 untimely, and the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. (Exs. 71, 79 13 & 94). Reid subsequently returned to this court and moved to reopen 14 proceedings and for leave to file a second amended petition. The 15 court granted both motions. Reid filed his second amended petition 16 on April 23, 2020. (ECF No. 32). The instant motion to dismiss 17 followed. 18 II. Timeliness 19 The respondents argue this action should be dismissed because 20 not one of Reid’s three petitions was filed before the federal 21 statute of limitations expired. Reid does not deny that his 22 original and subsequent petitions were filed after the expiration 23 of the statutory limitations period, but he asserts that he should 24 be granted equitable tolling and that his claims otherwise then 25 relate back to a timely filed petition. 26 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) 27 amended the statutes controlling federal habeas corpus practice to 1 include a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal 2 habeas corpus petitions. With respect to the statute of 3 limitations, the habeas corpus statute provides in relevant part:

4 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 5 custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of . . . the 6 date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 7 seeking such review . . . . 8 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).2 9 A claim in an amended petition that is filed after the 10 expiration of the one-year limitation period will be timely only 11 if the claim relates back to a timely filed claim pursuant to Rule 12 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis that 13 the claim arises out of “the same conduct, transaction or 14 occurrence” as the timely claim. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 15 (2005). In Mayle, the Supreme Court held that habeas claims in an 16 amended petition do not arise out of “the same conduct, transaction 17 or occurrence” as prior timely claims merely because the claims 18 all challenge the same trial, conviction, or sentence. 545 U.S. at 19 655-64. Rather, under the construction of the rule approved in 20 Mayle, Rule 15(c) permits relation back of habeas claims asserted 21 in an amended petition “only when the claims added by amendment 22 arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not 23 when the new claims depend upon events separate in ‘both time and 24 type’ from the originally raised episodes.” 545 U.S. at 657. In 25 this regard, the reviewing court looks to “the existence of a 26 2 Reid does not argue that any other subsection of § 2244(d)(1) 27 applies in this case. 1 common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly 2 asserted claims.” A claim that merely adds “a new legal theory 3 tied to the same operative facts as those initially alleged” will 4 relate back and be timely. 545 U.S. at 659 & n.5. 5 The Ninth Circuit has set forth a two-step analysis to 6 determine whether a claim relates: (1) “determine what claims the 7 amended petition alleges and what core facts underlie those 8 claims”; and (2) “for each claim in the amended petition, ... look 9 to the body of the original petition and its exhibits to see 10 whether the original petition ‘set out’ or ‘attempted to ... set 11 out’ a corresponding factual episode, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 15(c)(1)(B)—or whether the claim is instead ‘supported by facts 13 that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading 14 set forth,’ Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650, 664, 125 S. Ct. 2562.” Ross v. 15 Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2020). It is not 16 required that the “facts in the original and amended petitions be 17 stated in the same level of detail.” Id. 18 The parties agree that Reid’s federal petition was filed 19 almost two weeks after the federal statute of limitations expired. 20 However, Reid asserts that he was abandoned by counsel, who never 21 advised him of the conclusion of his direct appeal. He argues he 22 therefore be allowed equitable tolling through the filing of both 23 the original and first amended petitions. 24 Equitable tolling is appropriate only if the petitioner can 25 show that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 26 some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented 27 timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). “[F]or 1 a litigant to demonstrate ‘he has been pursuing his rights 2 diligently,’ . . . he must show that he has been reasonably 3 diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to 4 filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before 5 and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal 6 court.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 7 banc). 8 “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is 9 ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” 10 Holland, 560 U.S. at 653.

11 In determining whether reasonable diligence was exercised courts shall consider the petitioner’s overall 12 level of care and caution in light of his or her particular circumstances and be guided by decisions made 13 in other similar cases with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in 14 advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case. 15 16 Smith, 953 F.3d at 599 (internal punctuation and citations 17 omitted). 18 Equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. 19 Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), and “the threshold 20 necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the 21 exceptions swallow the rule,” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 22 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 23 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). The petitioner ultimately has the 24 burden of proof on this “extraordinary exclusion.” Id. at 1065. He 25 accordingly must demonstrate a causal relationship between the 26 extraordinary circumstance and the lateness of his filing. E.g., 27 Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Accord Bryant 1 v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). 2 “[I]t is only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a 3 petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely 4 filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy.’” Smith, 5 953 F.3d at 600. 6 Reid was sentenced on December 1, 2015. (ECF No. 45). Judgment 7 of conviction was entered on December 7, 2015, and counsel filed 8 a notice of appeal that same date. (ECF Nos. 47 & 48). 9 On January 12, 2016, Reid sent his attorney, Michael Sanft, 10 a letter that asked for confirmation that his appeal had been filed 11 and for a copy of his appeal and of the sexual assault examination 12 report.3 (ECF No. 17-2). In the letter, Reid noted that it was his 13 second letter to Sanft, that Sanft had not responded to his first 14 letter and that no one ever answered the phones at Sanft’s office. 15 (Id.) Two weeks later, Reid sent a letter to the state court that 16 explained he had been trying to reach his attorney with no success 17 and requested any help the court might be able to offer in that 18 regard. (ECF No. 17-3). 19 Five months later, on July 2, 2016, Reid sent a letter to an 20 investigator.4 (ECF No. 17-4). In the letter, Reid explained that 21 he had been trying without success to reach Sanft and asked the 22 investigator if he could send him a copy of the sexual assault 23 3 The respondents have not contested the authenticity of this or 24 any other item of evidence submitted by the petitioner.

25 4 Although neither party explains whether the investigator had worked on Reid’s case or in Sanft’s employ, the contents of the 26 letter suggest that Reid at least believed the investigator was either familiar with Reid’s case or familiar enough with Sanft to 27 be able to contact him. 1 exam and advise whether his appeal had been filed. Three weeks 2 later, on July 23, 2016, Reid sent a second letter to the trial 3 court. (ECF No. 17-5). In his letter, Reid again complained of an 4 inability to contact Sanft and asked the trial court for help. 5 (Id.) In each letter, Reid appears unaware his appeal had been 6 decided just a few months before. 7 There is no evidence that anyone – the investigator, Sanft or 8 the state court – responded in any fashion to Reid’s requests for 9 information. In addition, that Reid was unable to contact or obtain 10 any response from Sanft is corroborated by accounts from several 11 of his family members, including two who were also unable to reach 12 Sanft on Reid’s behalf during this time period. (ECF Nos. 49-1, 13 49-2, 49-4, 49-5 & 49-6). 14 Nearly a year after sending his last letter to the state 15 court, Reid moved to withdraw Sanft as counsel on July 17, 2017. 16 (Ex. 65). In his motion, Reid also asked the court to order Sanft 17 to turn over his case file. (Id.) On July 25, 2017, on the advice 18 of another inmate, Reid pulled a copy of his state court docket. 19 It was then, he claims, he finally learned that his appeal had 20 been decided. 21 “[I]f a petitioner’s attorney ‘fail[s] to satisfy 22 professional standards of care,’ and if the failure contributes to 23 the untimely filing of a federal petition, the petitioner may be 24 entitled to equitable tolling.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. An 25 attorney’s “[f]ailure to inform a client that his case has been 26 decided, particularly where that decision implicates the client’s 27 ability to bring further proceedings and the attorney has committed 1 himself to informing his client of such a development, constitutes 2 attorney abandonment” justifying equitable tolling. Gibbs v. 3 Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2014). 