Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner

44 B.T.A. 573, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1310
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedMay 22, 1941
DocketDocket No. 101325.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 44 B.T.A. 573 (Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 573, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1310 (bta 1941).

Opinions

[574]*574OPINION.

HaRRon:

The sole question is whether in the computation of the surtax imposed by section 14 of the Revenue Act of 1936 petitioner is entitled under section 27 (f) to a dividends paid credit of $54,130.38, the amount of its earned surplus at the time of the transfer of all its assets to the new corporation. Under section 14 undistributed net income, on which the surtax is based, is computed by subtracting from adjusted net income the “dividends paid credit provided in section 27.” The provisions of section 27, in so far as pertinent to the present question, are set forth in the margin.1 In the compu[575]*575tation of the surtax imposed by section 14 on its corporation income and excess profits tax return for the taxable year petitioner took a dividends paid credit of $54,130.38, under the assumption that the distribution of the stock of the new corporation in exchange for its own stock, and in liquidation, was a distribution which was properly chargeable to accumulated earnings within subsection '(f) of section 27. In the statement attached to the deficiency notice respondent disallowed the full amount of the dividends' paid credit taken by petitioner.

Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to any dividends paid credit under subsection (f). He argues that no gain to petitioner’s stockholders from the receipt of the shares of stock of the new corporation was recognized by law; that thus under section 115 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1936 the distribution by petitioner of such stock did not constitute “a distribution! of earnings or profits of any corporation”; and that thus no part of such stock distributed by petitioner was “properly chargeable to the earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913” within the meaning of subsection (f). The provisions of section 115 (h), in so far as pertinent to the present question, are set forth in the margin.2

Respondent also makes the somewhat related argument that on the exchange by petitioner of all its assets for the shares of stock of the new corporation the earned surplus of petitioner was not convertible into capital of the new corporation, but still remained earned surplus in the hands of the new corporation, and that thus no part of the stock of the new corporation subsequently distributed by petitioner to its stockholders in complete liquidation was properly chargeable to earnings or profits. In support of this argument he cites Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 Fed. (2d) 931; certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 667; United States v. Kauffman, 62 Fed. (2d) 1045; Murchison v. Commissioner, 76 Fed. (2d) 641.

In our opinion respondent’s determination is correct.

Under section 27 (f) not all distributions in liquidation are to be treated as a taxable dividend paid for the purposes of computing the dividends paid credit. Only amounts distributed or the part of such distribution which is “properly chargeable to the earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913”, shall be treated as a taxable dividend paid. Petitioner has not presented any argu[576]*576ment whatever to support a contention that the distribution of the stock of the new corporation was such distribution as is specified in section 27 (f) to be the kind of distribution which shall be treated as a taxable dividend paid. Petitioner makes a “philosophic” argument, for want of a better term, that it ought to be entitled to a dividends paid credit because it distributed all that it retained in a complete liquidation; namely,, stock of a new corporation received in an exchange of property for stock pursuant to a plan of reorganization. Petitioner makes a wholly untenable argument that the holding in Credit Alliance Corporation, 42 B. T. A. 1020, supports a determination in its favor in this case, completely ignoring the great difference in facts in that case where the distributing corporation distributed its cash and property in a complete liquidation, and no distribution of stock of another corporation, a party to a reorganization, was involved. In reality petitioner has made no analysis whatsoever of its case and it comes to this Board with no more than a plea that the respondent’s determination be set aside. The foregoing is pointed out to make it clear that petitioner has presented little or no authority for its general contention. It is hardly necessary to point out that the Credit Alliance Corporation case is distinguishable on the facts and that the holding there made is in no way controlling here.

Furthermore, petitioner has stipulated that all of the parties concerned in the exchanges made pursuant to a plan of reorganization treated the exchanges as not involving gain or loss. Petitioner did not report gain or loss from the exchange of its assets for stock of the new corporation and petitioner’s stockholders did not report gain or loss from receipt of stock of the new corporation in exchange for petitioner’s stock.

The first step taken by petitioner pursuant to a plan of reorganization was to exchange all of its assets solely for the stock of the new corporation. Under section 112 (b) (4) no gain or loss was recognized by law. The second step, taken a few months later, was the exchange of the stock of the new corporation for petitioner’s own stock, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization. No gain or loss was recognizable at law upon this exchange under section 112 (b) (3). Section 115 (h) deals specifically with the kind of distribution with which we are concerned here. It refers to a distribution by one corporation of stock in another corporation and it provides that such distribution “shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits of any corporation—(1) if no gain to such distributee from the receipt of such stock * * * was recognized by law, * * (Italics supplied.) Clearly, the distribution by petitioner of the stock of the new corporation to its stockholders falls squarely within [577]*577the terms of section 115 (h). It follows that no part of the distribution in question is “properly chargeable to the earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,1913,” and no part of the distribution can be treated as a taxable dividend paid under section 27 (f). In short, in our opinion, section 27 (f) is not applicable to the distribution of stock involved in this case.

It is hardly a possibility that section 27 (f) was drafted without cognizance of the provisions of section 115 (h), which is entitled “Effect on Earnings and Promts of Distributions of Stock.” It is clear from the report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany the Revenue Bill of 1936 3 that section 115 (h) of the 1936 Act was drafted to make clear the rule at law of the effect on earnings and profits of a distribution of stock in connection with a reorganization on which distribution gain is not recognized. The Committee stated in its report that “earnings- or profits are not diminished by such distribution (of stock).” Furthermore, if the petitioner’s contention could be sustained, such result would do violence to the real purpose of section 27, because a corporation could obtain a dividends paid credit each year by the device of a reorganization and a distribution of stock of the new corporation to its stockholders without reducing its accumulated earnings and profits.

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Related

Great Lakes Coco-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner
133 F.2d 953 (Seventh Circuit, 1943)
Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner
44 B.T.A. 573 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
44 B.T.A. 573, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-drug-co-v-commissioner-bta-1941.