Reed v. Rhodes

455 F. Supp. 569
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 6, 1978
DocketC73-1300
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 455 F. Supp. 569 (Reed v. Rhodes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978).

Opinion

455 F.Supp. 569 (1978)

Robert Anthony REED, III, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
James A. RHODES et al., Defendants.

No. C73-1300.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.

February 6, 1978.

*570 *571 James L. Hardiman, Cleveland, Ohio, Nathaniel R. Jones, Gen. Counsel, NAACP, New York City, Thomas I. Atkins, Roxbury, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Mark O'Neill, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Ohio State Bd. of Ed., George I. Meisel, Charles F. Clarke, William C. Hartman, James P. Murphy, of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, John H. Bustamante, Cleveland City Bd. of Ed., Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.

REMEDIAL ORDER

BATTISTI, Chief Judge.

In its Remand Opinion entered today, this Court reconsidered and elaborated upon its findings of August 31, 1976 in light of Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977), and other recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Today's Opinion reaffirms the August 31, 1976 findings that defendants (City and State) discriminated against plaintiffs by numerous acts and omissions, the purpose and effect of which were to foster and maintain a segregated dual school system; that these numerous constitutional violations had systemwide impact entitling plaintiffs to a systemwide remedy; and that both the City and State defendants are constitutionally liable for having maintained a de jure segregated public school system. This Order is addressed to remedying that condition and restoring plaintiffs to substantially the position they would have occupied had these violations not occurred.

As stated in the Remand Opinion, the finding of systemwide de jure segregation mandates a comprehensive, systemwide plan of desegregation which eliminates the systematic pattern of schools substantially disproportionate in their racial composition to the maximum extent feasible. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). Recognizing that "[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and *572 solving these problems," Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (emphasis added), the Court ordered the defendants to prepare a desegregation plan which would satisfy this mandate. To aid the Court in evaluating the proposals, a Special Master and two experts were appointed, on September 14, 1976 and December 3, 1976 respectively. In addition, on December 7, 1976, the Court provided the defendants with Instructions and Guidelines. (Appendix A)

On February 10, 1977, the Court requested the United States Attorney General to intervene in this action to assist in formulating and implementing an appropriate remedy. The Attorney General declined to intervene as a party, but at his suggestion, on March 28, 1977, the United States of America, through the Attorney General, was designated to appear and participate in this action as amicus curiae.

The Cleveland and State defendants filed their proposed plans on January 18, 1977. On February 10, 1977 the Court rejected the Cleveland defendants' initial plan because it failed to comply with either the August 31, 1976 order or the December 7, 1976 guidelines. The Cleveland defendants were, therefore, ordered to submit another plan. On February 25, 1977 the Cleveland defendants filed their second proposed plan. Amendments to the second plan were filed on March 31, 1977 and April 18, 1977. On May 13, 1977, Cleveland defendants filed a third proposed plan to replace those previously filed.

In a May 27, 1977 report, the Special Master recommended that the faculty and staff of the Cleveland system be desegregated by September 19, 1977. That recommendation was adopted and implementation was effected as ordered. That Order, entered June 3, 1977, is attached as Appendix B and is incorporated herein as a part of the remedy in this case.

During June and July of 1977, the Special Master and the two Court-appointed experts held hearings on the State's proposed plan and the Cleveland defendants' third proposed plan. These lengthy hearings included testimony from six Cleveland Board of Education administrative personnel, five Cleveland Board Members, three State Board of Education employees, one expert who assisted in the development of the State Board of Education's desegregation plan, and one expert involved in the implementation of the Boston, Massachusetts desegregation plan.

Members of the general public were also invited to present testimony concerning recommendations for the final plan at public hearings before the Special Master, also in June and July of 1977. During the hearings, 41 representatives for 27 community organizations, a representative of the Cleveland Teachers Union, and five private individuals testified. In addition, a large number of written responses, containing supplemental information and recommendations, were made a part of the record of this case.

On October 27, 1977, the Special Master submitted recommendations which modified the State's plan and the Cleveland defendants' third plan where appropriate. The Special Master's recommendations were based upon evidence developed at hearings, supplemental information and recommendations submitted by civic organizations and concerned citizens of the City, and additional data and information obtained from the Cleveland School Superintendent. The following topics, all addressed by the Special Master, will be discussed in this Order:

I. Student Assignments
II. Education Programs and other Ancillary Relief
A. Testing
B. Reading Programs
C. Counselling and Career Guidance
D. Magnet Schools and Programs
E. Cooperation with Universities, Businesses and Cultural Institutions
F. Extracurricular Activities
G. Staff Development and Student Training in Human Relations
H. Student Rights
I. School-Community Relations
*573 III. Transportation
IV. Safety and Security
V. Defendants' Ability to Implement Plan
A. Management Perspective
B. Financial Considerations
VI. State's Role in Implementation

In many of these areas the Special Master recommended that the defendants be required to submit more detailed information and more specific remedial plans. Information regarding transportation plans and school closings, for example, had been requested from the defendants but has not yet been submitted in a completed form. As a result, certain parts of the desegregation plan, especially student assignments, will require some future modification.

The Court finds that the Master's recommendations are sound and well-considered and substantially adopts them, with the few modifications described infra. This plan allows the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation in consideration of the practicalities. In making modifications, the Court has considered and applied the principles Judge DeMascio stated in Bradley v. Milliken,

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Related

Reed v. Rhodes
179 F.3d 453 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago
588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Illinois, 1984)
Reed v. Rhodes
500 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ohio, 1980)

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455 F. Supp. 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-rhodes-ohnd-1978.