OPINION
DUNCAN, Judge.
In the first phase of a bifurcated proceeding, the appellant-defendant, Lula Mae Reed, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of shoplifting. In the second phase, the jury found her to be guilty of shoplifting, as a third offender, and imposed as enhanced punishment a penitentiary sentence of not less than one year nor more than two and one-half years.
In this appeal, the defendant complains about the admission into evidence of an eight-track stereo tape, the alleged insufficiency of the evidence, and the attorney general’s argument. We find merit to the defendant’s complaint about the proof in this case insofar as it pertains to that part of the indictment which charged her with having been previously convicted of shoplifting offenses.
This prosecution arose out of the taking by the defendant of an eight-track stereo tape from a Kroger store. The evidence clearly shows that the defendant is guilty of the present offense of shoplifting, and [147]*147she does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the present offense.
The defendant’s first assignment of error concerns the introduction into evidence of the stereo tape, and alleges that there was a faulty chain of custody. David Jones, co-manager of the Kroger Store, brought the tape to the trial and testified that he had kept the tape in his desk drawer from the date of the incident until he brought it to court. He identified the tape as the one stolen by the defendant. There was no defect in the chain of custody. Also, with the evidence showing that the tape was not in possession of or under the control of the State’s attorney or any law enforcement officer, the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the discovery provisions of T.C.A. § 40-2044. The tape was properly admitted into evidence.
Next, the defendant argues that the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty with respect to the second part of the indictment, insisting that the proof was insufficient to show her guilt of the prior shoplifting offenses alleged, and that there were variances between the indictment allegations and the proof. We find merit to this contention.
The second part of the indictment alleged that at the time of the current offense (May 8, 1977), the defendant had been previously convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of three shoplifting offenses, to-wit:
We find that the proof in this case is totally lacking to establish these prior convictions as alleged in the indictment. For some reason not apparent in the record, the State did not offer to prove these alleged prior convictions by introducing the minutes of the court. Rather, the State embarked on a protracted and confusing course seeking to establish its case by having a deputy clerk of the court to testify from information contained on or in the court’s “yellow jackets” concerning these prior cases.
The State filed as exhibits copies of the entries made on these jackets in an attempt to prove the alleged prior convictions. We find them woefully inadequate for the purposes intended. For example, the jacket entry concerning the first alleged prior offense (Indictment No. 11932) shows no judgment of conviction. There is a handwritten entry, apparently made by the foreman 1 of the jury stating:
“We the jury find Lula Mae Reed guilty of shoplifting as conformed with the indictment and fix her punishment at $50.00 fine.”
There is nothing signed or approved by the trial judge and no indication that the trial judge ever approved or entered any judgment on this jury verdict. Further, the indictment had alleged that this former conviction had occurred on March 29, 1969. There is no date showing when the jury verdict was entered. According to the deputy clerk’s testimony, he could not determine from the jacket the date of the disposition of this offense but stated that the last court appearance marked on the jacket was March 28, 1969.
Regarding the second alleged prior offense (Indictment No. B-27672), the State attempted a similar approach to prove that conviction. There is an entry on that jacket, ostensibly signed by the trial judge, as follows:
“As to Lula Mae Reed, plea of guilty to shoplifting, as charged in the indictment, [148]*148the court finds the defendant guilty and fix her punishment at confinement for thirty (30) days in the Shelby County Jail.”
This entry is dated June 17, 1971, and the jacket indicates that the proceedings occurred in Division I of the court. The present indictment alleges that this prior conviction occurred on July 6, 1971, in Division III of the court.
Because of these variances between the indictment allegations and the proof, the trial judge did not submit this alleged prior conviction to the jury.
Regarding the third and last alleged prior conviction (Indictment No. B-37701), the jacket contains the following entry:
“On a plea of guilty by the defendant to shoplifting as charged in the indictment, punishment is fixed at confinement for four (4) months in the Shelby County Jail.”
