Reed v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Reed v. State

367 S.E.2d 809, 186 Ga. App. 539, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 410

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 13, 1988

Docket75303

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 367 S.E.2d 809 (Reed v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Reed v. State, 367 S.E.2d 809, 186 Ga. App. 539, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinions

Benham, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-31 (a)), and his sole enumeration on appeal is the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was knowingly in actual possession of the cocaine found in the car he was driving at the time of his arrest. We disagree and affirm.

The evidence produced at trial showed that on October 29, 1985, a Georgia State trooper who was operating a stationary radar unit on 1-285 clocked appellant driving a 1977 Camaro at 91 miles per hour. Using his blue lights and siren, the trooper pulled appellant’s vehicle over to the side of the road. He noticed appellant, the driver and sole occupant of the car, making “a leaning motion, a forward motion, which indicates that he is either reaching under his seat [or] he is coming out from under his seat with something. . . .” Appellant was asked to step out of the car, whereupon the trooper searched the area around the driver’s seat and found a “fairly big bag” containing individual plastic bags of what was later determined to be approximately 77 grams of a white powder, 53 grams of which was pure cocaine. At the time of his arrest and at trial, appellant denied ownership and knowledge of the cocaine, and also denied ownership of the car. In fact, the car did not belong to appellant, but had been loaned to him. Appellant contends that since the officer could not testify that he saw appellant with the cocaine on his person, and since the automobile was not his, he could not be considered to have been knowingly in actual possession of the contraband. “This argument is without merit, for we have held that a person who knowingly has direct physical con[540]*540trol over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of it. [Cit.] . . . Although [appellant] testified [he] knew nothing about the [cocaine], [his] credibility was a question for the jury. [Cit.] . . . [Moreover], we do not believe the legislature intended the phrase ‘actual possession’ ... to mean that a person would be holding it in his hand or have it physically on his person” (Evans v. State, 167 Ga. App. 396 (1) (306 SE2d 691) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534 (314 SE2d 910) (1984)), because to do so would be a physical impossibility under the drug trafficking statute provisions that allow for possession of hundreds and thousands of pounds of contraband. Id. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Evans v. State, supra.

Decided January 13, 1988 Rehearing denied March 25, 1988. Victoria D. Little, for appellant. Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Stephen C. Steele, [541]*541Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

[540]*540 Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Benham, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-31 (a)), and his sole enumeration on appeal is the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was knowingly in actual possession of the cocaine found in the car he was driving at the time of his arrest. We disagree and affirm.

The evidence produced at trial showed that on October 29, 1985, a Georgia State trooper who was operating a stationary radar unit on 1-285 clocked appellant driving a 1977 Camaro at 91 miles per hour. Using his blue lights and siren, the trooper pulled appellant’s vehicle over to the side of the road. He noticed appellant, the driver and sole occupant of the car, making “a leaning motion, a forward motion, which indicates that he is either reaching under his seat [or] he is coming out from under his seat with something. . . .” Appellant was asked to step out of the car, whereupon the trooper searched the area around the driver’s seat and found a “fairly big bag” containing individual plastic bags of what was later determined to be approximately 77 grams of a white powder, 53 grams of which was pure cocaine. At the time of his arrest and at trial, appellant denied ownership and knowledge of the cocaine, and also denied ownership of the car. In fact, the car did not belong to appellant, but had been loaned to him. Appellant contends that since the officer could not testify that he saw appellant with the cocaine on his person, and since the automobile was not his, he could not be considered to have been knowingly in actual possession of the contraband. “This argument is without merit, for we have held that a person who knowingly has direct physical con[540]*540trol over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of it. [Cit.] . . . Although [appellant] testified [he] knew nothing about the [cocaine], [his] credibility was a question for the jury. [Cit.] . . . [Moreover], we do not believe the legislature intended the phrase ‘actual possession’ ... to mean that a person would be holding it in his hand or have it physically on his person” (Evans v. State, 167 Ga. App. 396 (1) (306 SE2d 691) (1983), overruled on other grounds, Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534 (314 SE2d 910) (1984)), because to do so would be a physical impossibility under the drug trafficking statute provisions that allow for possession of hundreds and thousands of pounds of contraband. Id. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Evans v. State, supra.

Decided January 13, 1988 Rehearing denied March 25, 1988. Victoria D. Little, for appellant. Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Stephen C. Steele, [541]*541Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

[540]*540 Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

367 S.E.2d 809, 186 Ga. App. 539, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-state-gactapp-1988.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack