J-S15026-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
GREGORY REDMOND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : WENDY’S RESTAURANT : No. 3212 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 251002587
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 4, 2026
Gregory Redmond (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order
dismissing his complaint against Wendy’s Restaurant (Wendy’s), in which he
alleged due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Because we agree that Appellant’s action was frivolous,
we affirm.
On October 23, 2025, Appellant, pro se, filed a petition for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and a civil complaint against Wendy’s. In the
complaint, Appellant averred that on October 18, 2025, he was seated inside
Wendy’s, waiting for his wife to join him for breakfast. See Complaint,
10/18/25, at 2 (unnumbered). Appellant alleged that a security guard
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15026-26
approached and informed Appellant that he needed to buy something in order
to remain in the restaurant. Id. Then, according to Appellant, the security
guard reached toward his gun and told Appellant that he had to leave Wendy’s
or he would be arrested. Id. Appellant alleged Wendy’s violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Id. at 3 (unnumbered).1
On November 24, 2025, finding that Appellant’s action was frivolous,
the trial court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s complaint. Order,
11/24/25 (citing Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1)). This timely appeal followed. 2
On appeal, Appellant generally claims the trial court erred or abused its
discretion by dismissing his complaint without a hearing. See Appellant’s Brief
at 3 (unnumbered).
Appellant’s handwritten appellate brief is largely illegible. We
acknowledge Appellant’s pro se status in this matter. “Although this Court is
willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant.” Smithson v.
Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself
1 Wendy’s did not respond to Appellant’s complaint, nor did it file an appellee’s
brief. From the record, it is unclear whether Appellant properly served Wendy’s with the complaint.
2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of
expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Wilkins v. Marsico, 903
A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2006).
From what we are able to discern, and construing the brief’s contents
liberally, Appellant’s argument includes a series of bald assertions that
Wendy’s violated Appellant’s due process rights by telling him he could not sit
in the restaurant without making a purchase. These assertions are not
supported by relevant case law, citations, or clear argument. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (providing that the argument shall include “such discussion and
citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). 3 “This Court will not act as
counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Bombar
v. West Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007). We could deem
Appellant’s claim waived on this basis. See Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d
21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “arguments which are not appropriately
developed are waived.”).
Nevertheless, we address Appellant’s argument to the extent we are
able to discern his claim. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1)
provides as follows:
3 Appellant’s brief then detours to a discussion of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the importance of an unbiased judiciary, absent any application of these principles to his underlying claims. Appellant appears to suggest that the trial court exhibited bias simply by dismissing his complaint. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-11 (unnumbered). Appellant has made no concrete allegation that the trial court displayed bias or prejudice against him.
-3- J-S15026-26
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.
Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). “A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as
one that lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id., note (citation
omitted). “Under Rule 240(j), an action is frivolous if, on its face, it does not
set forth a valid cause of action.” Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d
352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Our “review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
240(j)(1) is limited to a determination of whether an appellant’s constitutional
rights have been violated and whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law.” Bell v. Mayview State Hosp., 853 A.2d 1058,
1060 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Appellant asserts he was deprived of due process when he was forced
to leave Wendy’s. “In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state
action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property is not
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law.” Washington v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.,
306 A.3d 263, 296 (Pa. 2023) (emphasis added; citation and quotation marks
omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that
the amount of process that is due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 … (1976).
-4- J-S15026-26
This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.
Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 897 (Pa. 2020) (some
citations omitted).
Instantly, the trial court cogently addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
[Appellant] was not subjected to a deprivation of his rights by the government or a state actor, as Wendy’s [is] a private entity engaged in the business of selling food. As such, [Appellant’s] due process rights[,] as set forth in the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions[,] were not implicated.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/26, at 3. We agree with the trial court. Because this
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J-S15026-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
GREGORY REDMOND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : WENDY’S RESTAURANT : No. 3212 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 251002587
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 4, 2026
Gregory Redmond (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order
dismissing his complaint against Wendy’s Restaurant (Wendy’s), in which he
alleged due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Because we agree that Appellant’s action was frivolous,
we affirm.