The name “William H. Williams” is written under this entry, which we assume is the trial judge’s signature. Even if it is his signature, this entry cannot be afforded the dignity of a final judgment. Moreover, this entry also carries with it no date of disposition. The State attempts to establish this conviction date as December 7, 1973, because that is the last date in order that appears elsewhere on the jacket. Even if this 1973 date could be accepted, we hasten to point out that the indictment alleged that this third prior conviction had occurred on December 7, 1976, three years later.
The State attempted to bolster its case by introducing copies of the original indictments, which listed the dates of the occurrences of the alleged prior offenses. But these indictments cannot be used in any manner to show the dates and final judgments of the alleged prior convictions. Further, they cannot serve as a vehicle to cure the variances that exist between the allegations in the current indictment and the proof as introduced.
Further, the testimony of Sgt. Jerry McElrath, fingerprint expert for the Memphis Police Department, cannot aid the State’s case here.
In an effort to establish the defendant’s identity, the State offered Sgt. McEl-rath and his records to show that this defendant had been arrested for shoplifting on certain dates, ostensibly the same dates as those alleged in the original indictments concerning the prior offenses.2 This officer’s testimony is in the same posture as the original indictments in the prior cases; neither his testimony nor the indictments can properly or validly establish any dates of convictions, or that final judgments were rendered in the cases in question.
The trial court recognized that the State’s proof left much to be desired. At one point, the court stated:
“Let me say this. I don’t know of any way that you can prove officially what happened in a criminal court other than through the minutes of that court.”
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OPINION
DUNCAN, Judge.
In the first phase of a bifurcated proceeding, the appellant-defendant, Lula Mae Reed, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of shoplifting. In the second phase, the jury found her to be guilty of shoplifting, as a third offender, and imposed as enhanced punishment a penitentiary sentence of not less than one year nor more than two and one-half years.
In this appeal, the defendant complains about the admission into evidence of an eight-track stereo tape, the alleged insufficiency of the evidence, and the attorney general’s argument. We find merit to the defendant’s complaint about the proof in this case insofar as it pertains to that part of the indictment which charged her with having been previously convicted of shoplifting offenses.
This prosecution arose out of the taking by the defendant of an eight-track stereo tape from a Kroger store. The evidence clearly shows that the defendant is guilty of the present offense of shoplifting, and [147]*147she does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the present offense.
The defendant’s first assignment of error concerns the introduction into evidence of the stereo tape, and alleges that there was a faulty chain of custody. David Jones, co-manager of the Kroger Store, brought the tape to the trial and testified that he had kept the tape in his desk drawer from the date of the incident until he brought it to court. He identified the tape as the one stolen by the defendant. There was no defect in the chain of custody. Also, with the evidence showing that the tape was not in possession of or under the control of the State’s attorney or any law enforcement officer, the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the discovery provisions of T.C.A. § 40-2044. The tape was properly admitted into evidence.
Next, the defendant argues that the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty with respect to the second part of the indictment, insisting that the proof was insufficient to show her guilt of the prior shoplifting offenses alleged, and that there were variances between the indictment allegations and the proof. We find merit to this contention.
The second part of the indictment alleged that at the time of the current offense (May 8, 1977), the defendant had been previously convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of three shoplifting offenses, to-wit:
We find that the proof in this case is totally lacking to establish these prior convictions as alleged in the indictment. For some reason not apparent in the record, the State did not offer to prove these alleged prior convictions by introducing the minutes of the court. Rather, the State embarked on a protracted and confusing course seeking to establish its case by having a deputy clerk of the court to testify from information contained on or in the court’s “yellow jackets” concerning these prior cases.
The State filed as exhibits copies of the entries made on these jackets in an attempt to prove the alleged prior convictions. We find them woefully inadequate for the purposes intended. For example, the jacket entry concerning the first alleged prior offense (Indictment No. 11932) shows no judgment of conviction. There is a handwritten entry, apparently made by the foreman 1 of the jury stating:
“We the jury find Lula Mae Reed guilty of shoplifting as conformed with the indictment and fix her punishment at $50.00 fine.”
