Redmond II v. Swanson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedSeptember 30, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-12036
StatusUnknown

This text of Redmond II v. Swanson (Redmond II v. Swanson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redmond II v. Swanson, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION CHARLES REDMOND, II,

Petitioner, CASE NO. 2:20-CV-12036 v. HONORABLE PAUL D. BORMAN CHRISTOPHER SWANSON,

Respondent. _____________________________/ OPINION AND ORDER (1) DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND (3) DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL I. Introduction Charles Redmond, II (“Petitioner”), a pre-trial detainee confined at the Genesee County Jail, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his pending state criminal proceedings in which he is charged with multiple felonies, including human trafficking, kidnapping, and weapons offenses. See People v. Charles Redmond, II, Genesee Co. Cir. Ct. No. 18-043096-FC, http://www.co.genesee.mi.us/roaccsinq/ROACase.aspx?CASE= 18043096&CASETYP =FC&FILENAME=C092505456 (accessed Sept. 25, 2020). In his pleadings, which are somewhat difficult to follow, Petitioner seems to challenge the state court’s authority, jurisdiction, and procedures, as well as his continued confinement in state custody. He raises the following claims: (1) he is being held and

charged with capital offenses under the creation of an unconstitutional bill of attainder; (2) he was denied his due process right to full disclosure in order to fully participate in the fraudulent representations of state judicial procedures; and, (3) he

was denied the opportunity to present a constitutional diversity claim in circuit court and the court refused to acknowledge his jural instruments of constitutional deprived rights. (ECF No. 1, Petition.) For the reasons set forth herein, Court dismisses without

prejudice the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, denies a certificate of appealability, and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. II. Discussion Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to conduct a

preliminarily review of a federal habeas case and to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” If, after initial consideration, the Court

determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court must summarily dismiss the petition. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out”

petitions that lack merit on their face). Cases subject to dismissal under Rule 4 include 2 those that raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994);

Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). A state pretrial detainee may bring a habeas action in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to demand enforcement of the state’s affirmative constitutional

obligation to bring him promptly to trial or to raise double jeopardy issues, but may not generally seek habeas relief to forestall state prosecution altogether. Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489-91 (1973); Christian v. Wellington,

739 F.3d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 2014). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court may not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. The rule is “designed to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts,

particularly where the party to the federal case may fully litigate his claim before the state court.” Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted).

Thus, while 28 U.S.C. § 2241 establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts to consider pretrial habeas petitions, the courts should abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the

merits in the state courts or by other state procedures available to the petitioner. 3 Christian, 739 F.3d at 298; Atkins v. People of the State of Mich., 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981). A federal court must abstain from enjoining a state criminal

proceeding if: (1) the state proceeding is ongoing; (2) an important state interest is implicated; and, (3) the petitioner has an adequate opportunity in the state judicial proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex Co. Ethics Comm. v. Garden

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1996). The three factors that support Younger abstention are present in this case. First,

as acknowledged by Petitioner, there is an ongoing state criminal prosecution pending in the Genesee County Circuit Court. In that proceeding, the court has arraigned Petitioner, conducted multiple hearings on various motions, ordered a competency evaluation (awaiting report), and scheduled another hearing for October 14, 2020.

Second, state criminal proceedings clearly involve important state interests. Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 954 (6th Cir. 2000). Third, the state court proceedings provide an adequate opportunity for Petitioner to raise any constitutional challenges.

If he does so, and the state trial court denies or otherwise fails to consider his claims, Petitioner may pursue an appeal and/or seek collateral review in the state courts as provided by Michigan law.

Abstention is thus appropriate unless of one of the three exceptions to the 4 Younger abstention doctrine applies. Those exceptions are: (1) “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue,

Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); (2) “the challenged statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); or, (3) there is “an extraordinarily

pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975). These exceptions are interpreted narrowly. Zalman, 802 F.2d at 205. Additionally, even if extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant federal court

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
420 U.S. 592 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Kugler v. Helfant
421 U.S. 117 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Moore v. Sims
442 U.S. 415 (Supreme Court, 1979)
McFarland v. Scott
512 U.S. 849 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Theodore R. Allen v. E. P. Perini, Superintendent
424 F.2d 134 (Sixth Circuit, 1970)
Atkins v. People Of Michigan
644 F.2d 543 (Sixth Circuit, 1981)
Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County
668 F.3d 804 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Dewey W. Carson v. Luella Burke
178 F.3d 434 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Steven Craig Cooper v. Larry E. Parrish
203 F.3d 937 (Sixth Circuit, 2000)
Duniek Christian v. Randell Wellington
739 F.3d 294 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Zalman v. Armstrong
802 F.2d 199 (Sixth Circuit, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
Redmond II v. Swanson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redmond-ii-v-swanson-mied-2020.