On October 23, 2025, Appellant, pro se, filed a petition for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and a civil complaint against Wendy’s. In the
complaint, Appellant averred that on October 18, 2025, he was seated inside
Wendy’s, waiting for his wife to join him for breakfast. See Complaint,
10/18/25, at 2 (unnumbered). Appellant alleged that a security guard
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15026-26
approached and informed Appellant that he needed to buy something in order
to remain in the restaurant. Id. Then, according to Appellant, the security
guard reached toward his gun and told Appellant that he had to leave Wendy’s
or he would be arrested. Id. Appellant alleged Wendy’s violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Id. at 3 (unnumbered).1
On November 24, 2025, finding that Appellant’s action was frivolous,
the trial court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s complaint. Order,
11/24/25 (citing Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1)). This timely appeal followed. 2
On appeal, Appellant generally claims the trial court erred or abused its
discretion by dismissing his complaint without a hearing. See Appellant’s Brief
at 3 (unnumbered).
Appellant’s handwritten appellate brief is largely illegible. We
acknowledge Appellant’s pro se status in this matter. “Although this Court is
willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant.” Smithson v.
Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself
1 Wendy’s did not respond to Appellant’s complaint, nor did it file an appellee’s
brief. From the record, it is unclear whether Appellant properly served Wendy’s with the complaint.
2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
-2- J-S15026-26
in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of
expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Wilkins v. Marsico, 903
A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2006).
From what we are able to discern, and construing the brief’s contents
liberally, Appellant’s argument includes a series of bald assertions that
Wendy’s violated Appellant’s due process rights by telling him he could not sit
in the restaurant without making a purchase. These assertions are not
supported by relevant case law, citations, or clear argument. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (providing that the argument shall include “such discussion and
citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). 3 “This Court will not act as
counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Bombar
v. West Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007). We could deem
Appellant’s claim waived on this basis. See Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d
21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “arguments which are not appropriately
developed are waived.”).
Nevertheless, we address Appellant’s argument to the extent we are
able to discern his claim. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1)
provides as follows:
3 Appellant’s brief then detours to a discussion of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the importance of an unbiased judiciary, absent any application of these principles to his underlying claims. Appellant appears to suggest that the trial court exhibited bias simply by dismissing his complaint. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-11 (unnumbered). Appellant has made no concrete allegation that the trial court displayed bias or prejudice against him.
-3- J-S15026-26
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.
Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). “A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as
one that lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id., note (citation
omitted). “Under Rule 240(j), an action is frivolous if, on its face, it does not
set forth a valid cause of action.” Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d
352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Our “review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
240(j)(1) is limited to a determination of whether an appellant’s constitutional
rights have been violated and whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law.” Bell v. Mayview State Hosp., 853 A.2d 1058,
1060 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Appellant asserts he was deprived of due process when he was forced
to leave Wendy’s. “In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state
action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property is not
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law.” Washington v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.,
306 A.3d 263, 296 (Pa. 2023) (emphasis added; citation and quotation marks
omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that
the amount of process that is due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 … (1976).
-4- J-S15026-26
This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state.
Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 897 (Pa. 2020) (some
citations omitted).
Instantly, the trial court cogently addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
[Appellant] was not subjected to a deprivation of his rights by the government or a state actor, as Wendy’s [is] a private entity engaged in the business of selling food. As such, [Appellant’s] due process rights[,] as set forth in the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions[,] were not implicated.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/26, at 3. We agree with the trial court. Because this
incident involved no government action, Appellant’s claim lacked an arguable
basis in law and in fact. See generally Ocasio, supra. Thus, Appellant’s
-5- J-S15026-26
action was frivolous, and the trial court properly dismissed the action under
Rule 240(j)(1).4, 5
Order affirmed. Application for Relief denied.
Date: 6/4/2026
4 In his appellate brief, Appellant vaguely argues (without citation) that Wendy’s is a public accommodation. Appellant has not properly developed this claim, nor did he raise it in his original complaint. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Even if Appellant had preserved this claim, we would conclude it lacks merits for the reasons set forth by the trial court. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/26, at 3 (defining “public accommodation” for purposes of a discrimination claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 953), 4 (concluding Appellant failed to allege he was asked to leave Wendy’s for a discriminatory reason).
5 On April 7, 2026, Appellant filed in this Court a pro se application for relief,
which he titled a “Motion for Summary Judgment.” Therein, Appellant restates the facts he alleged in his complaint, and asserts he “was discriminated against on the bas[i]s of race or sex or civil right.” Application for Relief, 4/7/26, at 2 (unnumbered). We deny Appellant’s application for relief for the reasons stated in this memorandum.
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