There is nothing signed or approved by the trial judge and no indication that the trial judge ever approved or entered any judgment on this jury verdict. Further, the indictment had alleged that this former conviction had occurred on March 29, 1969. There is no date showing when the jury verdict was entered. According to the deputy clerk’s testimony, he could not determine from the jacket the date of the disposition of this offense but stated that the last court appearance marked on the jacket was March 28, 1969.
Regarding the second alleged prior offense (Indictment No. B-27672), the State attempted a similar approach to prove that conviction. There is an entry on that jacket, ostensibly signed by the trial judge, as follows:
“As to Lula Mae Reed, plea of guilty to shoplifting, as charged in the indictment, [148]*148the court finds the defendant guilty and fix her punishment at confinement for thirty (30) days in the Shelby County Jail.”
This entry is dated June 17, 1971, and the jacket indicates that the proceedings occurred in Division I of the court. The present indictment alleges that this prior conviction occurred on July 6, 1971, in Division III of the court.
Because of these variances between the indictment allegations and the proof, the trial judge did not submit this alleged prior conviction to the jury.
Regarding the third and last alleged prior conviction (Indictment No. B-37701), the jacket contains the following entry:
“On a plea of guilty by the defendant to shoplifting as charged in the indictment, punishment is fixed at confinement for four (4) months in the Shelby County Jail.”
The name “William H. Williams” is written under this entry, which we assume is the trial judge’s signature. Even if it is his signature, this entry cannot be afforded the dignity of a final judgment. Moreover, this entry also carries with it no date of disposition. The State attempts to establish this conviction date as December 7, 1973, because that is the last date in order that appears elsewhere on the jacket. Even if this 1973 date could be accepted, we hasten to point out that the indictment alleged that this third prior conviction had occurred on December 7, 1976, three years later.
The State attempted to bolster its case by introducing copies of the original indictments, which listed the dates of the occurrences of the alleged prior offenses. But these indictments cannot be used in any manner to show the dates and final judgments of the alleged prior convictions. Further, they cannot serve as a vehicle to cure the variances that exist between the allegations in the current indictment and the proof as introduced.
Further, the testimony of Sgt. Jerry McElrath, fingerprint expert for the Memphis Police Department, cannot aid the State’s case here.
In an effort to establish the defendant’s identity, the State offered Sgt. McEl-rath and his records to show that this defendant had been arrested for shoplifting on certain dates, ostensibly the same dates as those alleged in the original indictments concerning the prior offenses.2 This officer’s testimony is in the same posture as the original indictments in the prior cases; neither his testimony nor the indictments can properly or validly establish any dates of convictions, or that final judgments were rendered in the cases in question.
The trial court recognized that the State’s proof left much to be desired. At one point, the court stated:
“Let me say this. I don’t know of any way that you can prove officially what happened in a criminal court other than through the minutes of that court.”
The district attorney general, conceding that, “there are some variances” and “I don’t understand how someone could have drafted this and come up with variances like this,” nevertheless argued that the variances were mere surplusage. The State, in its brief, refers to the errors as merely “technical” ones and argues that the proof is sufficient to show these prior convictions.
We disagree with the contentions made by the State. The defendant, among other things, is entitled to be apprised of the accurate dates of the prior convictions which the State intends to rely on for enhanced punishment purposes. Also, the State is obligated to prove that there was a final conviction for each of these prior offenses. These things were not done in this case. We sustain this assignment.
In her last assignment, the defendant says that the attorney general wrong[149]*149fully argued to the jury that this was the type of case where they could “do something to show the public in general, and to show — The court sustained the defendant’s objection to this line of argument, and we hold that this innocuous comment was harmless.
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate that portion of the court’s judgment finding the defendant to be a third offender of the shoplifting laws, and the enhanced punishment set by the court for the defendant is hereby set aside. We dismiss that portion of the indictment. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
We find that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of the present offense of shoplifting is conclusive. Therefore, we affirm her conviction for the present offense and remand this portion of the case to the trial court for a punishment trial. See Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956).
DWYER and BYERS, JJ., concur.