Reed v. Trinidad Area Hospital Association

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: August 8, 2024
• Docket: 23-1266
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 23-1266 Document: 010111091910 Date Filed: 08/08/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

August 8, 2024 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ________________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court NORMAN RAY REED, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 23-1266 (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-03045-MDB) TRINIDAD AREA HOSPITAL (D. Colo.) ASSOCIATION, a Colorado non- profit corporation d/b/a Mt. San Rafael Hospital; SPANISH PEAKS NEW ALTERNATIVES, INC., a Colorado non-profit corporation d/b/a Health Solutions Medical Center; INNOVA EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., a Colorado professional corporation,

Defendants - Appellees. ___________________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * ___________________________________

Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

This appeal involves the district court’s dismissal of a discrimination

claim. The plaintiff, Mr. Norman Ray Reed, argues that the district court

* This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 23-1266 Document: 010111091910 Date Filed: 08/08/2024 Page: 2

applied the wrong test. But Mr. Reed didn’t make this argument in district

court.

1. Mr. Reed sues under the Affordable Care Act, and the district court dismisses the suit.

In district court, Mr. Reed sued three health-care providers under the

Affordable Care Act, claiming that they had discriminated against him by

denying mental-health services based on a disability. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 18116. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit. In the motion, the

defendants invoked a four-part test that had been used for claims under the

Rehabilitation Act. Under that test, Mr. Reed had to show:

1. He was disabled.

2. He was “otherwise qualified” for the desired services.

3. The defendants denied the services to him solely because of his disability.

4. The program received federal financial assistance.

See Cline v. Clinical Perfusion Sys., Inc., 92 F.4th 926, 931–32 (10th Cir.

2024) (applying the Rehabilitation Act’s four-part test to a discrimination

claim brought under the Affordable Care Act). Based on this test, the

defendants argued that Mr. Reed hadn’t alleged facts showing that he was

“otherwise qualified” for the mental-health services. The district court

agreed and dismissed the suit.

2 Appellate Case: 23-1266 Document: 010111091910 Date Filed: 08/08/2024 Page: 3

2. Mr. Reed didn’t preserve his argument that the district court had applied the wrong test.

On appeal, Mr. Reed argued that the district court

 erred by applying the Rehabilitation Act’s “otherwise qualified” test and

 should have applied a different test for causation (because of).

But Mr. Reed hadn’t raised these arguments in district court. 1

When the defendants pointed out that the appellate arguments were

new, Mr. Reed responded that the district court had used the phrases

because of and but for. But the court had used these phrases when applying

the Rehabilitation Act’s requirement that the plaintiff be “otherwise

qualified.” See, e.g., Appellant’s App’x at 149 (stating that in district

court, Mr. Reed argued that the defendants’ actions had “deprived him of a

mental health service that, but for his mental health disability, he was

‘otherwise qualified’ to receive”), 151 (stating that dismissal was

appropriate because Mr. Reed had not pointed to allegations showing that

he was “otherwise qualified”).

Because the arguments were new, we would ordinarily apply the

plain-error standard. United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036, 1044 (10th

1 In responding to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Reed said only that he had satisfied the Rehabilitation Act’s “otherwise qualified” test.

3 Appellate Case: 23-1266 Document: 010111091910 Date Filed: 08/08/2024 Page: 4

Cir. 2024). But Mr. Reed hasn’t made an argument for plain error. So we

decline to consider these arguments. Id.

3. Mr. Reed doesn’t otherwise challenge the district court’s reasoning.

Because we can’t consider Mr. Reed’s arguments for a different

discrimination test, we can assume that the Rehabilitation Act’s “otherwise

qualified” test applied. Mr. Reed doesn’t explain how the district court

erred in applying the test. So we lack any basis to disturb the ruling that

Mr. Reed hadn’t been “otherwise qualified” for the desired mental-health

services. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1368–70

(10th Cir. 2015) (stating that we can’t reverse when the appellant hasn’t

explained what was wrong with the district court’s decision). We thus

affirm the district court’s dismissal.

* * *

Mr. Reed didn’t ask the district court to apply a different test, and he

hasn’t requested review for plain error or presented another reason to

question the ruling. We thus affirm the dismissal.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge