Reed v. MedStar Health, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedAugust 10, 2023
Docket1:20-cv-01984
StatusUnknown

This text of Reed v. MedStar Health, Inc. (Reed v. MedStar Health, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. MedStar Health, Inc., (D. Md. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ELSA REED, individually as representative, of a class of similarly situated persons and on behalf of the Medstar Health, Inc. ‘ Retirement Savings Plan, , * Plaintiff, v. * k CIVIL NO. JKB-20-1984 MEMBER CASE NO. JKB-20-2250 MEDSTAR HEALTH, INC., et ai., * Defendants. ok

MEMORANDUM Plaintiff Elsa Reed, individually and on behalf of the MedStar Health, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan (“Plan”) and a certified Class of participants and beneficiaries in the Plan, brings this consolidated class action against Defendants MedStar Health, Inc. (“MedStar”), the MedStar Health, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan Committee (‘Administrative Committee”), the Board of Directors of MedStar Health, Inc. (“Board”), and the unnamed members of the Administrative Committee and Board (“Does 1-20”) (collectively, “Defendants”), (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No 11.) Plaintiff alleges breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 1001, ef seg. (“ERISA”), failure to monitor fiduciaries and co-fiduciary breaches, and in the alternative, liability for knowing breach of trust for the alleged imprudent management of the Plan. (See generally id.) Presently pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand (“Motion to Strike”) (Mot. Strike, ECF No. 87); (2) Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the

Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Gerald Buetow Concerning His Fund Replacement Methodology (“Motion to Exclude Buetow”) (Mot. Excl. Buetow, ECF No. 88); (3) Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Michael Geist (“Motion to Exclude Geist”) (Mot. Excl. Geist, ECF No. 89); and (4) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (“Motion to Amend”) (Mot. Amend., ECF No. 92). All Motions are fully briefed, and no hearing is required. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum, a separate Order shall issue granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 87), denying Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Buetow (ECF No. 88), granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Geist (ECF No. 89), and granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 92). I Factual Background! Plaintiff Reed is a former employee of MedStar and a participant in the Plan, a qualified tax-deferred, defined contribution retirement plan. (Am. Compl. ff 1, 2, 9.) As of December 31, 2018, the Plan had 25,010 participants with account balances and assets totaling nearly $1.8 billion, placing it in the top 0.1% of all defined contribution plans by plan size. (id. 4.) MedStar, a Maryland non-profit corporation, is the Plan’s sponsor. (Ud. J] 5,10, 11.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “maintain the Plan, and are responsible for selecting, monitoring, and retaining the service provider(s) that provide investment, recordkeeping, and other administrative services.” (id. 5.) According to Plaintiff, the Board appointed “authorized representatives” of MedStar, including the Administrative Committee, as plan fiduciaries. (Jd. | 12.) Plaintiff alleges that MedStar, the Board, the members of the Board, the Administrative Committee, and the members

Given that there were no motions for summary judgment filed in this case, the Court derives the factual background from the allegations in the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11).

of the Administrative Committee are all fiduciaries under Sections 1002 and 1102 of ERISA. (Am. Compl. 4 12, 13.) : - A, The Plan The Plan is a single-employer 403(b) pian in which participants direct the investment of their contributions into various investment options offered by the Plan. (Am. Compl. J 19.) Each participant’s account is credited with the participant contributions, and earnings or losses thereon. (id.) The Plan pays Plan expenses from its assets, and the majority of administrative expenses are paid by participants as a reduction of investment income. (/d.) Each participant’s account is charged with the amount of distribution taken and an allocation of administrative expenses. (/d.) The available investment options for participants in the Plan include various mutual funds, guaranteed investment contracts, and a self-directed brokerage account. (/d.) Plaintiff states that during the Class Period, which spans from July 6, 2014 through July 6, 2020 (id. { 60), “Plan assets were held in trust by the Plan’s custodians, Fidelity Management Trust Company and Prudential Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company,” and that “[a]ll investments and asset allocations are performed through these trust instruments” (id. {| 22). Among other investments, the Plan lineup offers a suite of thirteen “target date funds.” □□□□ 24.) A target date fund is an investment vehicle that offers an all-in-one retirement solution through a portfolio of underlying funds that gradually shifts to become more conservative as the assumed target retirement year approaches. (/d.) Managers make changes to the allocation to stocks, bonds, and cash over time, and these shifts are referred to as a fund’s “glide path.” □□□□ According to Plaintiff, as unsophisticated investors, “many of the Plan participants, by default, concentrate their retirement assets in target date funds,” and that “by December 31, 2018, approximately 58% of the Plan’s assets were invested in the Active suite.” (id J 28.) The

. . ,

underlying mutual funds that target date fund managers choose to represent each asset class can be “actively” or “passively” managed. (Am. Compl. § 24.) Funds are “actively” managed when the investment manager is responsible for deciding which securities should be bought and sold and in which quantities. (/d. 926.) On the other hand, “passively” managed funds, or “Index funds,” invest according to an established and tracked market index. (/d.) B. Claims Against Defendants Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ decision to add the Active suite funds as investment options in the Plan, as opposed to the Index suite funds, illustrates a breach of fiduciary duties. (Am. Compl. J 26.) This is because the Active suite is “dramatically more expensive than the Index suite, and riskier in both its underlying holdings and its asset allocation strategy.” □□□□ Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]ctively managed funds tend to charge higher fees than index funds,” which “present an additional hurdle” to “provid[ing] value and compensat[ing] investors.” (id. 30.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he higher fee . . . represents an annual cost to investors that is over eight times higher than what shareholders of the corresponding Index fund pay” (id. { 36) and that “[hJigher fees significantly reduce retirement account balances over time” (id { 37). Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Morningstar? assigns a “purely mathematical measure” of performance for these funds, which “emphatically favors the Index suite.” Ud. J 39.) In large part, Plaintiff challénges the inclusion of three specific funds in the menu of target date funds available to Plan participants: (1) the Fidelity Freedom Funds (see id. J§ 24-41); (2) the John Hancock Disciplined Value Fund (see id. {§] 43-46); and (3) the Baron Small Cap Fund (see id. J] 47-49) (collectively, “Challenged Funds”). Plaintiff claims that she and the other

2 Morningstar is an “investment research firm that compiles and analyzes fund, stock, and general market data” that “issues risk ratings for publicly traded mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).” Morningstar Inc., INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/morningstarinc.asp (/ast visited Aug. 2, 2023).

participants of the Plan suffered losses as a result of Defendants’ inclusion of the Challenged Funds

as investment options in the Plan.

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Reed v. MedStar Health, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-medstar-health-inc-mdd-2023.