4 The uncontested evidence before the court is that Sanft, who 5 was acting as Reid’s attorney and was thus receiving notice of 6 court filings on Reid’s behalf, never advised Reid that his appeal 7 had concluded. Reid tried repeatedly to obtain initiate contact 8 with his counsel regarding his appeal with letters to counsel, an 9 investigator, and the trial court -- to no avail. The court 10 therefore concludes Sanft abandoned Reid. That, coupled with the 11 failure of any other person or entity to respond to Reid’s multiple 12 requests for information, was an extraordinary circumstance that 13 prevented the timely filing of Reid’s federal petition. 14 The court further concludes that Reid exercised reasonable 15 diligence before, during and after the extraordinary circumstance 16 prevented timely filing. Reid made several attempts to contact his 17 attorney through multiple avenues – phone calls, letters to 18 counsel, a letter to an investigator, and letters to the court. He 19 did not send just one letter, as respondents argue. After receiving 20 no responses during the seven-month period, Reid paused his efforts 21 to obtain information. However, after a year of silence, Reid moved 22 to have counsel withdrawn and his case file turned over and, on 23 advice of another inmate, ran his docket to discover his appeal 24 had been decided. Under the circumstances of this case, and similar 25 to other cases, it was not unreasonable for Reid to wait a year 26 before taking further actions to ascertain the status of his 27 appeal. See, e.g., Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1 2016). 2 Respondents argue that Sanft was not appointed to file a 3 postconviction petition for Reid, but that is beside the point. 4 Saft was responsible for alerting Reid that his appeal had been 5 decided and it was reasonable for Reid to wait for his direct 6 appeal to be decided before filing his state postconviction 7 petition, Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 2000) 8 (“If a defendant reasonably believes that his counsel is pursuing 9 his direct appeal he most naturally will not file his own post- 10 conviction relief petition. Indeed, a defendant could seriously 11 prejudice his case if he were to prepare and file a habeas petition 12 while his counsel was pursuing his direct appeal.”), and to wait 13 for his state petition to be filed before filing his federal 14 petition. Thus, it was Sanft’s failure to advise Reid of the status 15 of his appeal that precluded Reid from timely filing his federal 16 habeas petition. 17 Respondents also assert that the state courts’ factual 18 findings, made in connection with Reid’s untimely state petition, 19 are entitled to deference.5 In affirming the dismissal of Reid’s 20 state court postconviction petition, the Nevada Court of Appeals 21 made the following factual findings:

22 Reid did not allege that counsel affirmatively misrepresented the status of his appeal. Further, the 23 record before this court demonstrates Reid knew how to 24 5 The state courts’ legal findings are not entitled to deference 25 in this context. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010) (“Equitable tolling . . . asks whether federal courts may excuse 26 a petitioner’s failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state court’s interpretation of 27 state law.”). request information directly from both the district 1 court and the appellate court. Reid did not explain his delay in requesting that information. Based on these 2 facts, Reid failed to demonstrate cause for the delay. 3 (Ex. 94 at 2). First, the Court of Appeals made no finding that 4 Sanft did not abandon Reid. Second, unaddressed by the Court of 5 Appeals is the significance of the two letters Reid sent directly 6 to the trial court in which he sought assistance contacting his 7 attorney –- letters that also indicated that Reid was completely 8 unaware of, and concerned about, the status of his appeal. Nor did 9 the Court of Appeals address the absence of any evidence that the 10 trial court responded to these letters, either by sending Reid a 11 copy of the order denying his appeal or forwarding his letter to 12 his court-appointed attorney with a directive that he contact his 13 client. This is, in the court’s opinion, the most critical evidence 14 showing Reid exercised reasonable diligence. In sum, as this 15 court’s findings are not at odds with those made by the state 16 courts, the deference due their factual findings does not preclude 17 application of equitable tolling in this case. 18 Accordingly, as Reid has met both requirements for equitable 19 tolling, the original petition -- filed two weeks after the 20 expiration of the federal statute of limitations -- is deemed 21 timely filed. Having so decided, the next question is whether the 22 claims in the first amended petition may be considered timely 23 filed.6 24

25 6 The second amended petition presents the same claims as those in the first amended petition. Accordingly, if the first amended 26 petition is timely, the second amended petition – the operative petition in this case – is also timely. 27 1 Reid argues first that his first amended petition should be 2 subject to equitable tolling on the basis that counsel relied on 3 Ninth Circuit cases endorsing a stop-clock approach to equitable 4 tolling when deciding when to file the amended petition. Although 5 there is Ninth Circuit case law holding that equitable tolling may 6 be granted when a petitioner’s attorney reasonably relies on the 7 unsettled law in deciding when to file his petition, Williams v. 8 Filson, 908 F.3d 546, 559 (9th Cir. 2018), the court need not 9 decide whether this law applies in the context of this case. The 10 claims in the first amended petition may be deemed timely through 11 application of relation-back and other equitable tolling 12 principles. 13 The first amended petition asserts the following claims: (1) 14 Reid’s plea was not knowing and voluntary because (a) he made it 15 without first having seen the victim’s sexual assault examination 16 report and (b) his attorney grossly mischaracterized the 17 likelihood that he would receive probation if he pled; (2) trial 18 counsel was ineffective on the same facts alleged in Ground One; 19 and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective on the same facts as 20 Ground One. 21 In his original petition, in relevant part, Reid asserts that 22 trial counsel was ineffective because the sexual assault exam 23 report had been withheld but counsel nevertheless failed to request 24 a continuance of trial, which forced Reid into an unfavorable plea. 25 (ECF No. 6 at 5). The core of operative facts supporting this 26 ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that Reid entered his 27 plea without the benefit of the sexual assault examination report, 1 which are the same operative facts underlying his claims that his 2 plea was involuntary because it was made without the report, and 3 that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for the same 4 reason. See Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296–97 (9th Cir. 2013) 5 (holding that a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for 6 failing to raise double jeopardy related back to a timely raised 7 substantive double jeopardy claim), abrogated on other grounds by 8 Davila v. Davis, – U.S. –, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017). Accordingly, 9 those parts of Grounds One, Two and Three based on the sexual 10 assault examination report relate back to the original petition 11 and are timely. 12 The operative facts underlying Reid’s claims that counsel 13 ineffectively predicted that Reid would get probation, however, 14 are not to be found in the original petition. While Reid references 15 his motion to withdraw guilty plea, which in turn references (but 16 is not based on) counsel’s estimate that Reid would get probation, 17 this is insufficient for relation back purposes. First, the motion 18 to withdraw is not attached to the petition and is not therefore 19 considered part of the petition. Second, there is no attempt by 20 Reid to incorporate the contents of the motion to withdraw as part 21 of his petition. Accordingly, those parts of Grounds One, Two and 22 Three that rely on counsel’s estimation of the likelihood of 23 probation do not relate back to the original petition. 24 However, the court is persuaded by Reid’s alternative 25 argument that equitable tolling should apply through the filing of 26 his first amended petition for at least this claim on the grounds 27 of attorney abandonment and lack of a case file. Under some 1 circumstances, the lack of a case file might justify equitable 2 tolling, see Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th 3 Cir. 2009); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002), 4 if “the hardship caused by lack of access to [the] materials was 5 an extraordinary circumstance that caused” the untimely filing of 6 the federal petition. See Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. Counsel 7 argues, and the respondents do not dispute, that the transcripts 8 for Reid’s change of plea and sentencing were not available until 9 May 2018. The court is further persuaded that the probation claim 10 could not have been ascertained without first reviewing those 11 transcripts. As such, the court concludes that Reid’s claims based 12 on counsel’s advice about probation were not available until May 13 2018 and that counsel acted diligently in preparing and filing the 14 first amended petition asserting that claim less than three months 15 later. 16 In sum, the court concludes that, through application of 17 equitable tolling and relation back, the claims in the first 18 amended petition, and by extension the second amended petition, 19 are timely. 20 III. Procedural Default 21 The respondents argue that even if the petition is deemed 22 timely, all of Reid’s claims are procedurally defaulted. 23 A federal court cannot review a claim “if the Nevada Supreme 24 Court denied relief on the basis of ‘independent and adequate state 25 procedural grounds.’” Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th 26 Cir. 2003). In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that a 27 state prisoner who fails to comply with the state’s procedural 1 requirements in presenting his claims is barred from obtaining a 2 writ of habeas corpus in federal court by the adequate and 3 independent state ground doctrine. