Reeder Associates II v. Chicago Belle, Ltd.

807 N.E.2d 752, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 791, 2004 WL 914585
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 30, 2004
Docket45A03-0311-CV-473
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 807 N.E.2d 752 (Reeder Associates II v. Chicago Belle, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reeder Associates II v. Chicago Belle, Ltd., 807 N.E.2d 752, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 791, 2004 WL 914585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-Plaintiff Reeder Associates II ("Purchaser") appeals the trial court's *753 grant of attorney fees to Appellee-Defen-dant Chicago Belle, Ltd., an IIlinois Corporation, ("Owner"). 1 We reverse. -

Issue

Purchaser raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees in the amount of $49,348.76 to Owner pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-18.

Facts and Procedural History 2

On February 13, 1999, as a result of Owner's nonpayment of property taxes, the Lake County Commissioners ("Commissioners") obtained a tax lien on the property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-24-6. 3 Reeder Assoc. II v. Chicago Belle, Litd., TiS N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct. App.2002), trans. denied ("Reeder II"). On February 17, 1999, the Commissioners transferred the property to Purchaser for $8,500.00 by way of a Commissioner's quitclaim deed.

Subsequently, in August of 2000, Ownér "became aware of the tax sale proceeding and made attempts to redeem the property." Id. at 881. On September 22, 2000, Owner filed a motion to vacate the issuance of the tax deed in a separate cause of action. 4 In a letter to Purchaser, also dated September 22, 2000, Owner made the following proposition:

Enelosed you will find a copy of a Motion, filed this date, requesting that your tax deed to the property involved be voided.
If you agree with our position (which it seems to me is indefensible) perhaps you are prepared to voluntarily transfer ree-ord title to [Owner] (or agree to the entry of judgment to that effect) in consideration of the payment of any and all sums required to be paid by statute. If so, please contact me immediately so that the same can be accomplished and further expensive litigation avoided.

Appellant's App. at 180.

On October 5, 2000, Purchaser filed a separate action to quiet title. These actions were eventually consolidated, and Owner filed a counterclaim against Purchaser seeking to quiet title in its favor and also requesting attorney fees and costs. On June 7, 2001, Owner tendered to Purchaser a check in the amount of $20,199.92, representing: (1) the purchase price of $8,500.00 and 10% interest there *754 on; (2) 1998 property taxes and 10% interest thereon; (8) 1999 property taxes and 10% interest thereon; and (4) 2000 property taxes and 10% interest thereon.

On August 8, 2001, Owner filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 6, 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment to Owner, thereby, voiding Purchaser's quitclaim deed and quieting title to the property in favor of Owner. Essentially, the trial court concluded that the statutory notices provided to Owner were defective. The trial court also set a hearing concerning Owner's request for attorney fees.

Purchaser appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Owner, arguing, first, that the tax sale notices-which were sent to Owner-were adequate and, second, that the trial court erred by setting a hearing on Owner's request for attorney fees. Reeder II, 778 N.E.2d at 830. After determining that the statutory notices were inadequate, another panel of this court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment to Owner, as well as the trial court's action of scheduling a hearing on Owner's request for attorney fees. Id. at 834-85. The Reeder II court also held that because the issue of attorney fees and costs was still pending in the trial court, such issue was not ripe for appellate review. Id. at 885.

On August 20, 2008, after conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Purchaser to pay attorney fees and costs to Owner in the amount of $49,848.76. Purchaser filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. This appeal by Purchaser ensued.

Discussion and Decision

On appeal, Purchaser argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to Owner pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-13. 5 The general rule in Indiana is that each party to litigation must pay his or her own attorney fees. Morgan County v. Ferguson, 712 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). However, an award of attorney fees may be authorized by contract, rule, statute, or agreement. Id. Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-13, which permits an award of attorney fees, provides that:

(a) When the grantee of an ineffectual tax deed, or his successors or assigns, receives payment for the amount which he is entitled to receive under section 12(c) [6] of this *755 chapter, he shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver a deed releasing the lien on the real property which he has acquired under section 12(a) of this chapter. The grantee shall execute and deliver the deed to the person who makes the payment.
(b) If the grantee, or his successors or assigns, fails to execute, acknowledge, or deliver a deed as required by this section, the person who makes the payment may initiate an action to quiet title to the real property. When the payor initiates such an action, the grantee, his successors or assigns, is liable for the court cost and the payor's reasonable attorney fees which result from the action.

Thus, here, the propriety of the trial court's award turns on the interpretation of a statute, ie., Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-18. The interpretation of a statute by a trial court is a question of law to which this court owes no deference. Id.

In the present case, Purchaser appears to argue that the trial court erroneously granted Owner's request for attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-13 because the statute does not apply to property acquired by a county under Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-24-6(a). We disagree with this premise but determine that Owner failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites necessary to recover attorney fees. In so concluding, we are required to analyze several related Indiana Code sections. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. In re Visitation of J.P.H., 709 N.E2d 44, 46 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Moreover, we will reject an interpretation of a statute that produces an absurd result. Id.

At the outset of our analysis, we observe that if an owner of real estate fails to pay the property taxes, the property may be sold in an effort to satisfy the tax obligation. Reeder II, TIS N.E.2d at 831.

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Related

Cochran v. State
859 N.E.2d 727 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)
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858 N.E.2d 199 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
807 N.E.2d 752, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 791, 2004 WL 914585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reeder-associates-ii-v-chicago-belle-ltd-indctapp-2004.