Reid James Hering v. Waukesha County, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 24, 2026
Docket2:26-cv-00014
StatusUnknown

This text of Reid James Hering v. Waukesha County, et al. (Reid James Hering v. Waukesha County, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reid James Hering v. Waukesha County, et al., (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ REID JAMES HERING,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 26-cv-14-pp

WAUKESHA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Reid James Hering, who is incarcerated at Stanley Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 26, 2026, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $23.33. Dkt. No. 6. The court received that fee on February 10, 2026. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff sues Waukesha County, the City of Waukesha Police Department, Sheriff Thompson and John/Jane Doe police officers. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. He alleges that at 1:30 a.m. on December 4, 2024, in Waukesha, Wisconsin, he was the passenger of a rental vehicle driven by his fiancée, Jamie Burkeen. Id. at 7. Burkeen allegedly struck a mailbox, then drove about

one block to a secondary road to assess the damage and contact the rental company. Id. The plaintiff states that soon after, a Doe police officer arrived, at which time Berkeen “freely admitted to being the sober and legal operator of the vehicle, to accidentally striking the damaged mailbox and then pulling off the main thoroughfare[.]” Id. at 7-8. The plaintiff alleges that through asking standard questions, the Doe officer learned that the plaintiff had a criminal record and was on state

supervision. Id. at 8. The plaintiff states that he was ordered out of the vehicle and detained for about an hour on the side of the road in freezing temperatures, for no cause. Id. He states that he was unlawfully detained, harassed and discriminated against solely because of his criminal record. Id. at 9. The plaintiff alleges that he was not read his rights or taken into custody but says that while detained, he was “threatened/coerced and intimidated by police brutality and presence, which repeatedly made it clear [he] he was at no point free to leave.” Id. The plaintiff asserts that the vehicle was searched without

seeking permission from Burkeen. Id. He says that despite there being no indication of any wrongdoing, he was subject to extreme levels of humiliation and excessive and extreme interrogation, on the side of the road, in a residential neighborhood, at 3:00 in the morning, handcuffed on the side of the road, in <30° temperature, on the curb, for approx. 1-2 hours, by 3-4 Waukesha PD vehicles with full lights (strobes/spot/and flashers) active culminating in [his] being ordered, with threat of immediate use of force to strip off [his] shoes, socks and overshirt so on-scene PD could examine [his] arms and between [his] toes to [] ‘look for track marks[.]’

Id. at 10. The plaintiff states that he was not issued a ticket, citation or warning. Id.

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Reid James Hering v. Waukesha County, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reid-james-hering-v-waukesha-county-et-al-wied-2026.