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 4 722, 731-32 (1991). A state procedural bar is “adequate” if it is 5 “clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of 6 the petitioner's purported default.” Calderon v. United States 7 District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A state 8 procedural bar is “independent” if the state court “explicitly 9 invokes the procedural rule as a separate basis for its decision.” 10 Yang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2003). A state 11 court’s decision is not “independent” if the application of the 12 state’s default rule depends on the consideration of federal law. 13 Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Reid’s state 15 postconviction petition on the grounds that it was untimely. The 16 Ninth Circuit has held that the Nevada Supreme Court’s application 17 of the timeliness rule in § 34.726(1) is an independent and 18 adequate state law ground for procedural default. Moran v. 19 McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268–70 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Valerio 20 v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 778 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Reid’s 21 claims are procedurally defaulted. 22 A procedural default may be excused only if “a constitutional 23 violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 24 actually innocent,” or if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the 25 default and prejudice resulting from it. Murray v. Carrier, 477 26 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 27 1 To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, the petitioner 2 must “show that some objective factor external to the defense 3 impeded” his efforts to comply with the state procedural rule. 4 Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. For cause to exist, the external 5 impediment must have prevented the petitioner from raising the 6 claim. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991). 7 With respect to the prejudice prong, the petitioner bears 8 “the burden of showing not merely that the errors [complained of] 9 constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to 10 his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire 11 [proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension.” White v. 12 Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. 13 Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). 14 Reid asserts that the abandonment of counsel discussed above 15 constitutes cause for the default of his claims. In Maples v. 16 Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 271, 289 (2012), the Supreme Court held that 17 abandonment by counsel at a critical time for the petitioner’s 18 state postconviction petition can constitute cause to excuse a 19 procedural default. As the court has already found, the evidence 20 before the court supports the conclusion that Reid was abandoned 21 by Sanft at a time critical to his state postconviction petition, 22 i.e., during the time period in which he could have filed a timely 23 state postconviction petition in order to properly exhaust his 24 federal claims. Sanft not only failed to advise Reid that his 25 appeal had been decided, he utterly failed to respond to multiple 26 attempts by Reid to contact him about the status of his case. This 27 amounted to abandonment in the circumstances of this case and 1 therefore constitutes cause for the procedural default of Reid’s 2 claims.7 3 Whether Reid has suffered prejudice as a result, however, is 4 a question that is inextricably intertwined with the merits of 5 Reid’s claims. The court will therefore defer a determination of 6 whether Reid has suffered prejudice until the time of merits 7 consideration. 8 IV. Conclusion 9 In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 10 that the respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36) is DENIED. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents shall file an answer 12 to the second amended petition within sixty days of the date of 13 this order. In filing the answer, respondents must comply with the 14 requirements of Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 15 in the United States District Courts and shall specifically cite 16 to and address the applicable state court written decision and 17 state court record materials, if any, regarding each claim within 18 the response as to that claim. 19 / 20 / 21 / 22 / 23

24 7 The respondents’ argument that the court must defer to the state courts’ finding that no cause existed for the untimely filing of 25 the state petition is without merit. “[T]he question whether a petitioner’s procedural default is excused by cause and prejudice 26 for purposes of federal habeas review is a federal, not state, question.” Visciotti v. Martel, 862 F.3d 749, 768 n.10 (9th Cir. 27 2016). 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Reid will have sixty days from 2 service of the answer within which to file a reply. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED this 22nd day of March, 2021. bball” D ft fMb> 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28