Redfearn v. Rankins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 6, 2023
• Docket: 22-6061
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 22-6061 Document: 010110793903 Date Filed: 01/06/2023 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 6, 2023 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JESSE DEAN REDFEARN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v. No. 22-6061 (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00999-J) WILLIAM CHRIS RANKINS, (W.D. Okla.) acting Warden,

Respondent - Appellee. _________________________________

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY _________________________________

Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Jesse Dean Redfearn, an Oklahoma prisoner, seeks a certificate of appealability

(COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We

deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Mr. Redfearn of first-degree rape and kidnapping. The state

district court sentenced him to life imprisonment on each count. The victim, T.A., did

 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) Scott Crow was replaced by William Chris Rankins as Acting Warden.

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-6061 Document: 010110793903 Date Filed: 01/06/2023 Page: 2

not appear at Mr. Redfearn’s trial to testify, but, over Mr. Redfearn’s objection, the trial

court admitted the transcript of her earlier testimony at the preliminary hearing.

On appeal before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA),

Mr. Redfearn argued that the admission of T.A.’s preliminary hearing testimony violated

his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain the convictions. The OCCA rejected these arguments and affirmed his

convictions and sentences. Mr. Redfearn petitioned for habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Adopting the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court

denied Mr. Redfearn’s petition, concluding he did not overcome the standards set forth in

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for federal relief from state

judgments.

Mr. Redfearn now seeks a COA to press those two issues before this court.

DISCUSSION

To appeal the denial of his § 2254 petition, Mr. Redfearn must obtain a COA by

“showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Our consideration of a COA request incorporates

AEDPA’s “deferential treatment of state court decisions.” Dockins v. Hines,

374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, to obtain habeas relief, “a state

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

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comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

We first consider Mr. Redfearn’s argument under the Confrontation Clause.

Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), testimonial hearsay, such as the

transcript of preliminary hearing testimony entered into evidence in this case, is

admissible “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has

had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” For a witness to be “unavailable,” the state

must show that “the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain [the

witness’s] presence at trial.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).

The OCCA concluded the state presented “detailed evidence” that was “more than

adequate to support the trial court’s findings regarding the victim’s unavailability and the

[s]tate’s due diligence.” Aplt. App. vol. 1 at 114. To wit, the state presented the

testimony of the director of its victim witness center and an investigator for the district

attorney’s office regarding their efforts to secure T.A.’s appearance at trial. The

witnesses testified they had traveled to the location T.A. normally stays but were unable

to find her on the day of trial. The witnesses also testified that T.A. “had never been

definitive about testifying at trial.” Id. at 147.

Mr. Redfearn argues the evidence established that “T.A. was absent by her own

choice,” Aplt. Second Am. Combined Opening Br. and Appl. for COA at 7 (internal

quotation marks omitted), and that the OCCA’s conclusion that she was unavailable was

contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law. But “when a witness disappears

before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might

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have taken to secure the witness’ presence, but the Sixth Amendment does not require the

prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” Hardy v.

Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 71–72 (2011) (citation omitted). Mr. Redfearn does not identify any

specific steps the prosecution should have but failed to take to secure T.A.’s in-person

trial testimony. Even if he did, AEDPA “does not permit a federal court to overturn a

state court’s decision on the question of unavailability merely because the federal court

identifies additional steps that might have been taken.” Id. at 72. No reasonable juror

could debate the district court’s conclusion that AEDPA does not entitle Mr. Redfearn to

relief on this issue.

Mr. Redfearn also seeks a COA to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction. When reviewing for evidentiary sufficiency, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The

OCCA concluded “[t]he circumstantial evidence supporting the charge of rape against

[Mr.] Redfearn was extremely strong.” Aplt. App. vol. 1 at 123. This evidence included

DNA evidence, testimony from the investigating detectives, and recordings of

incriminating statements Mr. Redfearn made in phone calls from jail. Mr. Redfearn does

not articulate any specific deficiency in the state’s case, nor does he provide any basis to

conclude the OCCA’s decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law.

So, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s denial of habeas relief on this

issue.

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CONCLUSION

We deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge