Baldwin, Judge.
This matter comes before the court on motions to dismiss by appellee, Ferro Corporation (“Ferro”), and appellee, the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”).
These motions urge that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this [154]*154appeal. The appeal is from the Commission’s refusal to review the Administrative Law Judge’s order that certain evidentiary matters in Investigation 337-TA-41 are to remain confidential under -a protective order, i.e., denying appellant’s Motion to Declassify. The investigation itself was terminated upon statutory disclaimer of all patent claims in suit by Ferro, the complainant below. The complaint instigating the action before the ITC alleged, inter alia, that certain imported articles infringed a valid U.S. patent owned by Ferro.
Proceedings Below
On the basis of a complaint filed by Ferro pursuant to 19 USC 1337,1 the ITC instituted, on February 3, 1978, an investigation of alleged unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation into or sale in the United States of certain ceramic the setters. [155]*155Tile setters are relatively simple box-shaped devices used to support flat ceramic tiles during firing in a kiln. The Commission’s Notice of Investigation 2 stated that an investigation was being instituted to determine wbetber there was a violation of § 1337 in the unauthorized importation of certain ceramic tile setters into the United States, or in their subsequent sale, by reason of:
(1) the alleged coverage of such tile setters by claims 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of U.S. Letters Patent 3,169, 295,
(2) the alleged unfair use of complainant Ferro’s trade secrets and know-how,
(3) the alleged charging of discriminatory and/or unfairly low prices for such tile setters with the intent to destroy or injure competition,
(4) an alleged conspiracy to charge discriminatory and/or unfairly low prices for such tile setters,
(5) an alleged attempt and intent to monopolize the U.S. market for such tile setters, and
(6) an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the U.S. market for such tile setters.
The effect or tendency of which unfair acts or methods of competition was to destroy or substantially injure an efficiently and economically operated U.S. industry or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.
On May 23, 1978, the Administrative Law Judge, in an Order for Prehearing Statements, directed the parties to submit statements of the issues to be considered at the hearing. Any contentions not set forth in detail were to be deemed abandoned, uncontroverted or withdrawn. Ferro’s prehearing statement omitted any reference to the alleged anticompetitive acts (2) through (6), thus effectively removing those alleged acts from consideration.
Thereafter on June 15, 1978, Ferro filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) a disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 2533 disclaiming claims 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the patent in question.4 Patent infringement was therefore removed as an issue in the investigation.
[156]*156Accordingly, on September 11, 1978, tbe Commission terminated its investigation based on a finding that none of the six unfair acts or unfair methods of competition found in the notice of investigation remained to be adjudicated.
However, about a month prior to the termination of the investigation, Refractarios Monterrey, S.A. (appellant here, respondent below) and its con-respondent, Dallas Ceramic Tile Co., filed a motion with the presiding Commission Administrative Law Judge seeking the declassification of certain depositions and related exhibits. During the discovery period, these materials had been classified as confidential commercial information subject to a protective order.5 After agreement between the parties that some material would be declassified, appellant filed a motion seeking the declassification of additional documents.
On September 27, 1978 (after the termination of the investigation), the Administrative Law Judge issued an order denying appellant’s motion to declassify. On October 6, 1978, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied on January 12, 1979. Appellant then filed, with the Commission’s Secretary, a paper denominated “Appeal of Order of Presiding Officer Denying Motion to Declassify.” The Commission informed appellant of its decision “not to review the presiding officer’s order * * * denying [the] motion to declassify” on March 6, 1979. This letter additionally took note of appellant’s right to seek release of the materials in dispute under the Freedom of Information Act. On March 23, 1979, appellant filed a “Petition for Reconsideration” of the Commission’s decision not to review the Administrative Law Judge’s order. The Commission again declined to review the order. The appeal to this court was filed on May 10, 1979, and seeks only review of the Commission’s refusal to review the order denying declassification. No review is sought of the Commission’s order terminating the investigation.
Ferro’s Motion to Dismiss
Ferro mounts a two-pronged argument in its Motion. First, Ferro observes that § 1337(c) provides that any person adversely effected by a final determination of the Commission under § 1337(d) or (e), may appeal such a determination to this court.
