Reid Scofield, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae. Debbie D. Anderson, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae

973 F.2d 874
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 4, 1992
Docket91-3014
StatusPublished

This text of 973 F.2d 874 (Reid Scofield, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae. Debbie D. Anderson, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reid Scofield, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae. Debbie D. Anderson, Cross-Appellee v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., Cross-Appellant, National Cable Television Association, Inc. G. Ray Warner, Professor, Amici Curiae, 973 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1992).

Opinion

973 F.2d 874

Reid SCOFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
TELECABLE OF OVERLAND PARK, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
National Cable Television Association, Inc.; G. Ray Warner,
Professor, Amici Curiae.
Debbie D. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
TELECABLE OF OVERLAND PARK, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
National Cable Television Association, Inc.; G. Ray Warner,
Professor, Amici Curiae.

Nos. 91-3014 through 91-3017.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 26, 1992.
As Corrected Sept. 4, 1992.

Steven D. Treaster, Lenexa, Kan., for plaintiffs-appellants, cross-appellees.

Frances J. Chetwynd of Cole, Raywid & Braverman, Washington, D.C. (Paul Glist and Lynn S. Friedman, Cole, Raywid & Braverman, Washington, D.C., R. Kent Sullivan and James W. Howard, Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish, Overland Park, Kan., with her on the briefs), for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant.

Ronald L. Plesser, Emilio W. Cividanes, Mary E. Brobson, Piper & Marbury, Washington, D.C., and Brenda L. Fox and Loretta P. Polk, National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc., Washington, D.C., on the brief for amicus curiae, National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc.

G. Ray Warner, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief for amicus curiae, G. Ray Warner.

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to interpret the subscriber privacy notice provisions and the remedial provisions of section 631 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Act"), 47 U.S.C. § 551 ("section 551"). TeleCable of Overland Park, Inc. ("TeleCable") and the plaintiffs below, Reid Scofield and Debbie D. Anderson ("plaintiffs"), appeal from a district court order granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. See Scofield v. TeleCable of Overland Park, Inc., 751 F.Supp. 1499 (D.Kan.1990) ("Scofield "). The principal questions before us are whether two forms of subscriber privacy notices mailed by TeleCable in 1988 and 1989 violated the section 551(a) notice requirements, see 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1)(A)-(E), and if so, whether the district court properly awarded each plaintiff $1000 in liquidated damages for each violation, see 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A). We conclude that both notices, taken as a whole, satisfied the section 551(a) notice requirements. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of damages, and we reverse the district court's judgment.

I.

In their complaints, plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of two different forms of subscriber privacy notices (or "SPNs") that TeleCable sent them as required by section 551(a) of the Act.1 One form, the "pre-1989 SPN" received by plaintiffs in 1988, was issued by TeleCable from 1985 to 1988. See Appendix A to this opinion. A second revised form, the "1989 SPN," was issued by TeleCable and received by plaintiffs in 1989. See Appendix B to this opinion. Plaintiffs concede that TeleCable's alleged faulty notices have not caused them any actual harm. Nor would the full and complete disclosure demanded by plaintiffs reveal any practice that violates law or intrudes upon the plaintiffs' substantive privacy interests. Rather, plaintiffs look to the alleged violation of the notice provisions itself as the source of their injury--an injury that each seeks to remedy with a liquidated damages award of $73,000, the amount to which they claim the statute entitles them.

A. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Act to establish national policy and guidelines for the cable television industry. Section 551 of this Act establishes a self-contained and privately enforceable scheme for the protection of cable subscriber privacy. The section was included in the Act in response to Congress' observation that: "Cable systems, particularly those with a 'two-way' capability, have an enormous capacity to collect and store personally identifiable information about each cable subscriber." H.R.Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, pp. 4655, 4666. "Subscriber records from interactive systems," Congress noted, "can reveal details about bank transactions, shopping habits, political contributions, viewing habits and other significant personal decisions." Id.

Consequently, Section 551 regulates four types of cable company practices involving "personally identifiable information."2 Most importantly, it limits the cable company's ability to use its system to "peer in" on the cable viewer and collect personally identifiable information such as the subscriber's viewing habits or the nature of transactions made by the subscriber over the cable system, and it limits the types of third-party disclosure that can be made of information the cable company has collected. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(b), (c). Section 551 also requires that cable operators provide subscribers access to personally identifiable information collected and maintained by them, see 47 U.S.C. § 551(d), and it mandates that operators destroy personally identifiable information that is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected, see 47 U.S.C. § 551(e).

In addition, section 551(a) establishes a set of subscriber notice requirements designed to inform subscribers of (1) the operator's information practices that affect subscriber privacy, (2) the subscriber's rights to limit the collection and disclosure of information, (3) the operator's legal duties, and (4) the subscriber's right to enforce those duties. These requirements do not themselves create a class of protected privacy interests. That is, subscribers have no privacy interest in receiving a notice itself. Nor can one infer from the failure to provide a privacy notice that an operator's practices in any way intrude upon subscriber privacy. Instead, the notice requirements provide "procedural safeguards to consumers for the protection of their privacy interests." H.R.Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1984) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp. 4655, 4714.B. TELECABLE'S INFORMATION PRACTICES

1. Collection of Personally Identifiable Information.

It is undisputed that TeleCable's system is a non-interactive "one-way" system. As opposed to "two-way" systems, TeleCable's system is capable only of transmitting television signals into subscriber homes. Subscribers cannot send messages over the system. TeleCable cannot receive or collect signals from subscribers or monitor how often a subscriber tunes into the system. Therefore, TeleCable cannot "use the cable system to collect personally identifiable information" concerning its subscribers, and the limits found in section 551(b) on the collection of personally identifiable information are inapposite.3 See 47 U.S.C. § 551(b).

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