Inasmuch as the Commission did not make a determination, as a result of an investigation, that there has, or has not, been a violation and the imported article should, or should not, be, excluded from entry [157]*157into the United States (§ 1337(d)) and since the Commission did not make a determination that certain articles may be entitled to entry under a bond (§ 1337(e)), Ferro contends that appellant is without standing to bring the appeal and this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.6
Ferro additionally argues that even if appellant had a right to an appellate review in this court, it nonetheless failed to file a notice of appeal within the allotted time period. Under the rules of this court,7 Eule 4 of the Federal Eules of Appellate Procedure8 provides sixty days in which to file a notice of appeal and such time is to be computed from the time of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Ferro maintains that such “time of entry” occurred upon the occasion of the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of the appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying the earlier motion to declassify rather than the subsequent denials by the whole Commission.
ITC’s Motion To Dismiss
The ITC also filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal. It notes that Congress has specifically provided for appellate review under §1337 (c) only of “final determinations” under subsections (d) and (e) and impliedly under subsection (f).9
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Baldwin, Judge.
This matter comes before the court on motions to dismiss by appellee, Ferro Corporation (“Ferro”), and appellee, the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”).
These motions urge that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this [154]*154appeal. The appeal is from the Commission’s refusal to review the Administrative Law Judge’s order that certain evidentiary matters in Investigation 337-TA-41 are to remain confidential under -a protective order, i.e., denying appellant’s Motion to Declassify. The investigation itself was terminated upon statutory disclaimer of all patent claims in suit by Ferro, the complainant below. The complaint instigating the action before the ITC alleged, inter alia, that certain imported articles infringed a valid U.S. patent owned by Ferro.
Proceedings Below
On the basis of a complaint filed by Ferro pursuant to 19 USC 1337,1 the ITC instituted, on February 3, 1978, an investigation of alleged unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation into or sale in the United States of certain ceramic the setters. [155]*155Tile setters are relatively simple box-shaped devices used to support flat ceramic tiles during firing in a kiln. The Commission’s Notice of Investigation 2 stated that an investigation was being instituted to determine wbetber there was a violation of § 1337 in the unauthorized importation of certain ceramic tile setters into the United States, or in their subsequent sale, by reason of:
(1) the alleged coverage of such tile setters by claims 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of U.S. Letters Patent 3,169, 295,
(2) the alleged unfair use of complainant Ferro’s trade secrets and know-how,
(3) the alleged charging of discriminatory and/or unfairly low prices for such tile setters with the intent to destroy or injure competition,
(4) an alleged conspiracy to charge discriminatory and/or unfairly low prices for such tile setters,
(5) an alleged attempt and intent to monopolize the U.S. market for such tile setters, and
(6) an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the U.S. market for such tile setters.
The effect or tendency of which unfair acts or methods of competition was to destroy or substantially injure an efficiently and economically operated U.S. industry or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.
On May 23, 1978, the Administrative Law Judge, in an Order for Prehearing Statements, directed the parties to submit statements of the issues to be considered at the hearing. Any contentions not set forth in detail were to be deemed abandoned, uncontroverted or withdrawn. Ferro’s prehearing statement omitted any reference to the alleged anticompetitive acts (2) through (6), thus effectively removing those alleged acts from consideration.
Thereafter on June 15, 1978, Ferro filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) a disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 2533 disclaiming claims 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the patent in question.4 Patent infringement was therefore removed as an issue in the investigation.
[156]*156Accordingly, on September 11, 1978, tbe Commission terminated its investigation based on a finding that none of the six unfair acts or unfair methods of competition found in the notice of investigation remained to be adjudicated.
However, about a month prior to the termination of the investigation, Refractarios Monterrey, S.A. (appellant here, respondent below) and its con-respondent, Dallas Ceramic Tile Co., filed a motion with the presiding Commission Administrative Law Judge seeking the declassification of certain depositions and related exhibits. During the discovery period, these materials had been classified as confidential commercial information subject to a protective order.5 After agreement between the parties that some material would be declassified, appellant filed a motion seeking the declassification of additional documents.
On September 27, 1978 (after the termination of the investigation), the Administrative Law Judge issued an order denying appellant’s motion to declassify. On October 6, 1978, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied on January 12, 1979. Appellant then filed, with the Commission’s Secretary, a paper denominated “Appeal of Order of Presiding Officer Denying Motion to Declassify.” The Commission informed appellant of its decision “not to review the presiding officer’s order * * * denying [the] motion to declassify” on March 6, 1979. This letter additionally took note of appellant’s right to seek release of the materials in dispute under the Freedom of Information Act. On March 23, 1979, appellant filed a “Petition for Reconsideration” of the Commission’s decision not to review the Administrative Law Judge’s order. The Commission again declined to review the order. The appeal to this court was filed on May 10, 1979, and seeks only review of the Commission’s refusal to review the order denying declassification. No review is sought of the Commission’s order terminating the investigation.
Ferro’s Motion to Dismiss
Ferro mounts a two-pronged argument in its Motion. First, Ferro observes that § 1337(c) provides that any person adversely effected by a final determination of the Commission under § 1337(d) or (e), may appeal such a determination to this court.
Inasmuch as the Commission did not make a determination, as a result of an investigation, that there has, or has not, been a violation and the imported article should, or should not, be, excluded from entry [157]*157into the United States (§ 1337(d)) and since the Commission did not make a determination that certain articles may be entitled to entry under a bond (§ 1337(e)), Ferro contends that appellant is without standing to bring the appeal and this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.6
Ferro additionally argues that even if appellant had a right to an appellate review in this court, it nonetheless failed to file a notice of appeal within the allotted time period. Under the rules of this court,7 Eule 4 of the Federal Eules of Appellate Procedure8 provides sixty days in which to file a notice of appeal and such time is to be computed from the time of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Ferro maintains that such “time of entry” occurred upon the occasion of the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of the appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying the earlier motion to declassify rather than the subsequent denials by the whole Commission.
ITC’s Motion To Dismiss
The ITC also filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal. It notes that Congress has specifically provided for appellate review under §1337 (c) only of “final determinations” under subsections (d) and (e) and impliedly under subsection (f).9 Accordingly, it is argued, this court does not review “disputes of a collateral or exterlocutory nature.” 10
The ITC asserts that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) similarly does not confer jurisdiction on this court over the issue in controversy in that §1337(c) incorporates only subchapter II, chapter 5, title 5 of the United States Code. That subchapter concerns only [158]*158procedures internal to an agency. The judicial review provisions of the APA are contained in another non-included chapter, namely, chapter 7. In any event, the ITC argues that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that “the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action” in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977), so that even if this court had jurisdiction under the APA to hear an appeal regarding the final determination, it would not necessarily have the authority to hear petitions on interlocutory matters or other matters unrelated to that final determination absent a separate statutory grant.
The Commission maintains that the proper method of attaining Commission review of the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of ap-pellent’s declassification petition is under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552 and the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the Commission (19 CFR 201 et seg.). It notes that appellant’s request will be granted if the documents it seeks are not business confidential information within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4).11
appellant’s arguments
Appellant contends that the notice of appeal was timely filed in this matter. It is said that the 60 day period for appeal begins only after pursuit of all administrative remedies available to the appellant have been exhausted. Appellant argues that the Commission’s rules (19 CFR 210.56-60) provide for an appeal to the full Commission from the denial by the Administrative Law Judge to declassify the documents in issue.12
Appellant then reasons that the appeal need be filed only after the final refusal by the whole Commission to review the holding of the Administrative Law Judge.
Appellant additionally contends that §1337(c), by incorporating sub-chapter II of chapter 5 of the APA, allows a review under the APA of the hearing and the record by this court. Therefore, it is argued, since the APA provides that any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action * * * is entitled to judicial relief thereof,” this court is to grant such relief.13
[159]*159Lastly, appellant argues that the FOIA is not appropriate in this case since the Protective Order itself (paragraph 13) 14 provided for an appeal from any ruling of the Commission.
OPINION
Section 1337(c) does not provide this court with the authority to review rulings and determinations of the ITC under the APA (see footnote 13, supra). Section 1337(c) does, however, grant this court the statutory authority to review “final determination(s)” made under § 1337(d), (e), and (f),15 and other associated matters necessary for the proper consideration of those “final determinations.”16
Without expressing any opinion on other points raised, this case may be disposed of on the basis of but a single question: Whether or not the matter in this appeal, i.e., the Commission’s action concerning the Administrative Law Judge’s refusal to declassify, is now or ever will be related to a “final determination” under the pertinent statute.
We note that the ITC terminated the investigation and dismissed the case against appellant — actions not challenged by appellant. It seems apparent that there is no “final determination” in this case within the meaning of the statute, nor will there ever be. The Commission will not, in this case, now direct that the tile setters be ex-[160]*160eluded or not excluded from entry into the United States. The Commission dismissed the action.
The keystone of our subject-matter jurisdiction in this case is simply missing. Without a “final determination,” or even the possibility of one ever existing, this court is without authority to review the matters in question.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.17
Dismissed.